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ABSTRACT 
Defense policy formulation has evolved significantly since 1940, yet these 
processes have a constitutional foundation.   This study described the process that the 
U.S. government uses to meet its security challenges.   This study examined the 
interdependent relationships between the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and 
the Army Force Management System (AFMS); it analyzed the process the Army uses 
to determine the forces and equipment needed to meet the civilian leadership‘s 
guidance for national security.  It explored this process ―From the Preamble to the 
Foxhole‖.  This study chronicled how Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry (retired) 
was instrumental in the development of a systematic approach to managing change 
across the Army in the 1980s.  The histories of many independent projects are 
portrayed in this study which comprised this effort.  Chief among these were the 
development of: the Army Force Management System (AFMS), the U.S. Army Force 
Management School (USAFMS), the Mother of All Charts (MOAC), and the role of 
the Inspector General of the Army.   This study demonstrated how civil-military 
relations are critical to defense policy determination.  Lastly, it provided some future 
policy considerations that demonstrate the interrelationships between force 
management and national security policy development.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War challenged traditional security relationships 
worldwide.  Many historians claimed that the United States won the Cold War.  
However, it is not yet clear what victory will mean for the United States.  
Globalization has increased economic interdependence and created new forms of 
competition and risks.  The relative power of the United States is declining.  
American sources of this power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic 
[DIME]) are increasingly threatened around the world.   The United States has 
become emblematic of the good and bad of capitalism and a target for the 
disenfranchised seeking revenge.  The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated 
the depth of enmity that extremists hold towards the United States.   
Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have mobilized a diverse group of 
enemies against the United States.  Belligerent actions have further reduced the 
relative diplomatic, military, and economic power of the United States.  The U.S. 
―war on terrorism‖ or ―war on terror‖ has become the ―long war‖ and more recently 
―overseas contingency operations‖.1  Despite these name changes, the United States 
                                                 
1Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, ―Global War on Terror is Given New Name,‖ Washington Post, 
March 25, 2009. http://ebird.osd.mil/cgi-bin/ebird/displaydata.pl?Requested=/ebfiles/e 200903256 
65616. html (accessed April 3, 2009).  
2 
has not mobilized as a nation for war.
2
   The U.S. military has been at war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for a longer sustained period than ever before in U.S. history.  The 
United States has mobilized for war with conscription and industrial reorganization in 
the past.  Conversely, the U.S. military forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
part of an all volunteer force, or professional standing army.   Additionally, the nation 
has not mobilized its economic or industrial base to support the war effort.   In effect, 
the government has initiated and conducted a largely unpopular war without 
impacting the daily lives of the majority of its citizens.  A generation of the nation‘s 
youth has not been conscripted or sent off to war involuntarily, and factory workers 
have not been retrained to produce materials required for war.  The combination of 
these two unprecedented events - longest sustained conflict and lack of full war 
mobilization - provides an opportunity to examine a timely issue in strategic security 
studies. 
 Coordinated government efforts, whether a comprehensive approach or a 
whole-of-government approach, are required to reverse the declining power trends 
and prepare the nation to overcome emerging threats.
3
  While many journalists, 
                                                 
2In accordance with Kate Turabian‘s A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and 
Dissertations 7
th
 Edition, the United States can be abbreviated U.S. when used as an adjective or 
spelled out(for a more formal tone), page 337.  It must be spelled out when used as a noun.  Example: 
the U.S. Army defends the United States. This convention will be used in this study. 
3The two terms ―whole of government‖ and ―comprehensive approach‖ have different 
implications.  A comprehensive approach is considered broader than a whole of government approach. 
George W. Bush on December 7, 2005, National Security Presidential Directive- 44 (NSPD 44) 
designated the Secretary of State as lead for reconstruction and stability operations and established the 
―whole of government‖ planning initiative.  Available at ftp.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html; 
(accessed 6 OCT 2009).  Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations dated 6 October 2008, page 1-5 
established that a ―comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the 
departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
3 
scholars, and members of society at large may agree that something should be done to 
counter emerging global threats, what to do or how to accomplish this is less clear.  
Strong opinions support recommendations for change on nearly every issue.  
Providing ―security‖ to national citizens becomes an essentially contested concept at 
nearly every level.
4
 
Power within the government is intentionally diffused - making significant 
change very difficult without broad popular support.   Both the legislative and 
executive branches of government share responsibility for developing national 
security policy.  Collectively, the colossal government bureaucracy and its complex 
procedures for effecting change are formidable.   However difficult it may be to 
develop a comprehensive security strategy, maintaining national security should be a 
principal public interest and is of grave public importance.  Therefore, understanding 
the process used to identify and mitigate national security challenges should also be 
of critical interest.  
 This study describes and assesses the process that the U.S. government uses 
to meet its current security challenges.   Since 1986, the Joint Strategic Planning 
System (JSPS) codified how national priorities are communicated to the Department 
of Defense (DoD) and translated into military requirements.  The JSPS is the formal 
                                                                                                                                           
organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a 
shared goal.‖  
4
Fierke, K. M., Critical Approaches to International Security (Mauldin, MA: Polity Press, 
2007), 99; and, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity, Revised Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 1998), 3, 227.  Both 
provide greater treatment of the contested nature of determining and providing national security. 
4 
process the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) utilizes to meet his statutory 
requirements for defense planning.
5
   This study concentrates on the interdependent 
relationships between the JSPS and the Army Force Management System (AFMS) to 
analyze the process the Army uses to determine the forces and equipment needed to 
meet security challenges.   
The Army has been transforming or modernizing continually since its 
founding 14 June 1775.   The historiography on U.S. military history is rich with 
comprehensive accounts of Army battles and campaigns, technological changes in 
weaponry, and doctrinal advances.  Two related works by Edward Coffman are 
particularly noteworthy for their insights into changes in the Army; The Old Army 
and The Regulars detailed the evolution of the professional Army from 1784 to 
1941.
6
  His analysis is augmented with reminiscences from soldiers of all ranks, and 
their family members, which provide valuable firsthand accounts of what life was like 
within the Army.  He argued that throughout the 19
th
 century "intervals of peace took 
up a far greater number of years than did war."
7
   Further, the nation has relied on a 
small peacetime Army which has been augmented by volunteers in time of war.  He 
                                                 
5
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B, dated 12 December 
2008.  ―The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in titles 6, 10, 22 and 50 
of the United States Code (USC).‖A-1, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf 
(accessed February 15, 2009). 
6
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-
1898 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and, Edward M. Coffman, The 
Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
 
 
7
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-
1898 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vii. 
5 
described the first half of the century as "the days of small things - less money, fewer 
people, more inconveniences, and downright hardship."
8
  He traced the beginnings of 
the professional Army to the founding of West Point in 1802.  West Point provided 
technical engineering training that facilitated civil works projects, mapping and 
exploration, artillery employment, and the construction, attack, and defense of 
fortifications.
9
  In the War of 1812, the nation again relied on volunteers lead by 
Winfield Scott against the British in Niagara and Andrew Jackson in New Orleans.
10
  
Subsequent generations of soldiers defended frontier outposts as the nation expanded 
west in pursuit of Manifest Destiny.  In 1846, volunteers under Winfield Scott 
successfully executed a complex expeditionary campaign into Mexico.
11
  The Civil 
War, during the 1860s, marked a dramatic shift in military capabilities and tactics.  
On both sides of the conflict mobilization efforts - and the Army size - far exceeded 
previous levels.   Railroads made possible the rapid movement of supplies and troops 
across previously unimaginable distances.  The lethality of weapons also increased –
which led to new tactics.  Together these changes required unprecedented 
                                                 
 
8
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-
1898 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vi. 
9
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-
1898 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11; Also, West Point was the only 
engineering school in the nation until 1824.  Available from: http://www.usma.edu/bicentennial 
/history/history_impact.asp; (accessed 18 February 2010). 
 
10
See also: Harry Cole, The War of 1812 (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 
1965); Donald Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Champaign, Illinois: The University of 
Illinois Press, 1990), 86, 203; and,  Robert Remini, The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew Jackson and 
America's First Military Victory (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 111, 116. 
 
11
See also John S.D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico1846-1848 
(New York, New York: Random House Publishing, 1989 and 2000), 216. 
6 
management efforts.
12
   During the period of reconstruction following the war the 
Army returned to pre-conflict strength levels.   In 1898, the Army again relied on 
volunteers to fight in Cuba and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War.
13
    In 
1917, when the United States declared War with Germany, advances in artillery and 
machine guns increased lethality on the battlefield.  The Army Pershing led across 
Europe did not remotely resemble the militiamen Washington led against the 
British.
14
    
Walter Kretchik in his 2001 dissertation entitled, Peering Through the Mist: 
Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000, also provided a detailed 
review of Army doctrinal changes since the founding of the Continental Army.  His 
work documented the changes in technology, societal values, and the external 
environment that influenced change in the Army throughout 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries.   
Collectively, these factors influenced the development of Army doctrine.  He argued 
that American culture evolved from a diverse society that differed greatly from the 
European origins of its members.  Their experiences in America shaped their beliefs 
that had lasting impact upon the limitations on the Army in the Constitution.  British 
                                                 
 
12
In 1801, the Army Strength was no more than 2579. By 1865 more than a million soldiers 
were in the Union Army alone.  By 1875, strength again was reduced to 25,000. Edward M. Coffman, 
The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 12, 215. 
13
Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 26. "The Old Army was gone...The Spanish-
American War had destroyed forever the quiet home life and projected us into the role of a world 
power which has developed into the tragic responsibilities with which we are laden today."  
 
14
Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 2, 142. Coffman devotes a chapter to the changes in 
the early 20th century promoted by Elihu Root, Arthur Conger, and Douglas MacArthur.   
7 
soldiers‘ harsh treatment of the colonials left a lasting distrust of large standing 
armies.
15
  His analysis of the roles of the Army in the 19
th
 Century American society 
corresponds with Coffman‘s earlier analysis.  However, Kretchik placed a much 
greater emphasis on the role of culture in determining doctrine.  After defining the 
doctrine and its evolution, he then analyzed the appropriateness of the doctrine to the 
major Army operations‘ success.   
Despite the volumes of work that chronicle these changes - technological 
changes in weaponry, doctrinal advances, and force structure- little documentation 
exists to explain the comprehensive management of change within the Army.  This 
study reveals how in the 1970s and 1980s the Army developed a system to manage 
change.  It includes an examination of the contemporary management philosophies 
that influenced organizational behavior in force management and defense strategic 
planning.  While the topics of management and defense planning are larger than can 
be addressed in one study, this study provides a basis for further analysis of national 
security objectives, policies, and issues.  
As part of the analysis of the AFMS, this study details the events that led to 
the creation of the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia.  Force management is the capstone process to establish and field mission-
ready Army organizations.  The School was established as the Army‘s central 
educational institution for preparing senior analysts and leaders for assignment in the 
                                                 
15
Walter Kretchik, Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 
1775-2000 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 2001), 22, 35. Available through ProQuest, 
UMI, Ann Arbor, Michigan, UMI Number 3018507.  
8 
force management community worldwide.   USAFMS trains the specialists that 
manage the Army bureaucracy to provide the resources needed to meet our national 
threats.  Many defense department primers and reference books describe these 
detailed processes.  One of the most comprehensive is How the Army Runs: a Senior 
Leader Reference Book, written by the USAFMS.
16
   Lieutenant General (retired) 
Richard G. Trefry is the Program Manager of this school. 
  Trefry also developed a series of charts somewhat whimsically entitled ―The 
Mother of All Charts‖ (MOAC) that traces several Army force management themes 
since 1940.  These charts consolidate a diverse collection of information that provides 
insight into Army force management.  Collectively, these charts reveal trends and 
some of the unintended consequences of defense policy changes.  The MOAC 
currently contains twenty seven themes and numbers over 100 separate charts.  
Strategic leaders, both military and civilian, utilize this robust display for reference 
during conferences and planning sessions.  Together, these charts represent an 
impressive amount of information.  These charts are supported by a database that has 
been digitized and contains a wealth of documents relating to Army force 
management since 1940.  This study also provides the first documentation of the 
development of these charts and the creation of the USAFMS.  Together, these 
histories provide a starting point to examine the rationale behind the broader topics of 
Army force management and formulation of national security policy.   
                                                 
16
How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook (Government Printing Office, 2007): 
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/Htar2007.html; (accessed February 17, 2009). 
9 
 Analysts must understand the JSPS and AFMS before they consider the 
impacts of current military operations on equipment, personnel, organizations, and 
strategy.  This study examines the civil–military relations that are embedded in both 
of these systems.  Civilian policy decisions, and the resources available to implement 
them, have serious implications for future U.S. national security.  While there is an 
impressive body of literature concerning future threats and likely challenges for U.S. 
national security, the interrelationships between force management and the JSPS 
provides a new heuristic for examining the implications of current military operations 
upon national security policy. 
 Chapter Two explicates the JSPS.  Chapter Three builds on this understanding 
and examines the AFMS.  This examination of the AFMS documents the 
development of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM), or functional 
life cycle model (FLCM) of the Army during the 1970s and 1980s.  This examination 
considers some of the broader influences of change during this period: the global 
security environment, Army equipment, Army doctrine, and management theories.  
Chapter Four describes the establishment of the US Army Force Management School 
(USAFMS) and the development of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).  Chapter Five 
considers civil-military relations as they relate to the JSPS and the AFMS.  Chapter 
Six considers the implications of current military operations on future national 
security policy.   
10 
Relevance of Study 
 Collectively this study offers a current perspective on the following 
contributors to the nation‘s security.  These areas - or categories - are interrelated, not 
discrete.  They provide a background for focused analysis and further consideration.  
They are: 1) JSPS, 2) AFMS, 3) MOAC, 4) Management theory, and 5) 
Contemporary security studies. 
1. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS): Formulation of foreign policy and 
presidential decision-making has been analyzed in a variety of secondary sources.  
Initial review does not reveal any efforts to describe the combination of policy 
development and force structure developments.  Policy analysts can benefit from 
knowledge of the process of how and why the Army is organized and equipped.  An 
increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve soldiers for operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has increased the percent of the population that personally knows a 
soldier who has deployed in support of combat operations overseas.  During the 2008 
presidential election, this increased personal awareness of the employment of military 
members attracted interest in why the Army is organized as it is, and how it should be 
changed to conduct combat operations in the Middle East.
17
  The threat of terrorism 
has also raised public concern over national security and homeland defense.  This 
increased public interest in security begs the question of how our leaders determine 
what force structure is required to meet our security challenges.  Operations in Iraq 
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Sacramento Bee, October 23, 2008. Available from http://www.sacbee.com/racefor08/ story/1335956 
html; (accessed 3 October 2009).   
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and Afghanistan have further increased interest in how the Army works at the 
strategic level.  Many recent policy decisions to deploy soldiers, extend rotations, and 
increase force structure have been scrutinized by the press and Congress.
18
  Civil-
military relations are at the heart of the JSPS and force management.  Current interest 
in these issues of national security warrants thorough examination of these planning 
processes.   
2. Army Force Management System (AFMS):  Only a select group of specialists 
really understand this process.  Historically, the Army has continuously changed, yet 
the current process used to manage change is a fairly modern development that is still 
evolving.  Defense management can be traced back through time to various defense 
initiatives, but there is little available explanation of the current process and system.  
This study contributes to the existing literature that is largely addressed to discrete 
communities of practice within the DoD.  Additionally, this study increases visibility 
and awareness of strategic defense management issues. 
3. The Mother of All Charts (MOAC): This study may become the seminal study for 
further research on the current twenty-seven different chart themes.  It may promote 
new research based on increased awareness of the charts.  Current source material for 
the MOAC is located at USAFMS Archives at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  The depth and 
scope of these archives is undetermined because they have not yet been completely 
cataloged.  Further organization and cataloging of the Fort Belvoir archives may 
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Numerous articles appeared between 2004 and 2009 as unit rotations were adjusted to meet 
operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq.  An Associated Press example from April 15, 2004 
entitled, ―20,000 troops see Iraq duty extended 90 days- Move breaks earlier pledge to soldiers of one-
year tour.‖ Available from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4739978; (accessed 3 October 2009).   
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reveal information that will result in new themes being developed or modifications to 
the existing charts.  Other related archives may similarly lead to modifying these 
charts.   This study provides a history of the USAFMS, the MOAC, and the functional 
Life cycle model of the Army.   
4. Management theory: The DoD is one of the largest bureaucracies in the world.  
Management practices within DoD may be applicable to other bureaucracies.  Many 
effective organizations manage change and deal with resource constraints.  This study 
provides insights that may encourage additional research within this broad domain.  
5. Contemporary security studies: Academics have become increasingly interested 
in understanding contemporary strategic issues and their implications for U.S. 
national security.  Scholars of national security and international relations can benefit 
greatly from understanding the interrelationships and implications that current 
operations, management systems, and processes have in determining defense policy 
and military readiness.  Although, current events are extensively covered by 
journalists, there is little evidence of their understanding of the interrelationships 
between policy formulation and force management. While journalists and scholars 
serve many roles and purposes, there are innumerable consequences to explore with 
regard to each national security policy decision.  This study serves as a starting point 
for better understanding of such issues.  Greater public awareness of these issues can 
strengthen the national will to maintain a military that is appropriately structured to 
meet the challenges set forth in our national security policy. 
13 
Chapter Two 
The Joint Strategic Planning System  
I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the 
orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. So help me God. 
  - Oath of Enlistment, United States Army
19
  
This Oath of Enlistment in the U.S. Army represents the long standing 
commitment of every U.S. Soldier to support and defend the Constitution.  The Army 
in this sense exists to support and defend the Constitution.   The framers of the 
Constitution designated the government‘s mission in the Preamble to ―provide for the 
common defense.‖20  In order to meet this requirement, Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution grants Congress the power ―to raise and support Armies, but no 
appropriation of money to that use shall be for more than two years.‖21   It provided 
the Congress the authority to raise and support the Army in order to provide for the 
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United States Code, Title 10, Oath of Enlistment; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording 
first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962). Available from 
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/faq/oaths.html, (accessed 10 December 2007). 
20United States Constitution, Preamble.  ―We the people of the United States, in order to form 
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
21
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, paragraph (12). 
14 
common defense, but limited their authority over a given incident to a two year 
period.   Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution established a balancing role for the 
Executive Branch in providing for the common defense: ―The President shall be the 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.‖22  This 
further subordinated all military officers to the President and purposefully established 
civilian control of the military.  The Constitution is very specific in these respects, yet 
it does not provide much further guidance on how to provide for the common 
defense.  This raises a critical question: How do the President and the Congress lead 
the DoD to provide for the common defense?   Through what process do they analyze 
the international environment and determine national objectives, identify threats, and 
formulate policy?  How is the Army designed to support national strategy and defend 
the Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic? 
This chapter explores these questions by identifying the key actors and 
analyzing their responsibilities to meet the Constitutional requirements to provide for 
the common defense.   The Constitution, amplified by United States Code, provides 
the legal basis for this analysis.  Starting with a review of established law, this 
analysis examines the roles of the President and Congress, the DoD, and then the 
Armed Services to provide national security.  This analysis of the bureaucratic system 
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United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, (1). Section 2.  (1) the President shall be the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several 
states, when called into the actual service of the United States; 
15 
in use in 2009 begins with the National Security Act of 1947.
23
   It describes the 
bureaucracy that interprets the strategic guidance and executes the policy decisions to 
ensure that the DoD is prepared to accomplish all assigned missions.  This chapter 
provides the background necessary to appreciate the relationships between the Army 
Force Management System (AFMS) and the Joints Strategic Planning System (JSPS).  
While it is obvious that the Constitution established the President as the Commander 
in Chief, the ways and means to provide for the national defense are intentionally 
diffused throughout the government.  
U.S. Code specifies the authorities and responsibilities within the DoD to 
provide for the common defense.  Within the Army, U.S. Code provides the legal 
basis for the establishment of the Army, the Army Staff, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army (CSA), and the Secretary of the Army.
24
  While the National Security Act of 
1947 established the Department of Defense, Titles 10 and 32 of U.S. Code were not 
established until 1956 when sufficient expertise enabled their transcription from 
approved legislation.  Further, the 1947 Act establishes the responsibilities and 
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National Security Act of 1947 available from: http://www.archives.gov/legislative/finding-
aids/reference/senate/armed-services/1947-1954.html; (accessed 20 February 2010);  More that 50 
changes have occurred to this system based on leadership changes. See  Current system based on 
CJCSI 3100.01B, Dated 12 December 2008 - Joint Strategic Planning System (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office), Available from http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit 
/3100_01.pdf; (accessed 8 November 2009). 
24
United States Code, Title 10, Sections 3062, 3032 and 3013.  Section 3062.  (a) It is the 
intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable…; Section 3032. The Army Staff: general 
duties: (a) The Army Staff shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, 
and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Section 3013. 
Secretary of the Army (a), Available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec 
_10_00003013----000-.html; (accessed 10 December 2007). 
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qualifications for the Secretary and CSA.
25
  Specifically, it requires the Secretary of 
the Army to be a civilian who has not held a commission in any of the Armed Forces 
within the past five years.  This requirement supports the importance of civilian 
control of the military.
26
  The Secretary is responsible for all of the functions essential 
to raise and maintain an Army: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training; 
servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining; and, the 
construction, maintenance and repair of equipment, buildings, and real property.
27
   
The Service Secretaries serve under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.  
                                                 
 25 "As expertise became available from various executive departments, other titles were 
enacted including titles 14 (1949), 35 (1952), 13 (1954), 10 & 32 (1956), 23 (1958), 38 (1958), 39 
(1960& 1970), 37 (1962), 5 (1966), 44 (1968), 17 (1976 rev.), 11 (1978), 49 Subtitle IV (1978), 
31(1982), 49 Subtitle I (1983), 46 (1983 in part, also 1986 & 1988), and 49 Subtitles II, III, V-X 
(1994)."  Richard J. McKinney, United States Code: Historical Outline and Explanatory Notes. 
Available from: http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/wysiwyg/544/us-code-outline.pdf; (accessed 26 
February 2010), 2. 
26
United States Code, Title 10, Section 3013. Secretary of the Army (a) (1) there is a 
Secretary of the Army, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Army. (2) A person may not 
be appointed as Secretary of the Army within five years after relief from active duty as a 
commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. Available from http: //www. 
law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec _10_00003013----000-.html;(accessed 10 December 
2007). 
27
United States Code, Title 10, Section 3013.  Secretary of the Army (a) (2) (b) Subject to the 
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 
of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all 
affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions: (1) Recruiting. (2) 
Organizing. (3) Supplying. (4) Equipping (including research and development). (5) Training. (6) 
Servicing. (7) Mobilizing. (8) Demobilizing. (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of 
personnel). (10) Maintaining. (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. (12) 
The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of 
real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this 
section.  Available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/ uscode10/usc_sec _10_00003013----
000-.html; (accessed 10 December 2007). 
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Additionally, U.S. Code establishes the National Guard as a force that can be called 
to active duty for as long as it is needed.
28
   
The National Military Establishment has evolved considerably since its 
creation in 1947.  An ample body of literature documents the history of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense.  In short, the scale and complexity of 
operations in World War II demonstrated the need for change within the military 
establishment that can be traced back to the ARCADIA Conference of 1941.   The 
American senior military staff structure did not provide a single Service point of 
contact to coordinate war efforts with the British.  The Combined Chiefs of Staff was 
established with an equal number of British and U.S. Service Chiefs.
29
  By 1942, 
―The U.S. representatives became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and absorbed the 
duties of the Joint Board.‖30  In 1943, the Casablanca Conference demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the American supporting staff when compared to the more mature 
British staff system.  Sweeping reforms provided a dedicated staff to support 
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United States Code, Title 32, Section 102. General Policy, In accordance with the traditional 
military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the    Army 
National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United 
States be maintained and assured at all times. Whenever Congress determines that more units and 
organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and 
air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United 
States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with such units of other reserve components as are 
necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal duty and retained as long as so 
needed. Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com /scripts/ts_search.pl?title =32&sec= 102 ; 
(accessed 10 December 2007). 
29
Michael McAleer, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff, The 
Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989, (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Historical Office, 1989), 3. 
 
30
Ibid., 3. 
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American war planning by the Chiefs.  By the end of the war compartmentalized 
planning systems evolved that facilitated victory in Europe and the Pacific.  However, 
these systems needed to be examined and codified to ensure future defense readiness.  
Several Army, Navy, and Congressional committees were established to analyze the 
military establishment and make reform recommendations.  The National Security 
Act of 1947 is the result of these efforts.
31
  Several more detailed official histories 
have been produced by the Joint History Office within the Office of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as well as by other authors, that detail the evolution 
of the DoD and the Chairman‘s role.  Three books are worth mentioning: The 
Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989, published in 
1989; The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published in 1995; and Richard 
Meinhart‘s, Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005.32  
Together they provide the required historical context to appreciate the numerous 
changes in the role of the JCS which manifests itself in the JSPS- the system the 
chairman uses to meet his statutory responsibilities.   
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Ibid., 11. See also: James Schnabel, History of The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and National Policy (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1986); Willard J Webb and Ronald 
Cole, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995); 
and Richard Meinhart, Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005, (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005). 
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Michael McAleer, Historical Division,  Joint Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff,  The 
Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1989, (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Historical Office, 1989); Ronald Cole, et al, Willard J Webb and Ronald Cole, The Chairmanship of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995); Richard Meinhart, Strategic 
Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2005);  and Richard Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint 
Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders, (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 
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The President and Congress 
The Founding Fathers established a constitutional balance of power between 
the Executive and Legislative Branches.  The President and Congress use a variety of 
means to determine our national interests, or objectives, and to identify their 
corresponding threats.  The two branches share leadership of the Department of 
Defense to provide for the common defense.   Congress relies on a variety of 
committees to provide leadership and oversight on defense issues.
33
   Congress 
further shapes national defense through their Constitutional authority to approve 
appropriations and confirm the appointment of Officers and Ambassadors of the 
United States.    
However, the President develops a strategy to prioritize allocation of 
resources and to achieve these objectives within an acceptable level of risk.  He has 
significant latitude in determining how to develop and execute foreign policy.  
Congress established The National Security Council (NSC) in the Executive Office of 
the President through the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.
34
  The 
President relies on the NSC to provide security recommendations, to develop a 
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The Senate and House Armed Services, Intelligence and Appropriations committees, among 
others, keep the Congress aware of the threats and interests and provide an opportunity to prioritize 
defense resources.  Control of appropriations is an obvious means to influence defense posture.  Power 
to confirm appointments of officers, and ratify treaties extends form Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution. 
34
National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). The function of the 
Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and 
military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other 
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the 
national security. Available from http://www. Intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml#s101; 
(accessed 10 December 2007).  
20 
coordinated strategy, and to assist him in executing this strategy.  The NSC is 
composed of: (1) the President; (2) the Vice President; (3) the Secretary of State; (4) 
the Secretary of Defense; (5) the Director for Mutual Security; (6) the Chairman of 
the National Security Resources Board; and (7) the Secretaries and Under Secretaries 
of other executive departments and the military departments, the Chairman of the 
Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board.  These 
NSC members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
35
   John Prados in his book, The Keepers of the Keys, 
examined the President's and their National Security Advisors from Truman to 
Bush.
36
  The composition of the NSC establishes a basis for civil-military relations 
that will be examined further in Chapter Five. 
The President can further organize his cabinet to accomplish his agenda.  The 
President issues Presidential Directives to establish the structure and authorities 
needed to enact his priorities.
37
  President George W. Bush established his National 
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 National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended).  The positions of 
Director for Mutual Security, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Chairman of the 
Munitions Board, and Chairman of the Research and Development Board have been abolished by 
various Reorganization Plans. The statutory members of the National Security Council are the 
President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. Available from http://www. 
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John Prados, The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from 
Truman to Bush (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1991). 
37George Caldwell, ―Presidential Directives and Where to Find Them,‖ Library of Congress 
Researchers, News and current periodical reading room, serial and government publications division.  
Contains a detailed listing of books and primary source locations for Presidential directives.  They 
have been given different names by different Presidential administrations: 1) National Security Action 
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Nixon and Ford; 3) Presidential Directives (PDs) – Carter; 4) National Security Decision Directives 
(NSDDs) – Reagan; 5) National Security Directives (NSDs) – Bush; 6) Presidential Decision 
21 
Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) to enact his priorities.
38
  National Security 
Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) established the Bush administration‘s cabinet 
organization for national security.  President Barrack Obama similarly proclaimed his 
cabinet organization for security in Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1), on 13 
February 2009.
39
   Later that month, he issued a Presidential Study Directive to 
review ways the White House organization can ―strengthen the government's ability 
to craft and implement sound policies designed to keep our country secure and our 
citizens safe.‖40  Presidents disseminate their national security policy through the 
National Security Strategy (NSS).  The current NSS was distributed in March 2006.  
It specifies broad goals that are the declared national objectives.  These objectives 
provide a general direction for other government departments and agencies.  For 
example, the 2006 NSS contained two key pillars: the first, to promote freedom, 
justice, and human dignity; the second, to confront the challenges of our time by 
leading a growing community of democracies.  However, achieving these goals is 
acknowledged as the work of generations.   These objectives reflect a broad vision to 
facilitate a myriad of subordinate activities working toward the common goal of 
                                                                                                                                           
Directives (PDDs) – Clinton; and, 7) National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) - GW Bush. 
Available from h ttp://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html; (accessed 3 October 2009).  
38
George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), the White House, 
Washington, D.C., 13 February 2001.   Michael Donley, ―Rethinking the Interagency System‖ March 
2005; available from http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper.pdf; (accessed 
21 January 2007). 
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 Barrack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive-1, Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/off 
docs /ppd/ppd-1.pdf; (accessed 3 October 2009). 
40
Ibid. 
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promoting freedom and leading a growing community of democracies.  The Obama 
Administration is expected to publish a new National Security Strategy in 2010. 
 Presidents further define the role of the Armed Forces in providing for the 
common defense by establishing the Unified Command Plan (UCP).  This document 
sets forth basic guidance to all Combatant Commanders.  The History of the Unified 
Command Plan 1946-1993, detailed the evolution of this command structure and 
provided significant historical context to each of the changes that have occurred to 
this document since World War II.  The official history of the UCP, maintained by 
the Joint History Office, itemized the UCP changes since its creation in 1946 as an 
organizational directive known as the "Outline Command Plan."
41
  The UCP provides 
the President's senior command arrangements for management on a global basis; ―Its 
structure and the organizational philosophies that it represents have had a major 
impact on U.S. military operations in the post World War II era. Thus, the history of 
the UCP is a useful guide for those involved in the development of policy as well as 
an important reference of strategy and policy of the Cold War.‖42   The National 
Security Act of 1947 established Combatant Commands.
43
  Combatant Commands 
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National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended). An Act to promote the 
national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a 
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are military commands with broad, continuing missions assigned to forces from two 
or more military departments.   In brief, the Combatant Commanders are responsible 
for coordinating all military activities within a specific part of the world.  These areas 
are designated areas of responsibility (AOR).  There are currently six geographical 
combatant commands.
44
  The UCP establishes combatant command missions, 
responsibilities, and force structure; further, it delineates areas of responsibility for 
Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders.  Title 10 of the U.S. Code 
requires the CJCS to review the UCP every two years and recommend changes to the 
President, as appropriate.
45
  As the name implies, functional combatant commands 
focus on a function rather than a geographic area.  United States Transportation 
Command (TRANSCOM) is a functional command that commands all strategic level 
transportation assets across all services. The UCP outlines the distinction between 
geographic responsibilities and the functional Service responsibilities.  These two 
concepts are associated with the centralized management of the DoD at the expense 
of Service independence.  Operations in World War II identified the need for joint 
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The Five Combatant Commands are EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and 
SOUTHCOM. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com.htm; 
Internet; accessed 10 December 2007.  On October 1, 2007, U.S. Africa Command was established as 
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cooperation; however, strong resistance still remains to infringements of Service 
autonomy.
46
   
 The President also provides leadership in national security by submitting his 
budget recommendations to the Congress.  Defense funding provides the means for 
the President and Congress to decide how much money to spend, what to spend it on, 
and how to raise the money they have decided to spend.  The President relies on the 
Office of Management and Budget to assist him in preparing the Budget.  The 
Congress similarly relies on the Congressional Budget Office.
47
  The separation of 
powers between the two branches of government warrants maintaining both agencies 
with a common function.  Simultaneous efforts in each budget office often complicate 
sharing of information and often lead to disparities in interpretation of the data as well 
as the data itself.
48
  Meeting our national security objectives requires allocation of 
resources within the government as well as within the private sector.  Many budget 
decisions affect foreign aid and have global implications.  Budgetary decisions 
directly determine the strength of the nation and affect its ability to provide for the 
common defense.    
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The Secretary of Defense 
The National Security Act of 1947 also established the Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) as a member of the President‘s Cabinet.49  Again, Congress has codified the 
duties and responsibilities of this office in Title 10 of U.S. Code.
50
  Title 10 
empowers the SecDef to maintain efficient administration of the DoD.  It directs the 
Secretary to provide a variety of reports to Congressional oversight committees for 
intelligence, budget, and the Armed Services.  The SecDef is a member of the NSC 
and the senior member of the DoD.  He provides strategic direction through a variety 
of means, one of which is the National Defense Strategy (NDS).   This strategy seeks 
to create the conditions to support the President‘s National Security Strategy (NSS).  
It establishes DoD‘s strategic objectives to support the President‘s strategy. The NDS 
identifies anticipated challenges to the nation and provides a means to address these 
challenges.  The first NDS, issued by Secretary Rumsfeld in March 2005, contained 
the following objectives: 1) secure the United States from direct attack; 2) secure 
strategic access and retain global freedom of action; 3) strengthen alliances and 
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partnerships; and 4) establish favorable security conditions.
51
   The latest NDS was 
issued by Secretary of Defense Gates in June 2008.  Similarly, it contained the 
following five objectives: 1) defend the homeland; 2) win the long war; 3) promote 
security; 4) deter conflict; and, 5) win our nation‘s wars.52   
The SecDef provides more specific classified guidance in the Strategic 
Planning Guidance (SPG).  This single fiscally informed document replaced the 
policy/strategy sections of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 2003.  The draft 
is issued early in the planning process to provide overall guidance for policy and 
strategy development and their associated supporting defense programs.  The SPG 
provides the DoD components with direction on defense policy, strategy, force and 
resource planning, and related fiscal matters.
53
   The President issues fiscal policy 
guidance to the DoD, then the Secretary must manage DoD in compliance with this 
guidance.  The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) complements the SPG by 
providing final programmatic guidance and performance measures for planning.  The 
JPG is usually issued in even-numbered years.  Together, the SPG and the JPG have 
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replaced the DPG for use in developing DoD components‘ Program Objective 
Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs).
54
    
In June 2008, Secretary Gates further modified the strategic planning 
guidance with release of a new document called Guidance for Employment of the 
Force (GEF).  This classified document consolidated the Contingency Planning 
Guidance (CPG), Global Force Management (GFM), and Security Cooperation 
Guidance (SCG) into one document to facilitate near-term planning.   Through this 
consolidated document, the SecDef sought to simplify guidance to the combatant 
commands for establishing priorities for contingencies and steady- state planning.
 55
  
There is a conceptual link between the contingencies that a combatant commander 
may have to execute and the security cooperation engagement plans that he executes 
to build partner capacity, establish habitual relationships, mitigate risks, and 
potentially prevent the need for armed confrontations.  So, consolidating the guidance 
for each region may reduce contradictions and could be considered appropriate.  The 
GEF and the Chairman‘s Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) will become the two 
primary planning documents for the combatant commands.
 56  
Brigadier General Gary 
Patton testified on their utility before the House Armed Services Committee: ―The 
GEF and JSCP inform the Department of Defense how to employ, and in part 
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manage, the force in the near term (2008-2010). The GEF provides strategic planning 
guidance and identifies security cooperation focus areas for campaign planning.‖57   
Secretary Gates also consolidated budget and programming guidance in June 
2008 in his new document, Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF).  The GDF 
replaced documents previously issued every two years- such as the SPG, the 
Transformation Planning Guidance, the Global Posture Guidance, the Science and 
Technology Strategic Guidance, the Joint Concepts and Experimentation Guidance, 
and the Analytic Agenda Guidance.  The GDF, similar to the previously mentioned 
SPG, projects a 20-year view of the security environment to inform the Pentagon‘s 
development of relevant capabilities.  This classified document is distributed 
internally within DoD.  However, unclassified references to it confirm that it provides 
greater attention on joint capabilities than the preceding documents‘ service-centric 
program solutions.
58
 
The SecDef also provides guidance in the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR).  This document builds upon the guidance provided in the NDS and meets the 
Congressional requirement mandated in Title 10 of U.S. Code.  In broad terms, the 
QDR assists the Congress in shaping the DoD to provide for the common defense.   
Specifically, by statute, the QDR‘s purpose is to specify: sufficient force structure; 
                                                 
57
BG Gary S. Patton USA, Director, Manpower and Personnel, Testimony before the 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Foreign 
Language and Cultural Awareness Transformation on September 2008. Available from http://ww 
w.dod.mil/dodgc/ olc/docs/testPatton080910.pdf; (accessed 4 October 2009). 
58
Inside The Pentagon, May 15, 2008 available from http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/ 
gates-signs-planning-documents-guide-t62194.html; (accessed 3 OCT 09). 
29 
force modernization plans; DoD infrastructure; budget plans; and, other elements of 
the nation‘s defense program associated with the NDS that would be required to 
successfully execute the full range of missions called for in that NDS at a low-to-
moderate level of risk.
59
  The 2006 QDR provided four specific priorities: 1) 
defeating terrorist networks; 2) defending the homeland in depth; 3) shaping the 
choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and, 4) preventing hostile states and non-
state actors from acquiring or using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).   
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Terms of Reference (TOR) were 
announced in April 2009.  The TOR identified the following key security trends and 
associated challenges: 1) violent extremist movements; 2) spread of weapons of mass 
destruction; 3) rising powers with sophisticated weapons; 4) failed or failing states; 
and 5) increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, and 
cyberspace).  Additionally, national security is affected by issues associated with 
climate change, cultural and demographic shifts, increasing scarcity of resources, and 
the spread of destabilizing technologies.  Noting these trends, the following areas of 
emphasis were identified for further analysis in the 2010 QDR: 
1) Further institutionalizing irregular warfare and civil support abroad 
capabilities and capacities, to include building partnership capacity; 2) 
                                                 
59
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Addressing threats posed from the use of advanced technology and WMD; 3) 
Global Force Posture; 4) Strengthening DoD support to civilian-led operations 
and activities; and 5) Managing the Department‘s internal business processes 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
60 
 
 The 2010 QDR was released in February 2010.  Each QDR addresses contemporary 
security concerns identified within of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Hence, 
each QDR is different from the last.  In 2009, The Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, established a QDR Analysis and Integration Cell 
to coordinate the issues for consideration by the senior members of the DoD.  Five 
issue teams were established, corresponding to the previously cited five areas of 
emphasis.  The teams are lead by a representative of the Joint staff and a member of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; they report to Dave Ochmanek, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development.
61
   
The SecDef issues additional guidance for planning within the Department 
through the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG).   This document establishes 
planning objectives for Combatant Commanders within their geographic areas of 
responsibility.  The Secretary has designated the DoD‘s Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to lead, direct, and manage security cooperation 
programs and resources to support national security objectives that: 1) build 
relationships that promote U.S. interests; 2) build allied and partner capacities for 
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self-defense and coalition operations in the global war on terrorism; and 3) promote 
peacetime and contingency access for U.S. forces.
62
  These objectives align with the 
guidance in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs and serve to foster planning efficiency. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the senior uniformed 
military member in the DoD.  This position was established by the National Security 
Reorganization Act of 1947 and the subsequent amendments of 1949.
 63
  The Joint 
History Office has detailed the historical context and contributions of each of the 
CJCS from Omar Bradley in 1949 to Colin Powell in 1993.
64
  Richard Meinhart 
continued the historical analysis of each of the CJCS, the challenges they faced, and 
the evolution of the chairman's role, in his work Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005.  Title 10 of U.S. Code contains the current specific 
authority and responsibilities of the CJCS, whose functions include six broad areas: 
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1) strategic direction; 2) strategic planning; 3) contingency planning- preparedness; 4) 
advice on requirements, programs, and budget; 5) doctrine, training, and education; 
and 6) other matters. 
65
    
The Chairman developed the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to assist 
him in meeting these Title 10 responsibilities.   This system provides a formal means 
to analyze the broad guidance provided by the President and the SecDef and develop 
detailed plans, strategies, and assessments to accomplish the desired objectives.  The 
JSPS also interacts with the other DoD systems by providing military advice to: the 
Acquisition Systems; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
(PPBE); and, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES).  The 
strategic documents that the Chairman must produce to provide his strategic direction 
within the DoD include: the National Military Strategy (NMS); the Chairman's 
Planning Guidance (CPG); the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); the Joint 
Planning Document (JPD); the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR); the 
Chairman‘s Program Assessment (CPA); and, the Joint Strategy Review (JSR).    
This study will examine each of these documents to demonstrate how they enable the 
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Chairman to efficiently distribute limited resources to achieve the military objectives 
that support the National Military Strategy (NMS).
66
  
The NMS defines the nation‘s military objectives, establishes the strategy to 
accomplish these objectives, and specifies the military capabilities required to execute 
the strategy. The Chairman develops the NMS by analyzing the security policy 
guidance contained in the President's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 
SecDef‘s NDS in consultation with the other Service Chiefs and Combatant 
Commanders.  The NMS describes the strategic environment and includes a 
discussion of potential threats and risks.   It also provides strategic direction for the 
development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Planning 
Document (JPD).
67
  The CJCS submits the NMS to the SecDef by 1 January of every 
odd numbered year.
68
  The NMS provides the Chairman‘s assessment of the nature 
and magnitude of risk associated with executing the current NMS.  The SecDef 
forwards these comments to the Congress with the next budget submission.  If any 
risk is considered significant, the SecDef must submit a plan for risk mitigation with 
the strategy.  The Chairman also submits the NMS to Congress by 15 February of 
every even numbered year.  This document contains the Service Chiefs and the 
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Combatant Commanders‘ assessments of risk associated with executing the NMS 
within their respective areas.
69
   
The latest NMS was provided in 2004.  This strategy conveyed The 
Chairman‘s message to the Joint Force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces 
should follow to support the NSS and NDS in this time of war.  This document 
described the ways and means necessary to protect the United States; to prevent 
conflict and surprise attack; and to prevail against adversaries who threaten our 
homeland, deployed forces, allies, and friends.  Success rests on three priorities: first, 
while protecting the United States we must win the War on Terrorism; second, we 
will enhance our ability to fight as a joint force; third, we will transform the Armed 
Forces ―in stride‖ by fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts 
while actively taking the fight to terrorists.
70
 
The Chairman‘s Guidance or Chairman‘s Contingency Planning Guidance 
(CPG) is issued as a separate classified document that provides deliberate guidance.  
The Chairman may also provide continual assessments of the security environment 
and may provide contingency planning guidance to the combatant commanders based 
on analysis from other planning efforts within the JSPS or changing world events 
which is not published in the CPG.  However, the CPG establishes a common set of 
assumptions, priorities, intent, and planning factors to facilitate planning and 
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development of strategy.  The analysis that occurs in developing the National Military 
Strategy (NMS) often surfaces as the Chairman‘s Guidance upon approval of the 
strategy.
71   
In December 2008 a new CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B incorporated the 
CPG into the new document, Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF).   
Figure 1 below graphically portrays this new relationship.  
 
Figure 1.  Consolidation of Strategic Documents by CJCSI 3100.01B.
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CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B established three major components of the JSPS 
to address the Chairman‘s statutory responsibilities: assessments, advice, and 
direction.
73
   New assessment documents include: the Comprehensive Joint 
Assessment (CJA), the Joint Combat Capability Assessment (JCCA), the Joint 
Strategy Review (JSR) process, the Chairman‘s Risk Assessment (CRA), the 
Capabilities Gap Assessment (CGA), the Chairman‘s Program Recommendation 
(CPR), and the Chairman‘s Program Assessment (CPA).74 While many of these 
documents are still evolving, collectively they will provide the CJCS with an annual 
review of the strategic environment.
75
  These documents also provide the Chairman‘s 
advice to the President, SecDef, National Security Council (NSC), and Congress.   
Both the CRA and the CPA have components of assessment and advice that 
represents the overlap between the corresponding statutory roles of the CJCS.  The 
NMS is the base document that accompanies the CRA.  The NMS delivers the 
Chairman‘s advice and direction on behalf of the President and SecDef, based on 
near-term military capabilities, to the military departments and combatant commands.  
The NMS and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) meet the CJCS 
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responsibilities to direct in Title 10 of U.S. Code.
76
   Figure 1 below depicts the 
consolidation of documents into the GDF and GEF by CJCSI 3100.01B.   
CJCS Instruction 3100 .01B also directs a timeline for the completion of these 
strategic documents.  The cycle begins when the President publishes the NSS and the 
SecDef, supported by the CJCS, completes the QDR.  During the first year and third 
year, or as required, the CJCS completes the JSR. During the second and fourth year, 
the majority of the other documents are produced, to include: the Unified Command 
Plan (UCP) from the President; the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Guidance 
for the Development of the Force (GDF), and the GEF from the SecDef; and the 
NMS and JSCP from the CJCS.  The JSPS cycle is repeated annually starting with 
input from the combatant commanders and Services and ending when the JSR is 
published at the end of every odd numbered year, or as required.
77
   Figure 2 below 
graphically portrays this timeline.    
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Figure 2. Joint Strategic Planning System Timeline.
78
 
The Chairman develops the JSCP to provide guidance for strategic planning to 
the Combatant Commanders based on their specific theater requirements.  It assigns 
tasks and missions in support of the NMS, NDS, and NSS.  This enables the 
Combatant Commander‘s to develop their detailed operations plans (OPLANs) and 
contingency plans (CONPLANs) and prioritize resources within their area of 
responsibility.   Additionally, the Combatant Commanders develop Theater 
Engagement Plans (TEPs) to conduct their peacetime engagement missions in support 
of the objectives and missions identified in the NMS.  These TEPs include the 
Combatant Commander‘s intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve 
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the shaping objectives in areas that are not involved in combat.  They are similar to 
the Theater Security Cooperation Plans that also support NSS and the SecDef‘s 
Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG).  The SCG has now been incorporated in the 
classified GEF.  The JSCP and GEF are the new companion documents for 
implementation planning.
79
   
The development of the NMS also provides a basis for development of the 
Joint Planning Document (JPD).   The JPD sets the initial, CJCS planning and 
programming priorities and advices the SecDef in his preparations of the draft 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).  SecDef, Donald Rumsfeld, replaced the DPG 
with the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and Joint Programming Guidance 
(JPG).
80
   So, the JPD now informs the preparation of the SPG and JPG.  Further, the 
JPD identifies the critical capabilities and shortfalls in the current NMS.  
Identification of these shortfalls provides clear and concise terms that focus the 
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efforts to formulate the DPG or SPG.
81
  The JPD was prepared and submitted 
approximately six months in advance of the scheduled publication of the DPG. 
The Joint Staff J- 5 Director, coordinating with the Joint Staff J-8 Director, 
prepares a cover letter for the JPD that summarizes the Chairman‘s advice on 
planning and programs.  The JPD is forwarded to the SecDef after the CJCS has 
approved it.  At a minimum, the JPD is required to address the following areas: 1) 
planning guidance; 2) challenges; 3) required capabilities; 4) priorities; and, 5) 
combatant commander and Service programming initiatives.
82
  The new CJCSI 
3000.01B directs that the JPD will no longer be published and the SPG will be 
incorporated into the GDF.  Therefore, the GDF will provide the programming and 
planning guidance once found in the JPD.
83
  
The Chairman‘s Program Recommendation (CPR) further analyzes the 
capabilities and shortfalls of the NMS and the JPD through the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) process.  The process of determining capabilities provides 
specific recommendations to address Joint capability shortfalls, to improve Joint 
training, or to meet warfighting requirements.  These recommendations then become 
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inputs into the JROC process for further consideration.
84
  Accordingly, each issue is 
vetted through the Services and Combatant Commanders. The CPR consolidates the 
issues that support his priorities.  The draft CPR is vetted again through the Services 
and Combatant Commanders.  The Chairman then forwards the document to the 
Secretary of Defense for his consideration in developing the DPG, SPG, or now the 
new GDF.
85
  The Services use this guidance in the development of their Program 
Objective Memorandums (POMs) and Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs). 
The Chairman‘s Program Assessment (CPA) provides the SecDef with the 
Chairman‘s personal assessment of the Service‘s conformance with the priorities 
established in the strategic guidance.  This guidance includes: the DPG; the SPG; the 
GDF; the JPG; the JSCP; and, indirectly, the CPR.
86
   The Secretary considers the 
Chairman‘s assessment when he develops his Program Decision Memorandums 
(PDMs) and develops his budget proposal.  The PDMs reflect the Secretary‘s 
priorities for allocations of resources.  PDMs are issued by the SecDef or Deputy 
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SecDef; they report final decisions on Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 
proposals as modified by these decisions.
87
 
Title 10 of U.S. Code requires the Chairman to provide strategic assessments 
and advice to the National Command Authority (NCA).
88
  The Joint strategy review 
process, or joint strategic review, provides continuous analysis to support the CJCS‘s 
strategic assessments.
89
  The Joint strategic review is the Chairman‘s primary means 
for monitoring the strategic environment to identify conditions that may require 
changes to the strategic guidance.  The Joint Strategy Review Working Group 
(JSRWG) conducts this review; it is composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, 
the Services, and the Combatant Commands and is supported by various agencies.
90
  
The representatives study the strategic environment and develop a common planning 
horizon.  One of the reasons that this analysis is accepted across the DoD is that all 
the representatives provide input.   Under the direction of the Joint Staff J-5, they 
meet regularly, to coordinate recommendations, resolve incongruities, or address 
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(accessed 10 December 2007). 
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The Joint Strategy Review process was referred to as the Joint Strategic Review to avoid 
confusion between references to the document and the process between 2002 and 2006 by the Joint 
staff J-5 planners.   
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The Joint Strategy Review Working Group (JSRWG) was referred to as the Joint Strategy 
Working Group (JSWG) that performed these functions from 2002-2006.  This differs from the CJCSI 
reference but is the same group of planners that are addressed here.  I was a member of this body and 
worked with the Joint Staff J-5 in this process during this time.  
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areas of critical concern to the Chairman or National Command Authority.  Their 
analysis specifies a common set of assumptions that facilitates further defense 
planning.  There are two main products of the Joint strategy review process:  the JSR 
Annual Report; and, the JSR Issue Papers.
91
  
The JSR Annual Report, or now the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA), 
fundamentally supports the JSPS and JSR process.
92
   It examines the future security 
environment in the short- (0-2 years), mid- (2-10 years), and long-term periods (10-20 
years), to determine likely threats and capabilities required to counter the threats.
93
  
Although the process is continual, the JSR assesses the global strategic setting for 
issues affecting the current: NMS; Presidential policy guidance; DPG, SPG or GDF; 
and, the CPA.  JSR Issue Papers, now called the CJA or annual CJA, identify changes 
in the security environment and estimate how they may impact the current strategy.   
The JSR produces a long-range vision paper addressing plausible strategic settings 
10-20 years into the future.  When they are approved by the Chairman they provide a 
common framework for planning and further analysis.  These products become inputs 
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(accessed 12 December 2007); and CJCSI 3000.01B, Enclosure B-5. 
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to the JROC process; and they provide a complementary means for evaluating 
programs and plans, threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, 
organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions.  Each paper 
provides the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders with a 
summary of issues; significant changes in the strategic environment; and their 
projected impact on the NMS.
94
   
Considering the Chairman‘s documents collectively, the JSR process provides 
a continual analysis that informs strategists about changes and trends that may affect 
their analysis and guidance.  The Combatant Commander‘s representatives provide a 
geographical or functionally specific perspective that indicates their challenges and 
concerns.  The Joint Staff Directorates and Services similarly identify their concerns 
and trends, which are evaluated collectively for impacts on the NMS.   Figure 3 
below illustrates this complex process.  
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Figure 3. Joint Strategic Planning System.
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 Figure 2 created by the author for this study as a Microsoft PowerPoint chart.  Description: 
The NMS and the Chairman‘s Program Recommendation (CPR) serve to provide the SecDef the 
Chairman‘s military advice for supporting the NSS and NDS.  The Secretary uses this input to draft his 
DPG, SPG, GDF, and JPG.  The Chairman further assists the Secretary with military planning by 
issuing the JSCP that provides detailed planning requirements for each of the Geographic Combatant 
Commanders (GCC).  The Services then develop their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) that 
support the strategic guidance provided by the Chairman and the Secretary.  The Chairman then 
evaluates the Service POMs and provides the Secretary with his assessment and recommendations for 
changes in the CPA.   The Secretary then considers this advice and issues the Program Decision 
Memorandums (PDMs) that may alter, but approves, the Service POM submissions.  Every two years 
NMS is updated and reviewed by Congress.  Every year the Secretary provides an annual report to 
Congress to account for the status of equipment and resources for the prior year.  Every four years the 
Secretary, supported by the Chairman, conducts a QDR to provide Congress with an evaluation of the 
strategic resources and future challenges anticipated in the global security environment.  Collectively, 
this system provides a common strategic direction for the Department of Defense to efficiently utilize 
its resources. 
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Combatant Commanders and Services 
 The Combatant Commanders‘ role as geographic or functional military 
representatives has already been examined.
96
  The Combatant Commands play a key 
role in providing for the common defense.  Their origin and authorities for developing 
and executing plans have also been discussed.  The first Combatant Commands 
emerged after World War II to define responsibilities in the Pacific for future 
operational planning.
 97
  Command representatives provide key regional or functional 
insight and participate in: the JSPS; the Joint Strategy Review Working Group 
(JSRWG); and the JROC process.  Moreover, they also play a key role in 
programming resources to accomplish the strategy.  Combatant Commanders submit 
budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense for consideration and possible inclusion 
in his budget.
98
  Combatant Commanders have two additional means of influencing 
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U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 164, (b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMBATANT 
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COMBATANT COMMAND BUDGETS.—The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual 
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subsection (b). (b) CONTENT OF PROPOSALS.—A budget proposal under subsection (a) for 
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funding may be requested in such a proposal include the following: (1) Joint exercises. (2) Force 
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programming and prioritization of resources: the Integrated Priority List (IPL) and the 
Chairman‘s Risk Assessment (CRA).  
The Combatant Commanders develop their plans and budgets in accordance 
with the strategic guidance from the President, the Chairman, and the SecDef to 
accomplish all assigned operational and engagement missions.  Changes in the 
strategic environment or conflicting requirements can create gaps between missions 
and resources.  Combatant Commanders identify and then prioritize these capability 
or resource shortfalls in a document called the IPL.
99
   This list is then provided to the 
Chairman and the SecDef for consideration in the development of the CPA and the 
Secretary‘s PDMs.   Similarly, in a resource-constrained environment, Services 
submit an Unfunded Priority List (UPL) for their unfunded requirements to their 
Service Chiefs based on perceived disparities between missions and resources. 
Combatant Commanders continually update their plans and analyze the 
security environment to assess their ability to perform all of their missions in support 
of the NMS.  They develop a Commander‘s risk Assessment that is submitted to the 
Chairman and the Secretary which reports their personal assessment of risks in 
executing their assigned missions.  These assessments are then consolidated in the 
                                                                                                                                           
training. (3) Contingencies. (4) Selected operations.  Available from: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com; 
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Integrated Priority List Definition: (DOD) A list of a combatant commander's highest 
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programs the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant 
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48 
Chairman‘s Risk Assessment (CRA).  The CRA then informs the Chairman, the 
Secretary, the President, and Congress of the status of the Armed Forces and the 
programming requirements to provide for the common defense. 
 The POM is the Services‘ primary document for submitting programming 
proposals.  The POM includes an analysis of missions, objectives, alternative 
methods to accomplish objectives, and allocation of resources.
100 
  The Services have 
detailed procedures for developing these proposals.  The Army uses the Total Army 
Analysis (TAA).  In brief, this process builds on the strategic guidance that has been 
provided through the JSPS.  The Services analyze their missions and propose a force 
structure and list of equipment needed to accomplish these missions.   These 
proposals are submitted through the Chairman to the Secretary and the President for 
inclusion in the budget that the President submits to Congress. 
Conclusion 
 The JSPS enables the Chairman to meet his responsibilities to advise the 
President and the Secretary on military matters.  It assists him in organizing planning 
efforts and resources within the DoD to support the NSS and NDS.  The CJCS thus 
has a flexible means to analyze the current security environment in order to determine 
whether our military capabilities are adequate to secure the nation and to assess real 
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The program provides for four years beyond the budget year for cost and manpower, and 
seven years beyond the budget year for forces. For example, FY06 Program Objective Memorandum 
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time risks to the nation‘s security.  These assessments then inform the programming 
process in the Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), 
which determines resource allocations in support of the NMS.  The JSPS thus aids in 
quantifying how to best utilize many kinds of resources in order to provide for the 
common defense. 
 World War II demonstrated that the Services could no longer operate 
independently on a global scale.  Coordination was required with a joint perspective 
that could integrate all the capabilities into a campaign across theatres.  The role of 
the CJCS grew to provide better informed advice to the President.  Congressional 
reforms increased the Chairman's authority significantly in 1986, at the expense of the 
services, to provide a vehicle for comprehensive joint reform.  Colin Powell used this 
authority to establish joint functional commands that could better manage DoD assets 
across the services.
101
  The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the 
roles of the civilian Service secretaries and reduced the roles of each of the Service 
chiefs, thereby increasing civilian control of the military.
102
  The aforementioned 
relationships between the key actors in formulating defense policy provide a critical 
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background for the examination of force management and the role of civil military 
relations.    
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Chapter Three 
Findings: The History of the Army Force Management System 
 The previous chapter explored the changes in the DoD as a consequence of 
advancing technologies and World War II; however, the 1970s and 1980s were also 
periods of significant innovation and modernization.  Many weapon systems in use 
during the decade were developed and fielded with 1950s technology.  Complex 
acquisition regulations require milestones and review gates during each phase of the 
system development.  New capabilities must advance through each phase of a 
regulated system including concept development, research and development, testing, 
and fielding, to become a material solution.  Collectively, the DoD 5000 series of 
regulations defines this process as the Acquisition system.
 103
  In short, the 
development of a defense system typically takes fifteen to twenty years from 
conception to fielding.  Therefore, it was common practice to field systems with 
proven technology, that existed when the concept was approved, rather than with 
emerging technology.
104
   In 1980, The Packard Commission was established by 
President Reagan to evaluate defense reorganization.  The interim report identified: 
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Paul Wolfowitz, DoD Directive 5000.01, Dated 12 May 2003, Subject: The Defense 
Acquisition System, (verified current).  DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
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 With notable exceptions, weapon systems take too long and cost too much to 
produce. Too often, they do not perform as promised or expected. The reasons 
are numerous. ..Federal law governing procurement has become 
overwhelmingly complex.  Each new statute adopted by Congress has 
spawned more administrative regulation. As law and regulation have 
proliferated, defense acquisition has become ever more bureaucratic and 
encumbered by unproductive layers of management and overstaffing.
105
 
However, developing new defense systems became even more challenging in the 
1980s when the rate of technological change rapidly increased.   The Army fielded 
new systems with technology that was not only dated but also obsolete.  Development 
of new systems was also complicated because projected Congressional funding 
authorizations differed from the actual appropriation of resources.
106
   
During the 1970s, Congress reduced defense spending – in percentage of the 
budget and in real dollars - as American forces were removed from Vietnam.
107
   At 
the same time, other countries were developing defense systems that capitalized on 
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recent technological advances in computerization, communications, and 
miniaturization.  President Richard Nixon‘s comment to the NATO Supreme Council 
in 1969 illustrates the challenges faced in the early 1970s: ―Let‘s put it in plain words, 
the West does not have the massive nuclear preponderance that it once had, and any 
sort of broad based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present 
balance.‖108  Similarly, President Ronald Reagan‘s speech twelve years later in 1982 
reflects the same concern: ―The combination of the Soviets spending more and the 
United States spending proportionally less changed the military balance of power and 
weakened our deterrence; in virtually every measure of military power the Soviet 
Union enjoys a decided advantage.‖109  The Soviet military buildup of the 1970s 
consisted of more than an increase in numbers of systems.  The Soviets also forged 
ahead of American military technology in one area after another.
110
  In business 
terminology, the chief executive officer of the organization, the president, believed 
that the United States comparative advantage in defense systems was threatened.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) responded to these challenges by 
developing significant modernization programs for all Services.  Within the Army, 
five major combat systems were introduced to modernize the force structure.  These 
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systems, known as ―the Big Five‖, included a new tank, attack and assault 
helicopters, an infantry fighting vehicle, and an artillery system.  ―Few outside of the 
Army were aware either of the massiveness and complexity of the modernization 
events under way in the 1980‘s or under the limitations under which they 
proceeded.‖111  Thirty- five percent of the 7,500 M-1 Tanks, seventeen percent of the 
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, forty percent of the UH-60 Black Hawk 
Helicopters, eleven percent of the Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and over 3,500 
trucks had been delivered to units within the active and reserve components of the 
Army by 1984.
112
   
Although these figures affirm fielding an impressive number of new systems, 
change in the Army, as in any large organization, requires much more than new 
equipment.   These systems provided new capabilities and prompted a reexamination 
of the fundamental Army business practices (tactics and doctrine) as well as its 
management theories (headquarters administration) and organizational structure 
(Table of Organization and Equipment [TOE]).  The Army‘s change may be viewed 
from two perspectives: First, this change refers to a comparison of the Army at two 
points in time- the Army before and after the 1980s.  Second, this change refers to the 
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process of how it occurred in the Army.  The simultaneous fielding of these new 
systems revealed the need for an integrated system to manage how change takes place 
in the Army.  
The Army commissioned the Division 86 Study to develop a recommendation 
for the integration of these new systems and capabilities into the Army in the 1980s.   
General Donn A. Starry, who was one of the key leaders of the Division 86 Study, 
met with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward C. Meyer, on 20 December 
1980 to discuss this issue.
113
   Starry recommended an Army reorganization to 
maximize the potential capabilities of these new weapon systems.  John Romjue, who 
became the TRADOC Historian, produced a comprehensive historical account of the 
proposed doctrinal changes that Starry developed.  Starry also proposed changing the 
Army personnel management system from one that managed individuals to one that 
managed whole units.  Starry‘s proposal was called the regimental system because it 
was similar to the British regimental personnel system, which assigned soldiers to one 
unit (a regiment) for their entire career.   
The idea for a regimental system centered on a belief that unit cohesion would 
be improved - and hence readiness - if soldiers were assigned to the same unit for 
their entire career.  The resulting habitual relationships and familiarity might result in 
improved unit performance.  In Vietnam, the personnel replacement system was 
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based on individual replacements and was criticized for the turmoil that high rates of 
turnover provided in units.
114
  Individual replacements were not familiar with the 
procedures and practices of their new units and needed additional training to become 
integrated into the unit.  The Army Lineage Series portrayed some of the challenging 
conditions that lead to the consideration of new manning policies:   
The early 1970s saw the U.S. Army in decline. The decision to stage a 
phased withdrawal from Vietnam led to a drastic cut in troop strength, 
and between 1969 and 1973 the Army shrank in size by almost half, 
from a force of 1.5 million to one of 800,000. More important, its 
ranks were plagued with incidents of drug abuse, racial turmoil, and 
lack of discipline. The final elimination of the draft in 1973 deprived 
the Army of its reservoir of college-trained enlisted men and 
confronted it with daunting recruitment problems.
115
 
If whole units were managed and replaced, rather than individuals, readiness and 
morale might be improved.  The Army Center for Military History also expressed this 
belief in the importance of unit histories: ―Experience has shown that members of a 
military community are more effective when they understand and take pride in 
military traditions.  By making soldiers feel that they are part of a unit, they can draw 
strength from the individuals who served before them.  This phenomenon is esprit de 
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corps.‖116  In an attempt to maintain unit esprit and morale the Army developed the 
Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) which maintained the designation of units 
with established histories as the size of the Army was reduced after Vietnam.
117
  This 
program maintained unit designations and was not a personnel management policy or 
system like the British regimental system Starry mentioned. 
Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, who was the Army Inspector General, 
was informed that General Meyer wanted to see him.  General Trefry had a unique 
background.  He was the Inspector General for the Army from 1977 to 1983.  Born in 
Newburyport, Massachusetts, on 6 August 1924, he joined the Army in World War II 
as a trained meteorologist.  After the war he briefly attended Dartmouth College 
before he attended the United State Military Academy, graduating with the Class of 
1950.
118
   He was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer and successfully 
commanded units at various levels in Germany, Oklahoma, Korea, Vietnam, and 
Laos.  He was an instructor at the U.S. Army Field Artillery and U.S. Army Engineer 
Schools between 1953 and 1958, then a Tactical Officer at the United States Military 
Academy between 1959 and 1962.  He served in many command and staff positions 
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before his promotion to brigadier general in 1973.  As a general officer he served as 
the Defense Attaché to Laos; on the Army staff as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Personnel, the Director of Human Resources, the Director of Management, and 
the Inspector General of the Army (IG).  After retirement from the Army in 1983, he 
continued to serve as an independent defense consultant.  In 1990, he became the 
Military Assistant to President George H. W. Bush and the Director of the White 
House Military Office until 1992.  He then became the Program Manager for the 
Army Force Management School, which he continued to direct in 2010.
119
   
The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Vessey saw Trefry in the 
Pentagon Hallway on 20 December 1980 and asked him if he had seen the Chief yet.  
Trefry replied ―No‖ then Vessey informed Trefry, ―Well, he wants to give you a new 
job.‖120  When Trefry met with the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Meyer, 
requested Trefry to determine the feasibility of adopting a regimental system of 
personnel management.
121
  Meyer added ―I want you to have an answer to me by the 
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first of April.‖122  As the Army IG it was appropriate for Trefry to conduct studies 
and provide recommendations to the CSA on a variety of issues.  Trefry was also 
uniquely qualified to address this question based on his prior experience working in 
the Army Staff personnel office.  Confronted with this challenge, Trefry went back to 
his office and thought, ―If I were going to start an Army tomorrow, how would I do 
it?‖123   
In response to this challenge, Trefry drafted the functional life cycle model of 
the Army.
124
  He quickly drew it out on a piece of paper that evening as he thought 
about the functions of managing the Army.  Although the United States already had 
an Army, his approach to the problem was radically holistic.  He chose the term life 
cycle symbolically because it implied everything in the Army had a birth, matured, 
and had an end to its useful life.   His response below summarized his 
conceptualization of the model: 
Think about it: First off you have to have a reason to have an Army, so you 
have to understand the threat.  You need authorizations from Congress and the 
President to raise an Army. So the President has got to perceive that there is a 
threat and this has to be tied in with Congress.  Once that is understood, then 
there must be a force structure or organizations that are capable of 
accomplishing the mission.  Since they are new, they will need to be recruited, 
trained, distributed, sustained, and developed.  Since they may be required to 
fight overseas, they will need to be able to be deployed.  They will require 
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equipment to accomplish their mission that will have to be acquired and 
maintained.  They will need training on the new equipment and have to be 
developed professionally.  At some point we will no longer need the 
equipment and, as this is young man‘s game, some soldiers will get too old. 
So, we will need a means of disposing of the property and separating the 
personnel.  All of these functions must be coordinated by command, 
management, and leadership and require the resources of time, people, money, 
things, and information.
125
    
Trefry‘s description of what is required to build an Army amounts to a model.  The 
functions he described (force development, acquisition, training, distribution, 
deployment, sustainment, development, and separation) are represented in the Army 
functional life cycle model.   These functions require leadership to manage the 
integration of resources, which he designated as time, people, money, and 
information.   His feasibility study was initiated because of problems in the personnel 
system, but he understood the interrelationships of other systems to personnel system 
changes.  When asked if any current corporate management theories influenced his 
thinking, he replied ―No.‖126 
Trefry developed a team of twenty-five personnel from the Army staff and the 
U.S. Army War College students to conduct an independent assessment of the 
feasibility of incorporating a regimental system in the Army.  This group 
recommended that a regimental system was feasible for the infantry, armor and 
possibly artillery branches, but implementation should be restricted to the company 
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level.
127
    Before this recommendation was made to the Chief of Staff of the Army, it 
was presented to the Army Staff.   Trefry recounts:  
Major General Clay Buckingham, who was the Director of Information 
Management at the time, stopped and said to me: ―That model is fascinating, I 
had never seen the Army depicted that way.  You know it not only works for 
people, but this is the way we buy computers.‖  I replied, ―Well, I remember 
when I was drawing the thing on butcher paper down in my office:  I had 
thought maybe this could be used for other things.‖  That [the discussion with 
Buckingham] was the first cognitive realization I had that I had something that 
I could use across the Army.
128
 
Buckingham‘s application of the model to purchase computers enabled Trefry 
to realize his recommendation had greater significance to the Army.  Trefry 
envisioned applications of the model as a tool for analysis beyond the personnel 
system.  It could be used to manage change in other Army systems.  The model 
demonstrated that change made to any one function affected other functions.  All 
eight functions were interdependent.  The model in the chart was metaphorically 
referred to as a ―spider web‖.   One strand of the web could not be touched without 
affecting the other strands (or functions) on the web.    In this depiction, the web was 
the Army and each of the strands served as functional entry points into the web.   
Buckingham used the model to graphically depict the life cycle of computers in the 
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Army.  The following explanation illustrates the interrelationships within the model 
in greater detail. 
 
 
Figure 4. The Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army, 2001.
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This chart depicts eight functions with a brief description of each.  Force 
development is positioned at the top of the chart, indicating its fundamental 
relationship with the other seven numbered functions.   Trefry coined the term ―force 
development‖ to describe the process of leading and managing resources (the people, 
things, time, money, information and technology) through their life cycle.  
Essentially, force development involves identifying a needed Army capability; 
determining how to achieve that capability; designing units and a force structure 
capable of accomplishing the national military objectives; determining the personnel 
and materiel requirements necessary for robust, efficient organizations; and then 
allocating capabilities within the available constrained resources.
130
   Needed 
capabilities can be identified at any level of the Army and evaluated through this 
process of force development.  At the center of the model is Title 10 of U.S. Code.  It 
provides the statutory authorization for the Army.  The bottom of the model depicts 
the Army‘s most important output, or product: Combat-ready units - a combination of 
soldiers and equipment organized in units with appropriate doctrine and training to 
accomplish their mission.  Further, this product realizes the core objective of the 
organization.  Each resource required by an organization is represented somewhere on 
a life-cycle continuum within the model.  The dynamic nature of the model is 
depicted in the bottom left corner of the chart as command, leadership, and 
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management; these vital components must synchronize the efforts of all of these 
functions simultaneously.
131
  “These functions, while they do stand alone, do not 
represent a system;‖ advised Trefry.  ―However, when we apply feedback loops 
between all of these functions and provide the necessary resources to enable 
leadership, command and management to do its job, we then have a functioning 
Army at any level of organization.‖132  These eight functions of the functional life 
cycle model became a heuristic for Trefry.  As the Inspector General of the Army, he 
used them to manage change in the Army during this period. 
The Inspector General (IG) has a critical role in the Army‘s senior 
management.  The IG leads a fact-finding organization that conducts inspections of 
Army units.  The IG‘s background reports provide the Chief of Staff of the Army 
with advice on a variety of subjects.
133
  Before the 1980s, the Inspector General 
Agency focused on inspecting Army commands for compliance with Army standards.  
Many units considered these inspections the single most important event of the year.  
The inspection teams focused on identifying a unit‘s non-compliance with regulations 
rather than on identifying the rationale for their non-compliance.   However, unit-
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oriented inspections often uncovered deficiencies that were beyond the unit's ability 
to correct.
134
  Trefry reflected upon this issue when he described an inspection 
conducted in 1978: ―It‘s terrible; all you know is that some platoon sergeant did not 
come down and check that all the toothbrushes were in the same direction.  You‘re 
not solving anything.  I don‘t know what shape the unit is in; I don‘t know how much 
of this stuff is borrowed.‖135  This observation is significant because it reveals 
Trefry‘s holistic concern for the inspection process.  Units may have presented 
equipment borrowed from other units as their own in order to pass their inspection.  
Thus, the results of the inspection could be an unreliable indicator of the unit‘s status 
or readiness to perform its mission.  His observation further implies that there may 
have been systemic issues- indeed issues of integrity- in the 1970s Army.  The 
inspections also provided a report that was considered almost like a report card on the 
command.  This led to units spending a great deal of time preparing for the 
inspection, rather than training or doing other important tasks because no one wanted 
to risk a report card documenting any deficiencies.  This culture surrounding the 
inspections was perhaps the greatest obstacle to overcome when changing the role of 
the inspector general.  IG inspections meant weeks of preparation for compliance 
with established standards.
136
  Lastly, the inspections provided only a snapshot in 
time; the IG had no systemic means of ensuring corrective action was ever taken on 
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any of the identified deficiencies.
137
  Trefry began to change inspection policy and 
doctrine to correct these three major problems: 1) undue reliance on the inspections; 
2) ineffectiveness of inspections; and, 3) lack of follow up on inspection findings.
138
 
In 1981, Trefry decided to use the functional life cycle model as an inspection 
methodology to correct these problems.  The first experimental inspection was 
conducted in July 1981 on the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).
139
   Trefry 
changed the focus of the inspection from compliance with Army standards to 
something called a ―compliance-systemic inspection‖.  This new focus identified the 
systemic flaws in Army systems that created the underlying conditions that accounted 
for non-compliance with established Army standards.
140
  Prior to 1981, for example, a 
unit inspection could verify that tools were missing from a tool set, but it would not 
identify the reason that the tools were missing.  Perhaps the unit lacked secure storage 
areas. Or soldiers may have broken the missing tools and thrown them away without 
understanding or observing the procedures to replace or account for damaged tools.  
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Trefry‘s new focus on systemic problems represented a dramatic shift in perspective 
for everyone involved in the inspection.  Subsequently, the new inspection technique 
was heralded as an overwhelming success.  The Inspector General Inspection Team 
conducted several other inspections throughout 1981, utilizing and refining the new 
―compliance-systemic inspection‖ methodology based on the functional life cycle 
model.
141
   
In 1982, IG inspection teams cataloged over eight hundred and fifty systemic 
findings from the previous year‘s inspections.  Each of these findings identified a 
significant problem area within the Army.  For example, the inspectors observed a 
soldier inspecting his vehicle in order to evaluate the unit‘s maintenance procedures.  
Trefry explained, ―The mechanics used to spend months inspecting and fixing 
vehicles and would then put them behind barbed wire until it was time for the 
inspectors to come down and look for drips from the oil pans.‖142  This new method 
revealed a systemic problem: that many soldiers did not know the proper procedures 
for inspecting and servicing their vehicles.  These soldiers‘ lack of knowledge of 
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proper preventative maintenance led to increased maintenance costs and reduced 
vehicle availability.
143
    
Trefry‘s inspection team discovered that they lacked an easily understandable 
method of organizing their findings to facilitate corrective action.  Two members of 
the Inspector General Force Modernization Cell, Billy Gavin and Tom Fintel, decided 
to sort their findings in accord with the eight functions of the functional life cycle 
model, which was already used in the inspections.  They demonstrated that some of 
the findings in one area reappeared in later inspection findings in other areas, which 
clearly identified systemic problems.  This application of the model validated the 
inspection methodology and its holistic approach.  Trefry recalled, ―What these guys 
had done was truly amazing.  Well, I said, we‘ve got a winner, we‘ve got a 
winner.‖144  
 The Inspector General Agency spent most of August 1982 refining their 
analysis.  They then explicated their model, inspection methodology, and findings to 
the Army Chief of Staff Meyer.  Meyer was impressed with the model and discussed 
it at length with Trefry.
145
  Meyer also directed that the new Vice Chief of Staff of the 
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Army, General John A. Wickham, should study Trefry‘s expanded presentation in 
greater detail and then lead the Army staff effort to promulgate this holistic 
perspective throughout the Army.   
Trefry‘s staff prepared a twenty-five hour briefing to introduce Wickham to 
the complexity and scope of Trefry‘s winning model.  This comprehensive briefing 
explained all the Army systems affected by the modernization efforts and their 
interrelationships.  Wickham received the first of these presentations at 0800 on the 
Saturday of Labor Day weekend.  He initially allocated thirty minutes for the 
briefing, but consented to allocate four hours upon Trefry‘s request.  At the start of 
the briefing, he declared ―He was going to be hard to convince that he would need 
twenty-five hours of briefings.‖146  After the first four hours dealing with force 
development, Wickham agreed that he would need the entire twenty-five hours.  In 
the end, he stated that ―the information was a great education.‖147  Wickham directed 
Trefry to present the same information to the Command and General Staff College, 
The Army War College, and all the major Army commands.
148
    
The IG also serves the Army as a teacher and advisor.  Hence, it was quite 
appropriate for Trefry to travel to the Army schools to present this model.  On the 
return flight from one of these briefings at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Trefry decided 
to establish a school to teach all of the Army IGs this new methodology.  His 
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rationale was exquisitely simple: ―How can you inspect the Army when you don‘t 
understand how it runs?‖149  He received authorization from the Chief of Staff of the 
Army General Meyer to cancel all the IG inspections for the next year, thereby 
freeing the IGs to attend training.  Trefry recalled, ―I went down to Fort Belvoir and 
borrowed a classroom from the Engineer School because they were getting ready to 
move to Fort Leonard Wood and had some small classes and space available.  So they 
gave me this classroom over here that we still use today.‖150  He brought all the IGs to 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for a six-week course on the new methodology based on the 
functional life cycle model.  (IGs are also usually assigned at the rank of lieutenant 
colonel for every major command (or installation) in the Army to provide local 
assistance to assigned personnel and commanders).  Trefry recollected, ―Let me tell 
you - at first all of them groaned.  But at the end of the first week, we had a four-week 
school then, but at the end of the first week everyone was saying holy cow there is 
really something to this stuff.‖151   The goal of this effort was to increase awareness 
and establish a holistic approach to problem-solving throughout the Army.  This 
inspection methodology changed inspections from looking at the current condition of 
things, like vehicle oil leaks, to looking at the systemic problems, like do soldiers 
know how to inspect and service their vehicles. 
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Trefry had the first class of Inspectors General conduct an inspection at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, to apply their new understanding.  This inspection reinforced 
the new methodology that was taught in the classroom by requiring an application of 
the knowledge acquired in the classroom.  He recalled the importance of this event: 
―And let me tell you, if I ever had to do it again that would be the first thing I would 
do.  Because you see, it is one thing to go to school and sit in class, then to go out and 
say okay, show me what you‘ve learned by writing up these findings.‖152  This first 
class graduated on December 17, 1982.  Trefry then focused the entire agency on 
refining the coursework and inspection methodology; he published a thirteen volume 
report on the functional life cycle model of the Army in March 1983.
153
  This effort 
was completed in only six weeks.  These initial volumes presented the revised course 
material that was utilized in the initial course taught to the IG.   This material became 
the basis for a new IG course.
154
 
Trefry‘s new organizational objectives and inspection methodology was now 
firmly established with the IGs in the Inspector General Agency.  However, this new 
approach prompted a reorganization of the agency.   Trefry recounted that he asked 
his key staff members: ―Is anybody going home tonight?  Anybody have anything 
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going on tonight?  They said no.  So I said, Okay, call your wives and tell them we‘re 
going to be late.  I‘ll tell you what we‘re going to do.  We‘re going to reorganize the 
agency.‖155   This small team worked until midnight: then the next morning Trefry 
had all the members of the Inspector General Agency assemble for a briefing.  He 
startled his audience by beginning his presentation with: ―While you were home and 
sleeping last night, the staff and I changed things, and you are no longer working 
where you think you are.‖156  The group that formerly followed- up on the inspection 
findings was moved under the inspection group:  They were now required to travel 
with the inspection teams.   This significantly changed their way of doing business.  
However, requiring this follow-up team to travel made them more familiar with the 
inspection methodology and provided valuable context to the findings that they 
managed.  This policy increased the team‘s awareness of the interrelationships among 
systemic findings as they conducted more inspections and gained experience.
157
  This 
increased awareness then led to better informed recommendations to systemic 
problems in the inspection findings and follow-up advice.   Trefry was now 
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convinced that the Agency was prepared to run a school to better assist the Army as it 
modernized throughout the 1980s.
158
 
Modernization that alters the core values or culture of the organization can be 
very complicated.  Many prominent business and management scholars - like Henry 
Mintzberg, Peter Drucker, Knoll Tichy, and Alfred Chandler, among others explored 
in this study - have written many books explicating the challenges involved in 
managing change in large organizations.  Strategic change in an organization like the 
Army is not dependant solely on restructuring the organization or on technological 
change.  Summarizing many analysts‘ observations, changes in the 1980s strategic 
environment prompted change in large corporations as well as the Army.   The nature 
of this change was ultimately the responsibility of the senior leadership of these 
organizations.  A change in management or senior executives often brings new 
strategic vision to an organization.  This new vision often alters the key strategic 
objectives and essential core missions of the organization.  This new vision also 
challenges the established doctrine and values of the organization and often leads to 
unintended changes.  Accordingly, the initial scenario that led Trefry to develop the 
functional life cycle model was the regimental feasibility study that was part of the 
larger issue under consideration from General Meyer and General Starry; how should 
the Army prepare to accomplish its assigned missions.  Doctrine is the broad 
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guidance showing how the Army should accomplish its assigned missions.
159
  
Doctrinal changes also influenced change in the Army during this period. 
Doctrine 
In the 1970s, the Army developed new doctrine based on the assumption that 
it would be required to fight the Soviet Union outnumbered and win on the plains of 
Europe.  This differed from the previous doctrinal reliance upon nuclear weapons to 
deter Soviet aggression.
160
   Walter Kretchik detailed the historical context and 
application of the keystone Army doctrinal manuals since the Continental Army in his 
dissertation, Peering Through the Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army 
Operations, 1775 -2000.
161
  He further analyzed how appropriate the doctrine was in 
its wartime application.  He proposed that doctrine was only appropriate for the 
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strategic environment approximately half the time.  Considered differently, doctrine 
was not appropriate approximately half the time.  However, his analysis demonstrated 
that doctrinal failures were most apparent after they were applied in combat rather 
than prior to application.  Therefore, it was remarkable that the new doctrine outlined 
in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, developed by General William DePuy - 
then the Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command - was developed 
in peacetime.  This manual signaled a profound shift in guidance from the Army‘s 
senior leadership that responded to an acknowledgement that the Soviet Union 
enjoyed a superiority of conventional forces, both in their numbers and in the lethality 
of their modern weapons systems.  
 The U. S. Army tactics and doctrine for employing force during this decade 
largely resembled the tactics derived from operations in World War II.  Some argued 
that if war was to be fought over the same ground as World War II, the maneuver 
tactics that won the war would still be valid.  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War also 
demonstrated the strength of the defense to defeat a numerically superior force.
162
 
Further, the tactical experiences gained in Vietnam were considered limited to a 
counter-insurgency effort or only appropriate to a jungle environment.  Doctrine had 
not yet advanced for armored maneuver that could be expected in a European 
environment.  Modern weapons systems with increased capabilities were still under 
development and their capabilities still unknown.  This uncertainty created conditions 
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that made FM 100-5, Operations one of the most controversial field manuals ever 
published.
163
  The new doctrine stressed increased mobility- based on lessons learned 
from helicopter operations in Vietnam.  None the less, it continued to emphasize 
defensive operations.
164
   This new doctrinal focus on the defense of Europe with a 
numerically inferior force prompted a heated debate.  A defensive strategy implied 
that Western Europe would have to endure another invasion and potential occupation.  
Many believed that an offensive strategy was a better means to achieve victory in 
Europe than a defensive strategy.  An offensive strategy, however, did not imply that 
the United States military would invade the Soviet Union.  An offensive strategy was 
limited to counterattacks designed to restore the West German borders.   However, 
the anticipated shortage of military resources precluded realistic consideration of a 
strategic level offensive strategy with limited conventional forces.
165
    
This doctrinal shift challenged existing core missions and procedures at all 
levels of the Army.  This dramatic shift in strategy - from an offensive focus to a 
defensive focus - shook the cultural foundations of the Army.
166
  It required a 
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reassessment of all of the functions of the functional life cycle model.  As Trefry 
noted, ―The Army‘s most important output, or product, is combat-ready units - a 
combination of soldiers and equipment organized in units with appropriate doctrine 
and trained to accomplish their mission.‖167  As this doctrinal shift began to permeate 
the force, the Army‘s organizational structure began to change accordingly.  
The senior leadership of a large corporation or of the Army is required to 
provide the long-range vision of change to ensure proper allocation of resources.  
Similarly, in the 1970s the Army senior leadership of Generals Meyer and Starry 
provided the guidance for reorganizing the Army based on the operational concepts 
that shaped the new doctrine.  This Army wide effort was collectively referred to as 
the ―Army of Excellence‖.  The organizational design structure was referred to as 
―Army 86‖ or ―Division 86‖.168  The Army of Excellence organizationally reflected 
the doctrine proposed in FM 100-5, Operations.  
  The Army Training and Doctrine Command conducted a series of studies 
and simulations under Starry‘s leadership between 1977 and 1981 to determine the 
operational concepts required to optimize the capabilities of the modernized weapon 
systems.
169
  These concepts (doctrine) then provided guidance for planners to develop 
an appropriate organizational structure.  This approach is a significant example of 
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how senior leaders‘ ideas drive organizational change, rather than the organizational 
change driving the concepts.  Further, it produced an optimal organization to 
accomplish a desired capability, rather than the organizational design limiting the 
operational abilities of the organization.
170
  This change in Army organization also 
demonstrated the interdependent relationships described by Trefry in the functional 
life cycle model.  Collectively, these altered assessments of the Soviet military threat 
and corresponding change in U. S. Army doctrine, equipment, and organizational 
structures, are nothing less than monumental.   
In the 1980s the Army faced a series of significant challenges.  Globalization, 
modernization, economic crisis, political uncertainty, and the changing competitive 
environment collectively required an evaluation of how to accomplish the core 
mission of the Army.   Senior Army executives looked for the best method to manage 
change.  They considered the importance of organizational design, well-defined 
objectives, and horizontal integration.  The Army then changed its mission, its 
doctrine, its organizational structure, and much of its equipment.  These significant 
changes wreaked havoc at the highest levels of management.  However, Trefry‘s 
approach to these challenges was holistic, and his understanding of the 
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interrelationships among Army systems was singular.  He incorporated his functional 
life cycle model into the Army to manage some very turbulent changes.  
His model could be applied to any large organization.  It provides a holistic 
approach to managing change of an organization.   It addresses the importance of 
defining objectives and identifying systemic causes of problems before making any 
recommendations for change.  This model is still in use in the Army today, which 
testifies to its value.  Trefry‘s leadership was critical to the development of this 
model.  His performance in the 1980s demonstrates the positive impact that a 
strategic leader can have on an organization in a changing environment.    
Management Theories 
 Although Trefry did not have any specific business theorist in mind when he 
developed the organizational life cycle model, many organizational theorists have 
shown that change dramatically affected business in the 1980s.  It is likely that Trefry 
was aware of some of the business reforms of the time.  In any case, Army leaders 
and business managers encountered similar problems and arrived at a similar set of 
solutions to manage change.  Trefry‘s following remarks affirm his awareness of 
contemporary business managerial concepts: 
Now, there‘s a hell of a lot written about management, and I get a big kick out 
of the reformers talking about how we don't train leaders anymore, we train 
managers.  As a matter of fact, any study of the programs of instruction in the 
school system will show you it's just the other way around.  We train very few 
people in what you would call management.  Most of the school programs of 
instruction are built around warfighting, command and leadership, but 
80 
management to me, is nothing more than understanding of the processes by 
which you are able to command and lead.  That's where we get in trouble.
171
 
Exploration of some of the dominant business management theories reveals 
similarities between the corporate management concepts and Army management 
concepts embedded in the Army functional life cycle model.  First of all, senior 
executives of business, the Secretary of Defense, and all the Service Secretaries are 
civilian appointees.  Many of them were former leaders of industry.  The civilian 
leadership of the DoD has great authority and the ability to make lasting changes in 
the management processes of the organization.  For example, Robert McNamara, who 
was the Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1968, designed and implemented the 
planning, programming, and budgeting system that is still used by the DoD.  The 
military is not completely isolated from business practices or from society as a whole.  
From a practical standpoint, military leaders must understand civilian management 
theories in order to communicate with their civilian leaders.  The role of the senior 
leadership in leading change in an organization cannot be overstated.  Accordingly, 
Trefry‘s recommended model inevitably incorporated the dominant business practices 
in order for it to be approved by the Army‘s civilian leadership.   Some of these 
practices included the importance of organizational design, well-defined objectives, 
and horizontal integration.   
Peter Drucker, a noted business consultant and professor of the period, 
provided a corporate example of strategic change in an organization, including 
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unintended consequences.  He cited the case of a corporation that decided to stop 
making a measurement instrument that had decreasing sales.  The company informed 
its customers of its intention to stop production completely in three years, and then 
sales increased as past customers ―stocked up‖ on the familiar product.  The 
purchasing department, however, was unaware of the decision to discontinue 
production and continued to buy assembly parts to make new instruments.  Company 
policy required acquisition of assembly parts based directly on the number of units 
sold.  Hence, when production stopped, the company suffered a significant loss due to 
the accumulated inventory of approximately ten years of assembly parts.
172
  This 
example demonstrated that executive‘s strategic decisions have tactical consequences.  
Further, it illustrated the challenge of managing information within a large 
corporation.   
Within the Army functional life cycle model the importance of sharing 
information and synchronizing actions is graphically illustrated by the 
interdependence of functions woven into the ―spider web‖.  There were countless 
examples of unintended consequences of strategic decisions, or the lack of 
information sharing within the military.  Trefry recalled the modernization experience 
of the 256
th
 Infantry Brigade, Louisiana National Guard, to illustrate the impacts of 
lack of coordination.  He produced a thirty-four page summary that detailed the 
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shortcomings identified by the 1982 Army modernization inspection.  He organized 
the report findings along the functions of the life cycle model.  For instance, one of 
the findings under the distribution function was that a fifty million dollar funding 
shortfall was identified due to a lack of information sharing between management 
systems.
173
  The 256
th 
Infantry Brigade was being converted from a light infantry to a 
mechanized infantry structure.  This conversion involved many activities within the 
functions of Trefry‘s model.  For the most part, the unit was changing from carrying 
everything they needed on their backs to riding in armored personnel carriers and 
tanks.  Trefry recalled that, 
They received a tank with no keys, or anything else.  They had to use a winch 
to get it on a tractor trailer sideways and then they had the state police escort 
them twenty miles to the armory.  They had to get guys from Fort Polk, 
Louisiana to come down and show them how to start it and that sort of 
thing.
174  
 
The inspection culminated with a briefing to the Adjutant General of the State 
of Louisiana and the Brigade Commander.  Trefry sat them both down on swivel 
chairs in the middle of the room surrounded by a chart that went around the four 
walls.  The chart showed the functions of the model and the impacts of what the 
inspectors found that the Army did, or failed to do.  Trefry recalled, ―You should 
have seen those guys. They sat there and said, ‗Gee Whiz‘, and ‗that‘s right‘.  So I 
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asked them if I could take the information back to show the folks at Washington.‖175   
He did not seek to embarrass the Louisiana National Guard; they had done well in 
spite of the Army‘s bureaucratic failures.  He wanted to demonstrate that the lack of 
communication and coordination by the Army staff has some very serious 
consequences.  This example highlights the importance of senior executives‘ 
responsibility to effectively manage change and define organizational objectives. 
Another of Drucker‘s management theories related to the foregoing example 
is called management by objectives.  This concept validates the necessity of all 
workers to understand how they contribute to achieving an organization‘s 
objectives.
176
   This theory has been embraced and adapted to many organizations.  It 
is similar to the concept of mission in a military organization.  All soldiers are 
expected to know what their unit‘s mission is so that they can ensure that all their 
actions contribute to accomplishing this organizational mission.  Communication is 
vital for management by objectives.  It is not a means of organization, but a mode of 
organization.
177
   The design of the organization dramatically affects the flow of 
information; design is critical to both military and civilian organizations.  As Trefry 
commented, ―Look at the model, if the force structure isn‘t right, everything else is 
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wrong.‖178   Horizontal organization was also a dominant managerial redesign 
concept of the 1980s. 
The functional life cycle model incorporates the concept of horizontal 
integration in its representation of the lines that make up the ―spider web‖.  The Army 
was both a vertical organization, with specialists in many areas, as well as a 
horizontal organization, with commanders empowered to commit resources across 
organizational boundaries.   The model reinforced the importance of sharing 
information and synchronizing actions across organizational boundaries in order to 
implement effective change. 
Many large organizations are integrated vertically along functional lines, but 
they are integrated horizontally only at the highest levels of management.  However, 
horizontal integration is essential for the efficient and effective management of any 
large organization.  This horizontal integration is often referred to as the strategic or 
macro level of management.  Decision-making about organizational priorities and 
corresponding allocation of resources within an organization are made only at the 
highest levels of authority within an organization.  While the day-to-day decisions of 
a large organization are essential to its well-being, senior executives of an 
organization should not focus on its routine activities.  The problems of 
communication within a vertically structured organization were not new to the 1980s; 
however, Drucker stressed the importance of sharing information: ―In no other area 
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have intelligent men and woman worked harder or with greater dedication than they 
have worked on improving communications in our major institutions.‖179   
John Byrne also wrote about the problems of horizontal integration and the 
emergence of ―the horizontal corporation‖ in American business.180  He built on 
Alfred Chandler‘s 1977 work, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in 
American Business.  Chandler identified horizontal integration as a concept that 
originated with the consolidation of the American cigarette industry in the 1890‘s.181   
Byrne advanced this theory with modern examples from the 1980s and analyzed the 
restructuring initiatives of Eastman Kodak, DuPont, American Telephone and 
Telegraph, and Motorola to become more horizontal.  He stressed that ―to produce 
significant increases in productivity, firms must concentrate on managing across the 
organization as opposed to up and down.‖182  He credited the term ―horizontal 
organization‖ to Frank Ostroff of McKinsey & Company Consultants, who produced, 
In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies in 1982.
183
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Ostroff expanded the theory that centered on organizational design that was based on 
processes that empowered employees to make decisions that traditionally were made 
by senior department managers.  In theory, a horizontal organization needs fewer 
personnel than a vertical organization because the horizontal organizations create 
overlapping managerial positions.  Byrne also elaborated that the potential to reduce 
manpower costs increased the appeal of horizontal integration during the growing 
global competition of the 1980s.
184
  Byrne acknowledged that there are many 
challenges in restructuring an organization.  He analyzed the DuPont Chemical 
Corporation‘s challenges in creating a horizontal organization.  He concluded that, 
―Personnel must abandon the business practices that have made them successful in 
the past and look at process more broadly. That is the hardest damn thing to do.‖185   
Henry Mintzberg, another influential strategic business consultant and 
professor, cautioned that horizontal organizations did not work in all applications.  
―Some mass-production industries,‖ he warned, ―are better suited to streamlined 
vertical structures.‖186  In fact, vertical organizations encourage specialization and 
take advantage of technical expertise.  The predecessor of the horizontal organization 
was the team concept that cut across departments for temporary projects but left the 
organizational structure and authorities intact.  This practice dated back to the 
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1960s.
187
  In, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Mintzberg cites many of the 
fallacies of strategy development and planning.
188
  Additionally, he provides 
guidelines for implementing change and analyzes why many corporate strategies 
fail.
189
   However, Byrne, Ostroff, and Mintzberg all agreed that correctly determining 
an organization‘s key strategic objectives and identifying its essential core processes 
are prerequisites for considering any organizational changes.   
Much was being written in the 1980s about how to manage change in large 
corporations.  Executives share a common ambition: they want to change their 
organization for the better.  Some claimed the only real constant in an organization is 
change.   Many management theories of the period professed that dramatic change is 
very difficult in a large organization.  The very strengths that make an organization 
successful also serve as impediments to change.  Comfortable hierarchal relationships 
are threatened by organizational restructuring.  Turf wars can impede the overall goal 
of improving the efficiency of the company.  The pre-existing organizational 
structure, procedures, and personnel may be incapable of formulating or executing 
dramatic organizational change.  For this reason, many theories proposed a new 
‗change‘ organization or cell be created to dramatically change a large organization.  
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Several dominant theories of change in corporations and the Army emerged in the 
1980s.   
In his 1983 work, Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political, and 
Cultural Dynamics, Knoll Tichy proposed a model for managing organizational 
change.  His experience as a consultant convinced him that organizational change 
must be managed across three areas: 1) Technical, 2) Power or political and 3) 
Cultural or organizational values.
190
  He argued that many executives or management 
consultants focused their analysis and subsequent recommendations upon only one of 
these areas; their narrow focus then contributed to the failure of an organization to 
successfully adapt to change.
191
   In other words, a holistic approach provides a more 
effective means of changing an organization.  Both horizontal integration and a 
holistic approach facilitate positive change in a large organization.   
Trefry similarly identified the need for a holistic approach when he was 
developing the functional life cycle model: ―There is no system; there is a series of 
processes.‖192  The Army is organized into many vertical organizations that manage 
functions like acquisition, training, doctrine development, and operational 
warfighting.   Like Tichy, there are experts and consultants in all of these fields in the 
Army, but few of these experts can provide solutions to more than one function.  
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Trefry offered a model to determine the systemic causes to problems within the 
Army.   ―You‘re a lot better off using something like a model,‖ he explained, 
―because you‘re dealing with force structure, material, training, how you deploy, 
sustain, develop and get rid of things.‖193  For example, among detailed histories of 
organizational change, doctrine development, and material changes, we find no 
detailed histories of modernization in the Army that focus on the relationships among 
these separate functions.  Management of change was very difficult: Only innovative 
professional managers successfully change their large organizations.   They constitute 
a professional class of managers.   
The previous discussion emphasized the importance of strategic leaders in the 
management of large organizations; their roles were extolled by the dominant 
business theorists of the 1980s.   The American business and the professional 
management class also have rich histories.  The business activities of production and 
distribution required managerial expertise from the establishment of the first trading 
company.  Adam Smith and other economic theorists laid a rich foundation in their 
descriptions of market forces and capitalist theories of supply and demand.   In his 
1977 work, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business, 
Alfred Chandler expounded on these theories in his detailed explanation of the 
evolution of the modern American multinational corporation.  He diverged 
significantly from the current business analysis by challenging a basic premise of 
economic theory:  management, he argued, not ―the invisible hand of market forces,‖ 
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controlled economic production and distribution.
194
  His analysis focused on U. S. 
businesses between 1790 and 1960.   
In the 1980s, leaders of both the military and U. S. corporations were civilian 
senior executives.  The history of the professional management class underscores the 
role of senior executives.  Chandler discussed the emergence of this professional class 
of managers in American business.  As late as 1840, he stated, ―nearly all top 
managers were owners; they were either partners or major stockholders in the 
enterprises that they managed.‖195  These managers controlled specific product lines 
or oversaw business sites.  Corporations eventually began to utilize a new class of 
professional managers who established hierarchical organizations and managed the 
activities of many elements of the corporation from distant locations.
196
  Chandler 
cited the railroad and telegraph industries as the first modern enterprises that 
employed the new managerial class.  This new professional managerial class 
established techniques that still contribute to modern corporate management.  ―As 
technologies became more complex, and markets continued to expand, these 
managers assumed command in central sectors of the American economy.‖197  
Chandler claimed that ―professional managers replaced owners and financers by 1960 
to the point that no family or financiers were majority owners of the largest 200 
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companies in American business.‖198    This brief history of business executives 
traces increasing reliance on professional managers by the 1980s. 
Military Project Management 
Management of production and distribution in the military by a professional 
class of managers has a long history.  Paul Koistinen has produced a series of works 
that outline the process the U.S. Government used to mobilize the nation‘s industrial 
base for war.  In his first book, he outlined his model for a series of five books.  To 
date, he has completed four volumes that provide a thorough analysis of ―the political 
economy of warfare in America‖ from 1606 through 1945.  He stated, ―The political 
economy of warfare involves the interrelationships of the political, economic, and 
military institutions in devising the means to mobilize resources for defense and to 
conduct war.‖199  He established three major stages and periods of economic 
mobilization in U.S. history; first, the preindustrial stage associated with the 
Revolutionary War; second, the transition stage associated with the Civil War; and 
third, the industrial stage associated with twentieth-century warfare.
200
  He argued, 
due to a lack of established governmental functions and relatively little military 
specific technology during the first stage, ―economic mobilization involved 
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increasing civilian output and diverting products from civilian to military in order to 
supply the armed forces without converting the economy.‖201  There was not an 
established group of managers for war supplies during this stage.  He stated, 
―Merchants simultaneously served as public officials and military officers while they 
continued to conduct their private affairs.‖202    
In the second stage, he argued the Union military and government best 
represented the economic mobilization pattern of the second period.  ―Operating 
under the President, the War, Navy, and Treasury departments acted as the principal 
mobilization agencies.  They relied on market forces rather than elaborate 
regulations…to meet the enormous demands of war.  The only exception involved the 
railroads…followed by the telegraph.‖203  He accounted for these exceptions because 
the railroads and telegraph systems had been established before the war and were not 
considered a result of the wartime economic mobilization.   In fact, several prominent 
civilian railroad managers brought their experience and expertise to the Union Army.  
They became generals in the United States Military Rail Roads (USMRR) agency and 
managed complex strategic rail movements that provided logistical support for the 
Union Army.  Christopher Gabel portrayed the role of ―Railroad Generals‖ of the 
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Civil War in his book Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy. 
204
 
―Railroad generals‖ of the Civil War managed complex production and distribution 
systems that required dedicated staffs and management techniques similar to those 
utilized by the corporate enterprise.
205
  Koistinen‘s analysis corresponds to Chandler 
and Gabel‘s argument that the first American class of managers emerged in the 
railroad and telegraph industries.   
In the third stage, industrialization, Koistinen detailed the growth of large 
corporations and the government bureaucracy.  He argued, ―The growth of huge 
bureaucracies in corporate and governmental spheres began to blur the institutional 
lines between both.‖206  He noted similarity between the interdependent relationships 
in stages one and three: ―Businessmen often staffed the government‘s regulatory 
agencies, and…the affairs of government and business touched or merged at many 
points.‖207  By the eve of World War I complex bureaucracies existed in both 
business and government.  However, national security concerns required government 
control of economic mobilization due to the risk of dire consequences to the nation if 
market forces could not meet demand for war materials.   Koistinen argued the War 
Industries Board (WIB) was the most important board during the War.  It determined 
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the conversion of businesses to produce military hardware, as well as the priority, 
allocation, and price of wartime materials.
208
  He maintained that this model of 
government - working interpedently with business and the military communities - 
provided the precedent for military economic planning during the interwar years and 
World War II.
209
  Again, Koistinen‘s analysis conforms to Chandler and Gabel‘s 
assessment that a professional class of managers emerged in the industrial era in 
response to the increased technological advances.    
In his latest book, Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of 
American Warfare, 1940-1945, Koistinen detailed the complex set of boards and 
offices that were established for managing the political economy for World War II.  
In short, this history demonstrated the political struggle between the various interest 
groups over how to best coordinate or control the means of war production for the 
nation.  One the one hand, the military and business had continued defense 
coordination in the interwar years though several coordination boards.  Some of these 
included the War Resources Board (WRB) and supported the guidance of the 
Industrial Mobilization Plan.
210
  On the other hand, President Roosevelt deeply 
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wanted to oversee control of the means of war production.  The Reorganization Act 
of 1939 provided the authority for Roosevelt to establish the Executive Office of the 
President.  Within the executive office, he established the National Resources 
Planning Board and the Office for Emergency Management (OEM).  Roosevelt 
envisioned all other boards and commissions working under the authority OEM and 
therefore under his supervision of the executive branch.
211
  In 1940, Roosevelt 
reestablished the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) that had been 
utilized in World War I.  The composition of the board brings the discussion back to 
the role of managers and elites in the organization.  Roosevelt selected several leaders 
of industry; the heads of: U.S. Steel, General Motors, the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, Association of American Railroads, and a professor from the 
University of North Carolina.
212
  The nation‘s reliance on the best and the brightest 
from industry - or as Koistinen states ―the elite class‖- in times of national emergency 
supports his argument that a professional class of managers was needed for political 
economic mobilization of the nation for war.   
Since the 1940s, the military has adopted contemporary business management 
practices to manage the production and distribution of weapons systems.  On a 
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broader scale, the Department of Defense, Congress, and the President provide 
strategic guidance and may have divergent interests; Similarly Koistinen argued bitter 
disputes existed between Roosevelt and Secretary of War Stinson over control of war 
mobilization.
213
  Herbert Leventhal, the historian of the Army Material Command, 
detailed the role of project managers in the military in his work, U.S. Army Material 
Command: Project Management in the Army Material Command, 1962-1987.   
Project managers provided an organizational solution for achieving the objectives of 
specific programs.  Project managers were granted the sole authority and 
responsibility for managing a project to produce a final product, without any separate 
functional interests in another Army headquarters command.   He contended that the 
first modern example of this type of organization ―occurred in the 1940s and was 
called the Manhattan Project, which developed the Atomic Bomb.‖214   Later in 1955, 
he noted, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) was formed to oversee the 
Jupiter Missile Program.  In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
established the Army Material Command to oversee the production and distribution 
of Army systems.   Leventhal contends that McNamara‘s initiative expanded the 
project manager‘s role.  He reports that this role includes ―all phases of development, 
procurement, production, distribution, and support of a balanced program to ensure 
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that all employment schedules were met.‖215  This short history of military project 
management and political and economic mobilization provides a foundation for 
further analysis of the doctrinal and organizational changes that occurred in the 
Army.
216
   
Conclusion 
The Army Functional Life Cycle Model similarly incorporated the concept of 
the project manager using a team approach to coordinate the management of change 
or modernization.  Teams were established to coordinate projects; they included 
representatives from the different organizations that are responsible for the eight 
functions of the model.  Trefry provided management of Army programs with a 
codified inspection methodology that identified systemic faults and provided a means 
to correct them.  He developed a trained set of inspectors and founded a school to 
implement these changes at every level of the Army.  Further, he developed a model 
that served as a management tool to ensure a holistic approach to managing change of 
complex interdependent systems.  Trefry‘s approach to change resembles many of the 
change initiatives of managers of large corporations in the 1970s and 1980s.   
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Chapter Four 
Findings: The History of the Army Force Management School  
 The history of the U. S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) 
provides further insight into the management of change in the Army.  As the previous 
chapters have established, the Army continually adapts to changes in the global 
security environment, national policy, technology, doctrine, and resource availability.  
Chapter Three addressed the role of the Army inspectors general in developing and 
establishing the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model as a tool to manage change 
within the Army.  However, oversight of the daily activities required to manage 
change within the Army is not the main focus of the inspectors general.  Lieutenant 
General Trefry recognized that the scope and complexity of managing change 
throughout the Army in the 1970s and 1980s required a trained group of 
professionals.  These professionals needed a holistic view of the Army bureaucracy in 
order to increase efficiency in a resource constrained environment.  In response to this 
challenge, the Army established a specialized school which raised senior officials‘ 
awareness of the holistic perspective required to manage change within the Army.  
Trefry, once again, played an essential role in the establishment of this school - the 
U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS).  This chapter explores the 
development of the USAFMS as well as the creation of a series of charts that 
document many of the force management initiatives that have occurred within the 
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Army since 1940.
217
   These charts are referred to as the Mother of All Charts 
(MOAC).  
Trefry recalled that in 1993, after he had left White House as the Military 
Assistant to President George H. W. Bush and the Director of the White House 
Military Office, he met with Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Dennis Reimer 
and Army Operations Officer Army General Binford Peay.  Reimer and Peay 
mentioned that they had just received a functional area assessment report on 
modernization that was discouraging.  They were both familiar with Trefry‘s work on 
force management as The Inspector General of the Army in the 1980s.  They asked 
Trefry to assemble a team to investigate the status of force management in the Army.  
Trefry was obviously interested in what had happened to the force management 
initiatives began in the 1980s.  Trefry recalled, ―So we went around the Army (in 
1993) and found that all the schools had evaporated.‖218   
Force Management Training since the 1980s 
Chapter Three identified the origins of Army force management and the role 
of the inspector general in developing a program of instruction for force management 
in the 1980s.  The Inspector General School incorporated the functional life cycle 
model of the Army (FLCM) into the inspection training program.  This training 
provided the inspectors with a holistic understanding of the systemic causes of the 
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inspection deficiencies they encountered in the Army.    However, Trefry‘s 1993 
investigation revealed that although the Army recognized the importance of an 
integrated force management training program in the 1980s, no organizational 
structure was created to ensure the continuation of the educational initiatives he 
championed while on active duty.  When he retired in 1983, four courses were 
envisioned - 1) force developers, 2) training developers, 3) personnel specialists, and 
4) logisticians - to train a cadre of force management specialists.   
 First, a force developer‘s school offered a four week long course at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.  ―Believe it or not, the Force Development School lasted nine 
years and was run by contractors from the Allen Corporation between 1982 through 
1991.‖219   ―However‖, he stated, ―By 1988, the contract was down to just one 
instructor, who had been a program manager in the signal field.  The course began to 
closely resemble the Program Manager‘s Course at Fort Belvoir.‖220  By 1991, 
―General Mike Steele was the Commandant at Fort Leavenworth and he told me that 
they could no longer support the contract and had to eliminate the course.‖221  This 
was largely due to a reduction in budget resources.
222
 
A second school was also located at Fort Leavenworth.   Trefry stated, ―A 
training developer‘s course was established at Fort Leavenworth in 1983.  It only 
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lasted six months and graduated two classes.‖223   The third school was located at Fort 
Benjamin Harrison, Indiana to train personnel specialists.  Trefry recalled that he 
spoke to every class at this school.  It was a four week course and was also eliminated 
by 1990.   He remembered, ―Bill Richardson and Carl Vouno were the Commandants.  
They were very supportive.  But in the mid 1980s, the Army began to look at the 
school at Leavenworth as a senior Captain‘s course and they really believed that force 
management didn't have a place in this (instruction).‖224    
This lack of understanding of the importance of force management to the 
Army school system speaks volumes on the divide between training the institutional 
army for success and training the operational Army for success.  Although there is 
only one U.S. Army there are many specialties or tribes within the Army.  Within the 
Operational Army there are combat arms, combat support, and combat service 
support elements that all have their own heritage, culture, and community of 
significant others.  In a sense, these tribes all cooperate to support the overall mission 
of the nation, but they have different internal parochial priorities.  The operational 
Army consists of numbered armies, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions that 
conduct full spectrum operations around the world.
225
  The Institutional Army 
supports the operational Army and provides the infrastructure necessary to raise, 
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train, equip, deploy, and provide the readiness of all Army forces.
226
  Much of the 
instruction at the institutional school system is focused on training the operational 
forces for combat.  Many staff officers are required to complete the missions of the 
institutional Army and have to learn their staff skills and responsibility through on the 
job training.  There are many reasons for this phenomenon, but the lack of 
institutional foresight to train should not be one of them.
227
  
Lastly, a fourth course was envisioned at Fort Lee, Virginia for logisticians.  
Trefry stated, ―The logistician‘s course never got off the ground because there were 
no resources to support it.‖228   Collectively, including the Inspectors General School, 
these five courses lasted many years and had a great impact on raising awareness of a 
holistic approach to force management in the Army.  The establishment of these 
schools indicated that force management was recognized as an important concept in 
the Army in the 1980s.  However, adequate resources were not dedicated to maintain 
these initiatives into the 1990s.  Since resources were not allocated to sustain these 
initial initiatives, the relative importance of force management to the Army can be 
doubted.  In a large bureaucracy like the Army, however, the lack of resources for 
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force management training can be attributed to a number of factors other than ―lack of 
relative importance of the concept.‖229  
The importance of force management to the Army can also be measured by 
the importance placed on the selection of Army Inspectors General because they were 
the first officers trained in force management.  Trefry recalled, ―When Bernie Rogers 
was the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1976 he gave me top priority to select the 
Inspectors General.‖230  Rogers said, ―If you really want to understand the Army you 
have got to get out and see it and you've got these schools going and they are just 
making a hell of a difference, and they did.‖231  Trefry added, ―By 1983, when I 
retired, the Inspector General School was firmly established.  Nearly half of the 
general officers selected in 1984 had been former inspectors general.  No longer was 
an inspector general position seen as a career ending position.‖232  The high rate of 
selection to general officer implies that at the senior Army levels force management 
experience was still considered valuable in the 1980s. 
The National Guard and reserve components also benefited from the 
Inspectors General School.  Trefry reminisced, ―One morning I was having breakfast 
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with the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of the Guard Bureau, and the Chief of the 
Army Reserve.  I asked the Chiefs what they would think if I offered them an active 
duty Army Colonel to be their Inspector General.  Well, the National Guard thought it 
would be a hell of a good idea.‖233  The Reserve declined the offer because they 
preferred to have a reservist trained for the position at the Inspector General School.  
Trefry explained, 
We thought we'd start out small and he picked about six states: New Jersey, 
Tennessee, California, and Oklahoma were among the first.  I got a phone call 
a little later about how this program just turned into a howling success.   One 
of the state Adjutant Generals (Karl Wallace from Tennessee) called me and 
said, ―I nodded and really didn't know what I was getting into when I agreed 
to this program.‖  But he then said, ―This has turned out to be one of the best 
decisions I ever made.  I tell the other Adjutant Generals the best thing they 
can do is to get an active duty Colonel as their Inspector General.‖ So that's 
the way it grew.
234
   
As the previous chapter discussed, the Inspector General School provided the 
initial force management training in the Army and became the basis of the USAFMS.  
The history of the USAFMS therefore builds on the history of the Inspector General 
School.  Trefry recounted how the USAFMS was founded at Fort Belvoir.  ―Right 
before I retired, I went down to see the Chief of Engineers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
and asked him for a building where we could permanently run the Inspector General 
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School.  He provided the building (Humphrey Hall) 
 
that we still use today for the 
Inspector General School.‖235 
Force management training was also included in the curriculum for all officers 
attending the Command and General Staff College and the Army War.  Major Eric 
Hollister completed a review of the existing course catalogs for the Command and 
General Staff Officers Course (CGSC) conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in a 
2009 monograph examining the ―History of Force Management Education at the 
Command and General Staff College.‖  He argued that some aspects of force 
management training have been present in the college curriculum since 1933.  He 
considered force management as any instruction related to nine basic fields: ―General 
Force Management; Force Development (FD); Material Development; Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE); Force Generation; Manning; Total 
Army Analysis (TAA); Force Integration; and Case Study‖.236  He argued that the 
number of hours associated with a block of instruction was an indication of the 
amount of relative emphasis placed upon force management.  His analysis established 
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that the number of hours associated with ―force management‖ instruction at CGSC 
has varied dramatically since the 1930s.   His charts demonstrate that between 1985 
and 1993, force management instruction hours declined dramatically.
237
  Trefry also 
identified a similar trend of reduction in other force management courses in his 
investigation. 
In June 1993, Trefry‘s investigation team published their findings entitled the 
Final Report- U.S. Army Force Management. 
238
  The report identified nine ―key 
issues‖ from the detailed findings addressed in the final report.  It also contained 
fifteen recommendations; nine of which addressed the nine key issues.  The nine key 
recommendations were approved by Reimer for immediate action.  Based on the 
experience of the loss of resources for force management training at the service 
schools, Trefry believed that a force management school should be established in the 
National Capital Region under the oversight of the Army Staff.  This location would 
facilitate the training of specialists in force management, as well as senior members 
of the Army staff, with a minimum of expense or disruption because most of the 
Army Staff is assigned to the National Capital Region.  The location would also 
facilitate the Chief of Staff of the Army‘s visibility over force management training.  
Many force management initiatives are managed by the Army staff.  The location also 
supports the integration of force management issues being coordinated by the Army 
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staff into the curriculum.  Further, Trefry recommended that the school be organized 
under the G-3 of the Army rather than under TRADOC to prevent another dilution of 
resources over time.  The Inspector General School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia already 
provided some force management training so it was a likely location for a force 
management specialty school.  Accordingly, one of the final report recommendations, 
adopted by Reimer, directed the establishment of a force management training site in 
the National Capital Region.
239
  
Reimer asked Trefry if he would like to run the school based on his 
experience with the Inspector General School.  He told Reimer, ―I would love too but 
I‘m not sure that it is legal, (for) I‘m the one who came up with this stuff.‖240   The 
Adjutant General of the Army, at Reimer‘s request, determined that Trefry could 
compete for the position as long as an open competition was allowed.  There were 
three competitors for the contract, but Military Professional Resources Incorporated 
(MPRI) received the contract to establish the USAFMS on 24 June 1994.  The first 
test course started 1 October of that year as a three week class and contained fifty 
students.  The class has been offered six times each year since then.
241
  USAFMS 
serves the Army as an educational institution for preparing senior leaders, both 
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military and civilian, entering the force management worldwide community.  The 
contract has been competed several times since then but no competitor has shown 
interest in running the school.  MPRI has been running the school continuously under 
the G3 since 1994.   ―Since contract inception the USAFMS has provided in excess of 
20,000 graduates, and averages 3,500 students per year.  The USAFMS provides the 
only means to teach the Army how the Army runs versus the TRADOC School 
System, which teaches how the Army fights.‖242  Many of the instructors at the 
Inspector General School were the Army force management subject matter experts.   
 The existing school contract expires in 2010.   The Department of the Army, 
Defense Contracting Command-Washington, Contracting Center of Excellence has 
solicited inquiries for this opportunity.  A brief excerpt from the solicitation provides 
additional insight to the purpose and scope of work performed at the USAFMS.  It 
demonstrates the technical expertise required to understand the complex relationships 
between Army systems that constitute force management: 
To procure a contractor(s) who shall provide overall operational and 
programmatic support to the Force Management School: to provide in-depth 
education and training to both military and civilian personnel in the entire 
spectrum of Force Management, Force Development, and Force Integration to 
include the why and how to of determining force requirements and alternative 
means of resourcing. The contract will provide for the focusing of force 
capabilities centered upon the processes, system of systems and regulatory 
basis of force management and the capabilities that must be sustained through 
management of doctrinal, organizational and materiel change. The Army 
Force Management School is a government owned contract operated school 
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which provides consolidated and cost effective Force Management education 
and training to both Military and Civilian force Management Analyst, and to 
provide the means of maintaining currency of specified Army Force 
Management publications, regulations, manuals, pamphlets, circulars and 
associated documents, providing review, updating, and publication of force 
management related publications. Businesses are to outline their experiences 
in the following areas: 1) Organization Design and Analysis 2) Force 
Development 3) Capabilities Based Requirements Generation 4) The Army 
Authorization Documents System (TAADS 5) Structure and Manpower 
Allocation System (SAMAS 6) Force Management Education and Training 
and lastly 7) Doctrine.
243
 
Reimer became the Chief of Staff of the Army 20 June 1995.  He was 
interested in how force modernization training was progressing in the Army and at 
the USAFMS.  He made a visit to the school in January 1996.  Trefry recalled, ―I had 
a blackboard with me and basically, I described the two (Army) missions.  There is an 
organization mission, and there is a fighting mission, and Reimer said ―what's this?‖  
I said this is Army force management.  He said ―take me through it,‖ so I did.‖244   
Reimer was very interested in the information and embraced the program.  Reimer 
said: 
Okay, I want every officer in the Army to hear this.  I want you 
(Trefry) to go out to charm school (Army ‗Capstone‘ initial general 
officer development program) and give this same briefing.  I want 
thirty two hours of curriculum instruction-mandatory for the Army 
War College and Leavenworth as a core course, and I want a thirty two 
hour elective course at Leavenworth (CGSC) and the War College.
245
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Trefry continued, ―You can imagine what a response this got. Everybody screamed 
like hell at TRADOC.   They didn't have to furnish anything but it was the idea of 
taking people away from the tactical focus.  People would come to class kicking and 
screaming.  After they had been here about a week they said, ―Jeez what else do you 
teach?‖246   
 Reimer mandated instruction at the two Army schools, The Army War 
College and CGSC, institutionally responsible to develop the future senior leaders of 
the Army.   Force management instruction has remained a part of the core curriculum 
at the Army War College through 2010.  However, in 2003, the Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) instruction once again has been reduced to facilitate 
the transition to universal Intermediate Level Education (ILE).  The ILE transition 
involved providing resident education opportunities to all eligible Army officers, 
rather than the prior system that provided instruction to approximately half of all 
officers.  This transition reduced the contact hours available as the core course was 
shortened from ten months to approximately three months for required core 
instruction.  In 2003, the course was reduced from thirty-four hours by ten hours and 
the information was provided on a computer disk for self study.  After two years, the 
self study requirement was also dropped and the course was left at twenty-four hours.   
In 2006, the CGSC Commandant, Brigadier General Volney Warner reduced the 
force management instruction to sixteen hours per year in order to incorporate Middle 
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East regional studies instruction.
247
  Gregory Beck, the course director recalled, ―He 
directed that CGSC majors didn't need ‗strategic‘ level force management stuff -like 
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution, or material acquisition.  The 
course needed to address ‗current‘ stuff - that operations officers and executive 
officers needed - that the army was dealing with at the tactical level.‖248   Although 
the course director disagreed with the rationale, the hierarchal nature of the 
organization ensured that the decision would be carried out enthusiastically.  Two 
additional hours were recently added back to the course to address contracting.  A 
force management elective is also offered at CGSC and taken by approximately 
sixteen officers per year.
249
  
The reduction of training in force management at the major level has a greater 
impact than it may appear.  Senior level commanders must understand force 
management and the relationships between systems in the Army.  The problem 
becomes balancing training requirements with utilization assignments.  Many 
positions are not coded for a force management specialist because of the limitations 
on manpower and associated structure.
250
  Yet understanding the relationship between 
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systems is critical to the efficient operations of the Army.   If an officer is not going 
to be assigned to a force management coded position, it is unlikely that they will 
attend the USAFMS.  Personnel in many other positions - than the few specialty 
coded positions - require an understanding of force management to effectively 
manage the Army.  Yet, as discussed, they only receive limited instruction at the 
CGSC before they are assigned to positions that would benefit from their increased 
awareness.  It is difficult to quantify the impact of additional force management 
training, yet it is likely that there would be benefits.  Trefry understood this dilemma 
and stated:  ―There is not a day that goes by that the Army is not in need of Force 
Management.  People forget that the mission of the Secretary of the Army is very 
simple, he raises, provisions, and resources the Army.  He does not fight.  The people 
who fight are the Combatant Commanders, not the Chiefs either; the chiefs assist the 
Secretaries.‖251  Trefry‘s comment reflects the difference between the operational and 
institutional Army and are founded in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the UCP.
252
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There are two main parts to the Army, figuratively referred to as the tip of the 
spear and the shaft.  The tip of the spear represents the fighting forces and the shaft 
represents the forces that support the fighting forces, just as the shaft supports or 
enables the tip of a spear.  The supporting forces must understand how to manage the 
resources to ensure the tip of the spear – the fighting forces - have their combat 
capabilities when they are required.  Majors and lieutenant colonels serve in key staff 
positions at every level of the Army.   Many do so after completing CGSC but before 
attending the Army War College.  Universal attendance at the CGSC level provides 
an opportunity to influence every future senior leader of the Army at approximately 
their thirteenth year of their career - before critical staff utilization assignments.   
Attendance at the Army War College is based on a centralized selection board that 
typically selects six percent of the eligible population at an average of twenty-three 
years of service.   Many of the majors and lieutenant colonels retire when they reach 
twenty years of service and are never considered for attendance.  Therefore, foregoing 
the opportunity to teach the majors at CGSC has a much greater impact on the 
education of the Army than it may initially appear.  Much of the eligible population is 
missed by the current instruction methodology because it is projected too late in the 
officer‘s career- either after retirement or after staff assignment.253   Ironically, the 
current reduction in force management training in the Army is exactly the condition 
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Trefry reported in the 1993 Final Report  that led Reimer to mandate instruction at 
CGSC and the Army War College. 
All force management instructors at CGSC attend the Advanced Force 
Management Course at the USAFMS located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia as part of their 
instructor qualification training.
254
  The course consists of four weeks of 
comprehensive instruction that explicates the Army Flow Model.  Chapter Two 
detailed how the Army determines the national military objectives utilizing the Joint 
Strategic Planning System (JSPS). 
255
  At the USAFMS a series of charts are mounted 
to the walls on the second floor of the building (Humphrey Hall).  These charts 
provide a graphic representation of many events that have shaped the Army since 
1940.  Collectively, the charts are known as the Mother of all Charts (MOAC). 
Findings: The History of the Mother of All Charts 
The Mother of All Charts (MOAC) currently traces twenty-seven themes and 
consists of over one hundred separate charts.  Each chart is approximately three feet 
by six feet.  Senior executives, of both military and civilian organizations, have 
displayed these charts during numerous conferences and planning sessions.  
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The Army Flow Model is also known as the Army Force Management Model by the 
AFMS. It graphically depicts the interrelations between: the Joint Strategic Planning System, The 
Capabilities Integration and Development System, The Total Army Analysis, The Defense Acquisition 
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Collectively, these charts represent an impressive amount of information.  They 
provide an eclectic display of historical data and trends spanning from 1940 to the 
present.  They represent the history of the Army and the nation.  Coupled with the 
history of the USAFMS, these charts provide a foundation to consider the broader 
topics of Army force management and national security policy formulation.  The 
USAFMS maintains the charts with inputs from a variety of sources.  They have also 
digitized the charts and made them available online linked to a detailed Oracle 
database.  The school acknowledges that the charts will never be complete because, 
similar to history, new information is always being uncovered that must be added to 
the data base.   
In 1999, Scott Wilson joined MPRI and began work on the MOAC and has 
maintained the data base that supports the charts ever since.
256
   Lieutenant Colonel 
Scott Wilson worked on the Army Staff in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations, Force Development, Force Management and Integration Division from 
1987 until he retired in 1993.  Wilson was an Air Defense Artillery officer with 
experience in numerous command and staff positions throughout his career of over 
twenty years.  He worked in the Department of the Army Office of the Inspector 
General between 1980 and 1981 when many of the changes to the inspection 
methodology, which were discussed in Chapter Three, occurred.   He described the 
charts: 
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The charts are comparatively easy to read. The left-hand margin 
displays the category of information with the years depicted 
horizontally across charts for the 1940 to 2000 time period. Ideally, the 
charts would be stacked one upon the other in one column and you 
could then scan up and down to see the relationships of events and 
people and the following effects: Actions and reactions; intended an 
unintended consequences; initiatives and competence; doctrine leading 
technology or technology leading doctrine; and, sequential but 
simultaneous accomplishment of events.
257
  
The creation of the MOAC can be traced back to Lieutenant General Trefry.  
He needed a teaching tool, or training aide, that visually expressed the complex force 
development relationships.  He wanted to use historical examples to demonstrate how 
the Army functional life cycle model (FLCM), and force development provide a 
comprehensive understanding of change in the Army.  Curiously, the MOAC 
mirrored Trefry‘s own career that began before the start of World War II and still 
continues today as the program manager of the AFMS.  Trefry recalled that he had 
dealt with modernization and changes to Army units throughout his career and found 
it fascinating.
258
  He described the purpose of the FLCM model in a 1982 Army 
magazine article entitled, ―The IG: Inspector but a Teacher, Too‖: 
 To meet the dynamics of force modernization and to develop a means 
for Army personnel at all levels to better understand how the Army 
runs….Using the model, inspectors, commanders and managers are 
better able to evaluate the entire spectrum of Army operations, to 
describe them in proper perspective, and relate them in a context that 
is illustrative, meaningful, and comprehensible.
259
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The Army FLCM had been utilized as the basis of an inspection methodology 
since 1982.  By 1996, when Trefry developed the MOAC, he had over fourteen years 
of experience working with the FLCM.  This familiarity provided the background to 
view the interrelationships between historical events and their consequences in 
different systems throughout the Army.   He came back to his office one night in 
1996 and drafted the first chart on a piece of butcher paper.  These butcher paper 
charts are still displayed above his bookshelves on his office walls in Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia.  The first charts portrayed the linkage from the National Security Strategy to 
the National Military Strategy and down through the Army systems.  Each chart was 
connected to the adjoining charts by inputs and outputs from the force development 
functions.  He described what the first charts looked like: 
Those are the originals.  The purple lines that you see, you have to start on 
that chart up there and come down and then to the top of the next one and 
come down and over.  There are the events leading to the people. It starts 
with the President and it finishes up with the Secretary of Defense.  It comes 
down through the National Security Strategy and then the National Military 
Strategy.  Then you go back up here to organizational change and all those 
things in red up at the top here… and that is it.  Those are the divisions in 
red, World War I, World War II, and Korea.   Then you get into 
development, and culture, and personnel, and I tracked those things up until 
about the end of 1996; I think was the last one.  The green lines are 
reorganizations.
260
 
 
Trefry recalled, ―The Army is a system of systems how I can get that across?  I 
mentioned that the people determine the national security (through voting), and then 
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we get the national military stuff, and then we go into the domains.‖261  He started his 
charts with the domains of acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, 
sustainment, development, and separation that are referred to as the functions in the 
Army functional life cycle model (FLCM).
262
   
These domains can be traced to a term that is more familiar to many in the 
Army today: DOTLMS, or doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, 
material, and soldiers.
263
   Similarly, DOTLMS served as a model to analyze major 
areas of change within the Army.  General Vouno adopted these six functions and 
first published them in the 1986 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
commander‘s annual update in Army magazine.  TRADOC historian John Romjue 
chronicled much of the doctrinal changes in the Army in a series of TRADOC 
historical monographs; however, he does not examine the origin of the term 
DOTLMS before 1986.
264
   When Trefry discussed the development of the first 
MOAC chart, he recalled the term DOTLMS actually originated in 1984:  ―General 
Thurman was a great man on principles and one morning we met for breakfast and he 
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said, ‗What are the principles of force management.‘  I said, I don't know, let's make 
something up.  I‘ve still got the napkin they were written on. …This was in April 
1984.  He was the Vice (CSA); Yeah 1984, they have stood the test of time.‖265  
General Maxwell Thurman was an ordnance officer that served in a variety of 
command and staff positions culminating as Commander, U.S. Southern Command 
Overseeing the invasion of Panama to capture General Noriega.   He also served as an 
artillery battalion commander during the Tet offensive in Vietnam; the Commander, 
Army Training and Doctrine Command; and the Commander, Army Recruiting 
Command when the slogan ―Be all that you can be‖ was adopted.  Similar to Trefry, 
he was a bachelor and a tireless leader who would spend many hours at the office.
266
  
Over time many other chart themes emerged.   DOTLMS is now divided into 
several different charts chronicled on the MOAC.  As of January 2010, the MOAC 
had evolved into an electronic database.  The hard copy charts still exists.   Mr. Scott 
Wilson has been steadily converting the existing documents in the archive into 
electronic formats.   New material continues to be cataloged and stored electronically.  
Trefry determines which of the documents he believes are of sufficient historical 
significance for Wilson to archive from his daily correspondence.  Much of the 
cultural or social events have been subjectively added to the charts based on Trefry‘s 
judgment.  The abundant data points on the chart can now be expanded through the 
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―Microsoft Visio‖ program to reveal a greater level of detail.  They are also cataloged 
in a searchable Oracle database.   For example, the Threat theme chart is one of 
eighty-eight digitized charts that have many subcategories depicted on them.  Trefry 
described some of them, ―Threats can be personalities, they can be economic, they 
can be political, they can be regicide, they can be assassinations, and they can be 
holocausts.‖267  The data base contains more items than can be represented by each 
data point on the chart.  Trefry explained, ―The State Department puts out a 
publication that lists the threats since World War II.  They have identified over seven 
thousand of them.  I haven‘t even seen some of them.  We picked some of the major 
ones to put on the chart.‖ 268  Clicking on the bottom of each of these points opens a 
new set of data points.  Some of these similarly open another supporting level of 
detail.  It is similar to a wiring diagram that has branches extending from each 
subsequent level of the chart.  An example of the Geopolitical chart is provided 
below. 
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Figure 5.  The Mother of All Charts Electronic Database.
269
  
Figure Five provides an example of the capabilities of the electronic database.   
A ―tree search‖ provides an outline view of the data represented on the chart.  The 
Geopolitical chart expands to the subcategories of  ―people, nuclear weapons, School 
of the Americas, conferences & conventions, incidents, conflicts, boards, studies, 
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publications, and legislation.‖270  Selecting the category people returns forty-five 
records.  Selecting the dates listed in the third row, 1 March 1941- 3 August 1944, 
displayed a box with the summary ―Truman Committee: Senate Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense Program formed on 1 Mar 1941; Truman appointed 
chairman on 8 Mar 1941; Truman nominated for Vice President in July 1944; 
resigned chairmanship of committee on 3 Aug 1944.‖271  The database further 
provided a link to the United States Senate site with an historical essay detailing the 
Truman Committee.  The Senate link also contained additional historical links for 
further research.
272
  Many pictures were also represented by the data points on the 
charts.  The archive collection of photographs was also impressive.  The current 
charts and databases are listed below:  
 Events [Geopolitical, Threat, Mobilization, Military Actions, Joint & 
Combined Military Endeavors, Military Campaigns, Science & Technology, 
Army Culture, Army Reorganizations, Selective Service, Military Exercises, 
Installations (BRAC), and Security Assistance Programs] 
 People [Presidents, Key Advisors, Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, Key 
Congressional Leaders, Army Secretariat and Army Staff, CINC‘s, Major 
Army Commanders] 
 National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy 
 Resources [Manpower, Dollars] 
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 DTLOMS [Doctrine Development, Training Development, Leader 
Development, Organization Development, Materiel Development, Soldier 
Support Systems] 
 Information Systems 
 Army Analysis Programs 
 Major Combat Divisions [Regular Army, Army of the United States, Army 
National Guard, Army Reserve] 
 Major Combat Brigades/Armored Cavalry Regiments [Regular Army, Army 
National Guard, Army Reserve] 
 Branches of the Army [Coast Artillery, Air Defense, Field Artillery, Aviation, 
Armor, Engineers, Infantry, Signal, Military Intelligence, AG, Finance, 
Chaplain, Military History, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, etc.]
273
 
These chart themes have largely evolved from Trefry‘s imagination, although some 
have been ―inspired by some of the subject matter experts working at USAFMS like 
Jim Camp, John Walsh, and John Albertson.‖274  These subject matter experts are 
MPRI contractors on the faculty of the AFMS.  Each is responsible for a specific area 
of instruction based on their experiences as career Army officers and continued work 
with the Army staff.  Jim Camp is the Director of Instruction, John Walsh is a budget 
specialist, and John Albert is a logistics specialist.
275
   
The branches of the Army MOAC charts are particularly interesting.  There 
are twenty-four branches in the Army.  Each has a unique culture based on a rich 
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history of changing organizational structures, equipment fieldings, evolving missions, 
and distinguished leadership.  These cultural components lie at the heart of force 
management.  Trefry described his experience in the military as a field artillery 
officer since 1950.  He started as a battery level officer dealing with the transition 
from one type artillery system to another.  He managed his unit transition from eight 
inch artillery tubes to Honest John missiles.  Later his unit transitioned to nuclear 
capable missiles.  As a new general officer, in January 1971, he deployed to Thailand 
and oversaw the augmentation of the Laotian military.  He summarized, 
You see now all of these things, every one of them is a force 
management competition and a lot of people don't know that.  They 
think that force management is just about tactical troops.  That‘s the 
easy stuff.  It‘s the other issues that are more complicated. That you 
really have to sit down and think about this and ask, what do we want 
to do with this?  Why do we need this?  You have to keep a very close 
eye on technology… because when you bring a new piece of gear on, 
it probably means a change of MOS or two, or three… which also 
means a new school. …It‘s not all in the equipment.  It just requires a 
complete a change all the way around.
276
 
Scott Wilson was an Air Defense officer so he started with a MOAC Air 
Defense branch chart.  He then developed one for the engineers.  Some of the other 
MPRI instructors started charts for branches they were affiliated with.  The branch 
schools periodically request copies of their charts.   As an example of some of the 
information maintained on the chart, Trefry recalled a trip to dedicate a building at 
the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.   When he got there they unveiled the 
mission of the artillery branch and he was surprised that it was not the same one that 
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he had remembered.  That inspired him to research the missions of the Artillery 
branch.  He discovered that the mission has been changed nine times by different 
branch chiefs.  These changes are now incorporated on the Artillery Branch chart.   
Similarly equipment, organizations, and leadership changes are also captured.  
Conclusion 
The U.S. Army Inspector General School began force management instruction 
in 1980.  The inspectors general were the first to receive force management 
instruction in the Army.  The Army envisioned four other special courses to integrate 
force management into the Army during the 1980s.  Although these courses were 
deemed important, they were not adequately resourced for sustained operations.  
VCSA Reimer asked Trefry to conduct and inspection of the force management 
training in the Army in 1993.  Trefry‘s inspection team found that much of the force 
management instruction in the Army had been eliminated.   Ironically, the trend at the 
CGSC to reduce force management instruction in favor of more tactically focused 
topics has recently repeated itself in 2006.   The 1993 Final Report – U.S. Army 
Force Management Study recommended the establishment of a school in the National 
Capital Region to teach force management under the control of the Army G-3.   The 
recommendation was adopted by Reimer and the U.S. Army Force Management 
School was founded.  The courses at this school provide a holistic appreciation of the 
relationships between systems in the Army that generate combat ready organizations.  
This comprehensive training is based on the functional life cycle model of the Army 
126 
(FLCM) taught at the U.S. Army Inspector General School.   Trefry created the 
FLCM as well as the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).    The MOAC was created in 
1996 to provide a visual representation of the complex relationships between systems 
in the Army.   This analysis described how the MOAC was developed as a training 
aid to demonstrate the complexities involved in modernization and managing change 
in the Army.  However, while the charts do not provide an in depth analysis of the 
history surrounding each of the data points they represent, they display an impressive 
collection of information for additional research.  The MOAC has developed from a 
butcher paper chart into an extensive electronic database that demonstrates the 
linkages between historical events and the systems that constitute Army force 
management.   Force management was still taught at both the Inspector General 
School and the USAFMS in 2010.   
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Chapter Five 
Civil-Military Relations 
 Discussion of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and The Army 
Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) provides valuable insight to the 
mechanics of defense planning.  However, a broader question concerns the role of the 
military in providing leadership or executing the policy decisions of the civilian 
leadership in defense related matters.  Chapter Two explored the constitutional basis 
for military subordination of the military to the Congress and executive branches of 
government.  This chapter explores some of the dominant literature pertaining to 
civil-military relations to investigate the complex interrelationships that determine 
defense policy and execution. 
On 8 December 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld conducted a 
town hall style meeting with soldiers in Kuwait that was intended to boost the morale 
of the troops fighting in the Iraq War.  Army Specialist Timothy Wilson asked, 
―Now, why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal 
and compromised ballistic glass to up armor our vehicles and why don‘t we have 
those resources readily available to us?‖277  Wilson‘s comment represented the 
strained relationship between the military, which develop and execute a strategy to 
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support policy, and the civilian administration, that determines policy and resources.  
Rumsfeld replied, ―You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might 
want or wish to have at a later time.‖278  Although many have criticized Rumsfeld for 
a lack of imagination, stubbornness, and a failure to plan for likely consequences of 
many policy decisions surrounding the war, his response characterized the inherent 
complexity in developing and executing national security policy.
279
  Perhaps a better 
example of inappropriate equipment for the realities of war occurred in World War II 
when the Army failed to anticipate the complexities of armored warfare and had a 
shortage of M3, 37 mm anti-tank guns.  The guns that were on hand quickly became 
ineffective against German armored vehicles as armored technology improved.
280
  
Similarly, after defeating the Germans in Europe in World War II the U.S. Army was 
fatigued and faced serious resource shortages.  Yet, the Army still had to prepare to 
defeat the Japanese in the Pacific.
281
   In March 1946, General George C. Marshall 
commented to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, ―Making war in a democracy is not a 
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bed of roses.‖282   His comment denoted the challenge and frustration that the military 
faced when tasked with developing a strategy to achieve the civilian policy goal of 
unconditional surrender from Japan.
283
  Strategy and policy are inextricably linked in 
a democracy, with strategy subordinate and dependent upon policy.  Policy goals 
become the basis for the development of military objectives, regardless of military 
readiness.  As Wilson‘s and Marshall‘s comments represented the military and 
Rumsfeld‘s comments represented the civilian perspectives.  Neither comments 
encompass all the motives and concerns at work behind the development of strategy 
or policy, yet together they illustrate the complex challenges faced by both civilian 
and military leaders in developing and executing national security policy in a 
democracy.   
In the United States, policy determination is ultimately the responsibility of 
the President; however, the constitutional system of checks and balances provided 
numerous opportunities for other actors to influence policy development and 
execution.  Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution established, ―The President shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,‖ which placed 
civilian authority over the military.
284
  The military is required to execute policy 
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approved by civilian authorities even when it conflicts with their recommendations 
and may lead to failure.  This inherent struggle has made civil-military relations in a 
democracy a recurrent topic of debate.  Samuel Huntington summarized these 
relations in his book, The Soldier and the State; ―Any system of civil-military 
relations thus involves complex equilibrium between the authority, influence, and 
ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence in ideology of 
nonmilitary groups on the other.‖285 
 Historians, philosophers, social scientists, military professionals, lawyers, and 
scholars from other disciplines have created a large body of complex works that 
advance this debate.  Many of these works focus upon the United States as a model 
for analysis.  Five noted authors, Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, John 
Prados, Michael Pearlman, and Phillip Bobbitt offered differing perspectives on some 
key civil-military relations issues.  These works will be analyzed separately, in the 
order in which they were written to provide a foundation for further discussion.  
Considered holistically, three themes emerge that present a model for examining 
civil-military relations and policy development in America.  They are: 1) an 
understanding of civil-military relations theory; 2) an understanding of civil-military 
relations in practice; and 3) a theoretical and practical understanding of the role of 
international relations in civil-military relations and policy development.  The first 
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theme provided a theoretical understanding of the legal and philosophical basis of 
civil-military relations in a democracy.  This included a sociological analysis of the 
military profession and a study of the National Security Council.  The second theme 
provided historical case studies that depict the actual practice of determining national 
security policy.  These studies examined national security crises and policy 
determination as a component of civil-military relations.  These case studies vary in 
complexity from a relatively focused view to a comprehensive multi-actor analysis of 
policy development.  Many of the crises studied involved international conflicts, 
which increases the complexity of the study.  International actors and organizations 
must also be considered because they impact policy development.  The third theme 
embraced this complexity and examined how international relations influence policy 
development.   
Together, these works establish a foundation for understanding civil-military 
relations within a democracy, as well as international relations between states.  Each 
author makes a specific contribution that furthers this discussion.  Huntington‘s work 
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
published in 1957, sought to create a theoretical basis for civil-military relations in 
the United States.  He focused on the broad national security implications of civil-
military relations at the start of the Cold War.  Second, Janowitz building on this 
theoretical basis, wrote The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait in 
1960, which presented a sociological analysis of the professional United States 
soldier from 1900 to 1950.  His revised edition in 1971 added relevant national 
132 
security considerations of transitioning to an all volunteer force.  Third, John Prados, 
in his 1991 work, The Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security 
Council from Truman to Bush, examined the differing methods of national security 
policy development.
286
  This included a theoretical basis as well as case studies of 
actual policy development.  Fourth, Michael D. Pearlman‘s 1999 work, Warmaking 
and American Democracy: The Struggle over American Strategy, 1700 to the 
Present, supplied a synthesis of the struggle over developing military strategy in 
―America‖ since 1700.  His detailed analysis of historical examples from the 
Revolutionary War, to the War in Bosnia, exposed the role of politics in determining 
American military strategy.  Finally, Philip Bobbitt, in his 2002 work, The Shield of 
Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History, combined two books that studied 
western civilization and the evolution of states.  His work examined the impact of 
international relations on policy development in America.  First, he presented a 
theoretical scheme:  a new model and periodization for the study of the evolution of 
international relations.  Second, he offered historical analysis in which he argued that 
international treaties, following wars, set the conditions for future wars. 
Huntington‘s work, The Soldier and the State, supports the first theme and has 
had exceptional influence.  It has remained relevant for over fifty years as the seminal 
explanation of civil-military relations theory in the United States.  Huntington 
examined the relationship of the professional military officer corps to the state from 
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the Civil War to the Cold War.  His book was published as the nation reevaluated the 
national security requirements emerging from the Cold War and the Korean War.  He 
proposed that the United States historical tendency to retain only a small professional 
standing Army in peacetime was incompatible with the changed security 
environment.  Specifically, ―changes in technology and the international environment 
made a large professional military a requirement for national security‖.287   He argued 
that the professional officer is motivated to serve the state, subordinate to civil 
authority, as an essential part of this professionalism.
288
   
Huntington proposed that civil-military relations are characterized by 
equilibrium between the military requirement to provide advice to the Congress, the 
President, and the Service Secretaries.  This invariably created tensions that elected 
officials have often exploited for political gain through the media.   He also argued 
that Congress exercised civilian control of the military primarily through military 
appropriations.  The House provided the majority of the fiscal oversight, and the 
Senate provided the majority of the policy oversight.  Although he examined 
Truman‘s relief of MacArthur, he argued that in most cases the United States military 
supported the decisions of the civilian authorities after their military advice was 
considered.
289
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Huntington‘s analysis of the American military officer as a profession has also 
remained relevant.   He proposed that ―the distinguishing characteristics of a 
profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness.‖290  He argued that the military officer ideal meets all these 
requirements when considering his role in the ―management of violence‖ for the 
state.
291
  He examined the evolution of five key institutions of the military vocation 
that developed the professional ethic and provided the intellectual rationale for the 
profession.  They are: ―(1) the requirements for entry into the officer corps; (2) the 
means of advancement within the officer corps; (3) the character of the military 
education system; (4) the nature of the military staff system; and, (5) the general 
esprit and competence of the officer corps.‖292  He concluded that the officer corps 
became professional during the 18th-century.  Based on this understanding of the 
profession, he argued that the military must always be subordinate to civilian 
authority.  His detailed analysis developed a model that encouraged other sociological 
studies of military officers as a group.   
Morris Janowitz, who was one of the final reviewers of Huntington‘s work, 
offered a sociological examination of professional military officers.  His study, The 
Professional Soldier, offered valuable insight into the military profession that 
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complimented Huntington‘s theoretical work.  He analyzed the professional life, 
organizational setting, and leadership of the American military profession during the 
first half of the 20th century.
293
  His work expressed many of the same opinions that 
Huntington proposed about the professionalism and motivation of the military officer 
corps.  Janowitz maintained that the military profession was not a monolithic power 
group; but a diverse group with many interests, that accepted civilian control of 
military affairs.  Similarly he argued, ―Any imbalance in military contributions to 
political-military affairs - domestic or international - is therefore often the result of 
default by civilian political leaders.‖294  This hypothesis further advanced the 
theoretical belief from American Liberal traditions of civilian control of the military. 
Janowitz, however, identified several additional motivating factors that made 
the military professional serve his country.  This motivation is relevant to 
understanding civil-military relations.  His argument was based on the belief that the 
professional soldier is motivated to fight by professional ethics alone.  He devoted a 
chapter to professional motivation.  The central thesis was as follows: ―Civilian 
society permits the professional soldier to maintain his code of honor and encourages 
him to develop his professional skill.  He is amiable to civilian political control 
because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and 
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responsibilities of the constabulary force.‖295  His discussion of the constabulary 
force, like Huntington, is based on the belief that a large standing peacetime Army is 
required to meet the nation‘s security challenges.  He argued that the military should 
establish a ―constabulary force, which is prepared for war, committed to the minimal 
use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory.‖296  
Constabulary forces are prepared for major conflict, but also are required to perform 
across the spectrum of operations.  Constabulary forces would perform activities like 
humanitarian assistance, police action, limited war, and even domestic assistance to 
further policy goals.  Janowitz, like Huntington, recognized the role of the military 
professional in developing and executing policy as another important issue in civil-
military relations.   
Janowitz asserted that five changes have occurred in the military profession 
that affected civil-military relations since 1900.  First, organizational authority has 
shifted from authoritarian rule to a greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and 
group consensus.
297
  Second, skills have narrowed between the military and the 
civilian elites.  This has required military professionals to gain more managerial skills 
as well as technical training to perform skills that now have a civilian equivalent.
298
  
Third, officer recruitment has shifted from a high social status group to a broader 
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representation of society.
299
  Fourth, there is a prescribed career pattern that if 
performed with great competence will lead to membership in the professional military 
elite.
300
   Finally, the military profession developed an increased political role at the 
strategic level of the organization that required more than just military technical 
skills.
301
  The cumulative effect of these changes is that the military, at the strategic 
level, resembles a civilian organization and can be viewed in competition with the 
civilian authorities. 
Janowitz believed that the future professional soldier must also be better 
educated in international relations and politics if he is to be effective.
302
  Huntington 
and Janowitz proposed that civilian influence is greatest in budget oversight and 
development, rather than issues of policy and military operations.  They argued that 
the complexity of developing a force structure to meet policy objectives provides 
ample room for vastly different conclusions.  This led to divisions between the 
Services and their separate constituencies in Congress regarding conflicting solutions 
similar to those addressed in Chapter Two of this study.  The Department of Defense 
submits a consolidated budget proposal, but each Service develops their budget 
separately.  Great divisions remain within each of the Services about the appropriate 
mix of personnel and equipment.  Inter-service rivalries further complicate budget 
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allocations.  Due to this complexity, Janowitz claims, the civilian leadership often 
yields to the military‘s requests based on deference to military professionalism and 
expertise.
303
  Simultaneously, however, Congress has been increasingly suspicious of 
military budgets and focused on the elimination of waste, rather than on military 
performance.
304
  Therefore, the military is faced with a dilemma; it requires political 
awareness to ensure that it can gain support for the resources required to provide 
national security, yet it must remain subordinate to the disparate interests of 
numerous civilian authorities.  The annual political nature of the budget battles for 
limited defense resources suggest that these divisions still exists today.   Many of 
their observations about Congress, politics, and resource allocation are at the center of 
contemporary debates about civil-military relations and the role of the military.  
Fifty years after release of Huntington's The Soldier and the State Don Snider 
and Suzanne Nielson organized a conference at West Point to review the relevancy of 
Huntington's model to modern civil-military relations.  The group prepared and 
reviewed over thirteen papers that were subsequently published as American Civil-
Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era.
305
  This work is divided 
into four sections that all conclude that Huntington's work is still of great value today.   
Section one provides contrasting perspectives of American civil-military relations 
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since Huntington's work.  Of note, Chapter Three examined the friction between 
General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  The chapter's author, 
Mathew Moten argued that Shinseki provided his professional opinion to the 
Congress and the President and obediently carried out their decisions even when they 
conflicted with his personal opinions.  Moten contended that Shinseki's behavior was 
in keeping with Huntington's patterns of civilian control of the military and the officer 
corps as a profession.
306
  Section two examined Huntington's societal and functional 
imperatives.  The authors conclude that the management of violence may be too 
narrow a definition of the functional imperative when applied to the expanded group 
of tasks required of the military in a counter-insurgency environment.
307
  Section 
three explored issues associated with loyalty and obedience of the military profession.  
Further, it explored the conservative nature of the military society and expands 
Janowitz's treatment of the military as representatives of the broader society.
308
  The 
final section addressed the role of interpersonal relations in civil-military relations 
and suggests norms and practices to guide the military in politics, and working with 
Congress and the President.  Richard Kohn concludes this section with some 
suggested norms for improving civil-military relations.   
The concluding chapter offers nine conclusions that reinforce the lasting value 
of Huntington's work.  Snider and Nielson assert: "Five decades after its creation, the 
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contributions of Huntington's objective control model continue to outweigh its 
shortcomings.  The most significant shortcoming of his model was its failure to 
recognize that a separation between political and military affairs is not possible - 
particularly at the highest levels of policymaking."
309
  The book provides many 
examples from the Iraq War to illustrate the current relevance of Huntington's 
framework for the further study of civil-military relations.   Each chapter provides a 
detailed analysis and is worthy of repeated study.   
In contrast to Janowitz‘s military perspective, John Prados offered a detailed 
analysis of the civilian role in national security policy development.  His work, 
Keepers of the Keys, examined the prominent actors in the National Security Council 
since its establishment under President Truman in 1947.  Prados‘s detailed narrative 
description of the personalities of the Presidents and their National Security Advisors 
provided valuable insight into the civilian statutory roles of civil-military relations.    
Prados argued that the council‘s influence increased to the point of near independent 
action in the Iran-Contra scandal of the Reagan Presidency.  His work contributes to 
understanding both the theoretical and actual practice of civil-military relations in 
policy development. 
 The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council 
as a part of the executive branch.  Hence, each President has great flexibility in 
determining its composition and authority.  Prados concentrated on the relationships 
between the standing members of the National Security Council in developing policy 
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for each administration; the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Defense.  Prados did an excellent job of demonstrating the conflicting 
interests and objectives of the people and institutions that develop national security 
policy for the President.  His work highlights the volume of Presidential decisions 
that must be made with imperfect information - and it is sobering.  Prados 
demonstrated that The President‘s ability to make good decisions is dependent upon 
the advice he receives from his cabinet members and personal staff.  While each 
President can select ―the best and the brightest‖ people to support his decision 
making, he is ultimately at their mercy.
310
  
His book highlighted the Eisenhower administration as a model for policy 
development.  Prados credits President Eisenhower‘s management and intellectual 
ability for his administration‘s policy successes.311  In comparison, Prados condemns 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon for their character flaws and resulting policy missteps.  
Despite his pattern of assigning responsibility with the chief executive, Prados‘s 
evaluation of President Reagan and the Iran-Contra scandal placed most of the blame 
with the President‘s Cabinet rather than the President.   His criticism seems sharpest 
when the positions of trust have been violated.  He cited examples of these betrayals 
of trust as:  leaks to the media, commission or omission of obvious responsibilities to 
inform the President, and misrepresentation of the facts to the President, Congress, or 
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the media.  The book‘s narrative convincingly highlighted these violations of trust 
regarding Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and Watergate.
312
 
Prados also identified the challenges of policy implementation throughout the 
government.  The National Security Council is largely responsible for the 
coordination of the government bureaucracy; Prados provided valuable insight and 
numerous examples of how difficult a task this has been.  Again, President 
Eisenhower is applauded for his understanding of the requirement to manage the 
implementation of policy decisions through the executive branch.   In true military 
style, planning and implementation were treated as equally important functions.
313
   
Prados criticized Johnson and all subsequent Presidents for their lack of oversight and 
coordination of policy implementation.  While all global national security scenarios 
cannot be anticipated, Prados argued that many Presidential decisions were made 
without complete analysis or the development of a synchronized government policy.  
The escalations of military involvement in Vietnam, and the United States Middle 
East policy since Nixon, demonstrate how the various elements of government were 
not coordinated toward common goals.
314
  
Prados concluded his analysis with two themes.  First, the National Security 
Council Staff became ―the keepers of the keys‖ by: establishing policy and actions in 
the name of the President; and acting in the place of existing government institutions 
                                                 
312
Ibid., 223. 
313
Ibid., 149. 
314
Ibid., 201. 
143 
through secrecy.
315
  Second, the National Security Council has grown considerably 
stronger since its creation in 1947 and has become unaccountable in its present form.  
He argued that legislation is required to limit its power and increase Congressional 
oversight of the National Security Advisor.
316
  
Prados provided a great amount of detail on the actors within the executive 
branch that influence national security policy, however; he placed little emphasis on 
political influences from sources outside the executive branch.  This focused analysis 
limits the scope of the discussion but it does not provide a comprehensive 
appreciation of the factors influencing policy development.  For example, the political 
influence of Congress and the public is mentioned as a concern to the Johnson 
administration, but, Prados does not provide an analysis of what this means.  The 
focus of his work is the National Security Council, however, political considerations 
beyond those mentioned in this work shape policy determination.  
In contrast, Pearlman analyzed a broader base of actors involved in national 
security policy development than Prados.  He examined the interactions within and 
between the military, the Congress, the executive branch, domestic public opinion, 
international leaders, world opinion, and economics. The interactions between these 
forces demonstrate the challenges in developing a strategy in America.  He provided a 
comprehensive study of American historical examples of civil-military relations in his 
work, Warmaking and American Democracy.  He focused on these complex 
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relationships, which are collectively referred to as high and low politics.    His 
analysis also included the influence of international relations and actors in 
determining policy and their effect on civil-military relations.  Each of his chapters is 
focused on a specific period of conflict in American history and provided a narrative 
account of how policy was developed.  Pearlman cited many prominent actors, 
granting valuable insight into policy development and offered a more comprehensive 
analysis.   
His premise is based on historical analysis and concludes that the problems of 
strategy development in a democracy are traditional.  Policy and strategy 
development must balance the democratic principles of pluralism and individual 
liberties with the military necessity for discipline and hierarchal authority. The 
military requires clear objectives and guidance to ensure efficient utilization of 
resources and successful establishment of appropriate post hostility conditions.  
Political considerations, however, frequently preclude the clear declaration of 
objectives.  The military is regularly faced with policies that have multiple 
interpretations and unclear objectives.  This ambiguity leads to diffused allocation of 
resources and personnel.  Although this appears similar to Huntington‘s argument, 
Pearlman‘s specific examples of ambiguous policies support his argument throughout 
American history.
317
 
                                                 
317
Michael Pearlman, Warmaking and American Democracy (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1999), 5. 
145 
Pearlman began his argument with General Washington‘s predicament 
resulting from conflicting policies during the Revolutionary War.  On the one hand, 
the colonials needed an Army to defeat the British Army and occupy their forts to 
establish legitimacy as a nation.  On the other hand, they were opposed to establishing 
a professional army and preferred militia troops with local allegiance to the defense 
of their village.  As a rule, local militias were not willing to fight in distant areas 
against British regular units.  Militiamen were also unaccustomed to the discipline 
and tactics required by the Continental Army.  Pearlman argued that in order to gain 
foreign support for American independence, a standing Colonial Army needed to 
achieve a military victory against the British Army.  Then again, Washington also 
needed to maintain popular support for the war by accepting the militia‘s role in 
providing local security.  This requirement conflicted with his need to conscript large 
numbers of personnel, which were also militiamen, for the Army without 
jeopardizing popular support and security.   Advocates of the militia favored a 
protracted harassment campaign to defeat the British without a standing army.  The 
lack of an established government further added to the ambiguity of developing a 
comprehensive strategy.  These challenges demonstrate that the problems of war 
making in a democracy predated the establishment of the nation itself.
318
  
Pearlman analyzed similar examples from the Civil War, World Wars I and II, 
Korea, Vietnam, and Bosnia that indicate the challenges that Washington faced were 
not unique.  Grant, Pershing, Marshall, and Eisenhower all commented on the 
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difficulties of rapidly transforming recruits into disciplined fighting forces to achieve 
policy goals that were beyond the capabilities of the standing army.  Consider the 
similarity to this comment and Rumsfeld‘s opening remarks about going to war with 
the Army you have rather than the Army you need.  All of these military leaders 
adopted tactics and strategies to compensate for these factors, just as General 
Washington utilized the militia in a limited role against the British.
319
  
Pearlman‘s chapter on World War II was particularly noteworthy.  Pearlman 
clearly portrayed a number of individual actors that influenced policy and strategy 
development.  A few of the prominent actors that emerged are: Admiral King, 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, LeMay, Stinson, and Vinson.
320
  
The complexity, scope, and sheer number of actors involved in his analysis was 
impressive.  It provided a synthetic view of the debates surrounding the major issues 
in both theaters of the War.  Consequently, his treatment is lengthy, detailed, and 
warrants close study.  However, as this study focuses on the management of change 
in the Army over time, Pearlman has failed to include logisticians and key managers 
of support in his analysis.
321
  
Pearlman‘s treatment of Truman‘s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan 
is an especially comprehensive analysis of a complex issue of debate involving civil-
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military relations.  Specifically, he identifies five often overlooked factors.
322
  First, 
the combat readiness of the United States Army and Marine Corps after achieving 
victory in Europe was declining rapidly.  Pearlman argued that 450,000 veterans were 
released from active duty, and more were becoming eligible for release.
323
  The 
readiness of the armed forces decreased as the combat experienced veterans left the 
service.  Second, he cited Eisenhower‘s estimate, after Victory in Europe, it would 
take approximately eighteen months to prepare European Forces for an invasion of 
Japan.
324
  Third, he argued that as the veterans returned home national resolve to 
endure continued sacrifice in order to defeat Japan would decrease.   The veterans 
return psychologically affected communities as an indication of a return to prewar 
normalcy.  He argued that this affected public opinion and would curtail a protracted 
operation against Japan.
325
  Fourth, Congress legislated that all eighteen year old 
draftees required a minimum of six months training before they could be sent to a 
combat zone.  Conscription of new personnel, therefore, could not numerically 
compensate for the number of released veterans.
326
  Fifth, he cited Marshall‘s 
                                                 
322
These factors were not identified in two books focused on the use of the atomic bomb: 
Samuel Walker‘s, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against Japan 
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 2004), and Michael Hogan‘s, 
Hiroshima in History and Memory (New York, NY: The Cambridge University Press, 1996) both well 
respected authors and works. 
323
Michael Pearlman, Warmaking and American Democracy (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1999), 274. 
324
Ibid., 275. 
325
Ibid. 
326
Ibid., 276. 
148 
opinion: ―Don‘t ask me the question of whether to drop the bomb; it is not a military 
question‖ in order to demonstrate that the military believed dropping the bomb was a 
political issue.
327
  When these factors are considered together, the use of the atomic 
bomb becomes more of a necessity - to defeat the Japanese quickly - than an 
alternative to an armed invasion.  Further, this analysis highlights the complex 
interdependence between military and civilian information sharing involved in 
determining defense related policy. 
 Bobbitt rounds out this analysis with a focus on the role of international 
relations in developing national security policy.  His work, The Shield of Achilles, is 
organized into two books.  Book I focused on the evolution of the individual state and 
provided a new model to analyze international relations.  His model is organized into 
six periods: princely, kingly, territorial, state-nation, nation-state, and the Market-
State.  Bobbitt argued that the origins of the modern state can be traced back to Italy 
in the 15
th
-century.  Specifically, the princely, kingly, territorial, and state-nation 
periods occurred between 1494 and 1914.  He defined the period of the nation-state 
and the long war from the start of World War I to the end of the Cold War, or 1914-
1990.  He stated, the long war ―was fought to determine which of the three 
alternatives - communism, fascism, or parliamentarianism - would replace the 
Imperial constitutional orders of the 19th century.‖328  His last period, the Market-
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State is defined as beginning in 1990, with end of the Cold War, and continuing 
through the present as the new form of state in the system of states.
329
  
Thomas Friedman has written one of the many contemporary books that 
address the possible implications of an increasingly interconnected world in his 1999 
book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization.  Friedman 
contends that "Globalization has replaced the former Cold War system...and has its 
own rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, 
environment, geopolitics, and economics of virtually every country in the world."
330
 
Although this work precedes Bobbitt's, Friedman explores the potential declining 
influence of the state-centric system as transnational issues - such as religion - gain 
influence in guiding the behavior of populations.  Potentially, this creates a more 
dangerous world that empowers individuals with their ideas, for good or evil, to have 
dramatic and almost instant global effects.  These actions and the corresponding 
consequences cannot be controlled by the state system.
331
 
 In Book II, Bobbitt maintained the same periodization but changed his focus 
to the treaties that established the state‘s legitimacy and role in international matters 
as part of the society of states.
332
  He believed his thesis is different from the existing 
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literature ―because it derives from the general conclusion that the dying and 
regeneration of constitutional orders are a periodic part of the history of the modern 
state.‖333   In other words, treaties establish the periodization for new state systems. 
Bobbitt provided a new paradigm for examining the impact of war on the 
international environment.  His paradigm adds another dimension to the discussion of 
civil-military relations because he depends upon the impact of wars as a central 
component of his model.  First, he proposed that the international order of states is the 
result of wars and the treaties.  Wars led to treaties which ended an epoch.  The 
epochal change created disenfranchisement and a new set of problems, which led to 
another war and began the cycle anew.  Second, he proposed that the Cold War led to 
the creation of a new state system termed the Market-State.  He claimed, ―The 
Market-State promises to maximize the opportunity of the people (rather than the 
state) and thus privatize many state activities and make voting and representative 
government less influential and more responsive to the market.‖334   Third, he argued 
that the current global conditions present a new set of challenges that make the global 
security environment less stable than it was during the twentieth century.
335
   
 Bobbitt‘s book was written before the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
although it was released in 2002.   His last point, that the new epoch of the Market-
State will be less stable than the long periods of "peace" in the 20
th
-century, seems 
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prophetic.  His argument for the Market-State is most compelling at the strategic 
level.  Treaties shape future competition between states.  He asserted, ―War is a 
natural condition of the state, which was organized in order to be an effective 
instrument of violence on behalf of society.‖336  He argued that Market-States will 
take various forms around the world and this competition will inevitably lead to 
conflict.  Market forces will not prevent the disenfranchised from taking warlike 
actions against those they believe responsible for their plight.  These words seem 
even more accurate today when considering the current security environment in the 
Middle East.  Bobbitt maintained that the nation-state is dead ―due to revolutions in 
computations, communications, and weapons of mass destruction.‖337 A contrary 
view may be that these "revolutions" offer increased opportunities for cooperation in 
an increasingly interdependent global environment. 
 His identification of numerous threats that challenge the state and the 
constitutional system of states is enlightening.  He made a strong argument that 
international cooperation is needed to effectively combat these new threats with much 
more than just military power.  Untraceable enemies with global connections require 
a new approach to a state‘s defense; or society will need to lower their expectations of 
a successful defense against these threats.   Bobbitt suggested that the current set of 
constitutions and international treaties are inadequate to address these challenges.  He 
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argued ―that the world community faces its own historic challenge in creating a 
constitution for the international order that will emerge from this war.‖338  
Bobbitt‘s work is thought provoking and well researched.  It is most relevant 
to those interested in international relations, law, history, and national security affairs.   
The work‘s presentation of the interdependence between law, history, and strategy is 
one its major strengths.   His periodization offers a fresh approach to reconsider 
existing historical accounts.  His Market-State model can be applied to current events 
to consider their strategic implications.  The breadth of the issues contained in this 
book makes it one that can be studied repeatedly; each time from a different 
perspective offering new insights.  Book II, Part II, A Brief History of the Society of 
States and the International Order, provided a comprehensive understanding of the 
treaties that established the nation-state system.  It presented the evolution of 
international relations of states from the Treaty of Augsburg through the Peace of 
Paris.
339
  
Bobbitt‘s paradigm for considering the international order of states is based on 
a Eurocentric view.  A weakness is that he does not address trends in Asia or 
elsewhere in his analysis.  He briefly acknowledged this shortcoming in his 
appendices, ―The reason (that I have focused on a Eurocentric view) is that the state is 
a European political idea.‖340  In his defense, the global international state system 
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evolved from European treaties.  Specifically, the development of the United Nations, 
World Court, and World Bank can be traced back to Western initiatives.  However, 
without further analysis one can only speculate about any similarities in his analysis 
of epochal changes in the international order from an Asian perspective. 
Lastly, Bobbitt proposed that the United States is at a crossroad based on the 
strategic decisions it must make to develop a national strategy to ensure its national 
security in the Market-State.
341
  He suggested that the United States lacks a consistent 
paradigm, ―a worldview that members of a political community share; a policy is 
what some portion of them put in place in pursuit of the goals of the paradigm.‖342  
He argued that ―without a shared paradigm, the United States is condemned to adopt 
the most seductive of strategies, the case by case approach.‖343  As long as the United 
States retains a powerful position in the world community, this approach will appear 
as a self fulfilling prophecy of success.  However, he argued, it avoids facing the 
strategic choices that could enable the United States to shape the world of the future 
into a more advantageous scenario.
344
  These strategic level decisions lie at the heart 
of national security and civil-military relations.  They involve much more than just 
military considerations of security.  They demonstrate that the economic, information, 
and diplomatic elements of national power further complicate development of a 
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comprehensive national security policy or strategy.  Bobbitt‘s examination of future 
worlds and possible scenarios illustrates the degree of complexity that the 
international environment brings to the civilian side of civil-military relations.  That 
said, the military is increasingly asked to perform roles that have been traditionally 
performed by civilians as the nation continues to engage in nation building on a 
global scale. 
Conclusion 
Civil-military relations remain a critical topic of study in America.  The three 
themes of theory, practice, and international relations demonstrated the complexity 
involved in developing national security policy in a democracy.   The fact that 
Huntington‘s and Janowitz‘s works are still analyzed reflects their importance to the 
field.  They wrote as major changes in the security environment brought fundamental 
issues of national security into question.  Both authors established a theoretical basis 
for evaluating civil-military relations.  The Cold War and the Vietnam War inspired 
dramatic changes within the military, such as a large peacetime force and an all 
volunteer force.  Recent changes in the security environment since the end of the 
Cold War have resurfaced similar concerns over national security and civil-military 
relations in a democracy.  Prados provided valuable insight into how Presidents make 
national security decisions.  He also raised serious concerns over the autonomy and 
secrecy that exists within the National Security Council and the ―keepers of the keys.‖  
Current concerns over the buildup for the invasion of Iraq have raised similar 
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concerns about the appropriateness of the executive branch taking the nation to war 
on questionable precepts.  Andrew Bacevich has written two recent books on this 
topic which are worthy of additional study.
345
  Pearlman addressed the complexity of 
national security policy development in an international environment.  He clearly 
portrayed the complexity involved in developing and executing policy with imperfect 
information.  His comprehensive analysis of World War II is even more impressive 
when considering his scope.  He covered both events in the Pacific and Europe, 
international leaders influence on American policy determination, and the 
administrations of Roosevelt and Truman.  He identified numerous examples of 
problems with civil-military relations in policy making in World War II.  Many of 
these problems occurred due to a lack of resources available to execute a policy 
decision from a civilian executive.  In the same way, military forces today are 
challenged to balance resources with deployment policies.   Bobbitt‘s focus on 
international relations and the interrelationship between war, treaties, and civil-
military relations, added another dimension to the complexity of determining national 
security policy in America.  He proposed that the existing order of states has been 
replaced by a new order, with new threats and challenges for policy makers.  
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Regardless of these new challenges, the military remains in a subordinate role and 
carries out the civilian policy decisions.   
Collectively, these works provided a valuable foundation to the study of civil-
military relations in America and insight into the broader fields of historical case 
studies and biographies that focus on major policy dilemmas and senior government 
officials.  H.R. McMaster‘s Dereliction of Duty is a recent example of this body of 
literature.  He provided keen insight to both military and civilian leadership decisions 
surrounding the Vietnam War.  His illustrations highlight some of the problems with 
civil-military relations that lead to the development of the Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 and the formation of the Joint Strategic Planning System.
346
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Chapter Six 
Implications of What Had Gone Before for Today 
Stress on the Force 
Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq provide an opportunity 
for additional exploration of the topics presented in the previous chapters. 
Specifically, the discussion of the mechanics of defense planning contained in the 
Joint Strategic Planning System, the importance of force management, and the roles 
of civil and military leaders in policy formulation.  The United States has been 
conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for over nine years.  
Considered collectively as the war against violent extremists, or overseas contingency 
operations, they are the longest sustained combat operations conducted in the nation's 
history.  However, they are not the nation's first use of an expeditionary force and 
they have produced relatively few military casualties when compared to WWI, 
WWII, Korea, or Vietnam.  The war has not directly impacted many Americans daily 
routines.  However, for the soldiers and families of those who have served in support 
of these operations, their lives may never be the same.  Politicians, military leaders, 
scholars, and many journalists have expressed concern over the ―stress on the force‖ 
derived from the prolonged deployments in support of our national policies.   The 
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principles of force management and the Army functional life cycle model provide a 
holistic archetype to consider the implications of stress on the force.  This chapter 
will consider some of the policy implications arising from these security challenges.  
The functional life cycle model of the Army provided a heuristic to examine 
the interrelationships between the components of stress on the force.   In review, the 
eight aforementioned functions of the model are: force development, acquisition, 
training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation.  
Resources, command, leadership, and management impact each of them.   The goal of 
force development is to create a combat capable force within constrained resources.  
This last statement acknowledges the reality that there are never enough resources to 
meet requirements.  There is never enough time, personnel, money, equipment, fuel, 
ammunition, training space, bandwidth, or maneuver area to meet all the requirements 
placed on the force.  Leadership allocates finite resources and assumes risk in 
shortage areas.   Contemporary examples of resource shortages abound in the press.  
These shortages not only increase strategic risk to the nation, but also increase the 
stress on the forces responsible to execute the policies and accomplish the missions.  
Secretary of Defense Gates identified three main components of stress on the 
force.  The first is associated with the negative ramifications on the military force due 
to operational commitments that require repeated and prolonged absences from home.  
The second element is often associated with the cause for prolonged absences.  It is 
the stress derived from participation in, or proximity to, combat operations.  The third 
element of the term stress on the force applies to the equipment destroyed or worn out 
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because of demands the force.
347
  In short, stress on the force is a visible consequence 
of executing the national security strategy with limited resources.  Vice Chief of Staff 
of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli also expressed his concern about stress on the 
force after a United States Army soldier at Camp Liberty, Iraq shot five of his fellow 
soldiers in May 2009.  Chiarelli stated: ―As long as the demand on forces stays what 
it is right now and the supply of forces remains the same, it will be very difficult for 
us to do anything with that stress…‖348  Specifically, this concern addresses the first 
two components of stress on the force concerning the requirement for repeated 
deployments to a combat environment.  This requirement exists due to an insufficient 
supply of troops to meet the operational demand.  This imbalance raises the larger 
question of whether the Army, or in a broader sense, the military, should be 
developed and funded based on the threat requirements or the resources available. 
While components of both requirements and resources must be considered, Chiarelli 
correctly identified the heart of the problem of stress on the force as the imbalance 
between operational requirements and force capabilities.   
Chapter One reasoned that the military should be structured in order to meet 
national objectives.   The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review has sparked much 
debate about the need to determine a national strategy before a military strategy can 
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be developed to achieve national objectives.  This line of reasoning suggests that 
without a clear articulation of these national objectives, many force structures can be 
considered appropriate.  Imprecise objectives and a vague threat can have many 
appropriate force structure solutions.   Similarly, one could consider any answer a 
good one, if the question remains unknown.  Equally, any answer could also be 
considered extremely bad or incorrect.   Otherwise stated as John Collin‘s Law ―If 
you don‘t know what you want to do, you can‘t plan how to do it.‖349  Unfocused 
guidance provides proponents on all sides of the force structure debates considerable 
room to maneuver for their causes.  This question directly relates back to the 
discussion of the proper roles and responsibilities in civil-military relations.  How 
should the military gain focused guidance?  
This argument does not suggest that specific national security objectives 
require only one specific military force structure solution.  The solution set that meets 
all national security objectives contains nearly an infinite number of combinations.  
The flexibility inherent in the military to adapt to changing battlefield and security 
requirements precludes an exclusive solution.  Redundancies in capabilities 
compensate for periods of equipment non-availability due to battlefield loss or 
required maintenance.   Advocates of the different services, and of branches within 
the services, disagree about the specific force structure required to best achieve 
national objectives.  This debate can be easily exploited, or misinterpreted, by 
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journalists, congressmen, or proponents to support their exclusive agendas.   
However, the presence of stress on the force implies that the force structure solution 
set has a minimal level, or baseline, that must be considered adequate to meet national 
objectives.  Failure to resource this minimal level increases the risk that the military 
may be unable to achieve the nation's military objectives.   
Force Structure Considerations 
Force structure considerations are further complicated by time constraints. 
Two components of time constraints must be considered: the speed to respond, as 
well as, the anticipated length or duration of the conflict.  Timing guidance must 
precede force structure requirements.  Historical examples demonstrate the 
importance of timing considerations to defense policy formulation.   First, consider 
timing in the deployment of forces to Europe during World War II (WWII).  Once 
war was declared, the national military policy was clear; immediate wartime 
mobilization and conscription provided the force structure and equipment to meet the 
military requirements of a nation at war.
350
  However, the national policy and related 
force structure at the onset of the war did not anticipate military commitments that 
would endure for more than sixty years.  Until this time, national security and military 
policy were based on the belief that the geographic separation from Europe would 
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allow time to augment a small standing army to defend the nation in time of war.  
Warfare was expected to be conducted by an expeditionary armed force that - 
following an extended period for mobilization and training - would deploy and 
rapidly achieve a decisive victory.  Therefore, a small standing army could support 
the national strategy before the war.   The duration of an anticipated war could not be 
determined, but the speed to respond was susceptible to careful planning.  Along 
these lines, as the likelihood of war in Europe grew, conscription was authorized for a 
period of one year. However, Congress restricted conscripted soldiers from serving 
overseas in order to limit the President‘s ability to enter the war in Europe without 
further Congressional consultation.
351
   The attack on Pearl Harbor challenged this 
strategic situation.  Geographic separation no longer ensured the United States 
protection from the threat of attack or afforded time for full mobilization. 
 Upon the conclusion of WWII, timing considerations changed.  Cold War 
policies led to the development of a force structure to deter, and if needed fight, a 
land war in Europe.
352
  Cold War forces were expected to respond quickly to any 
Soviet aggression.  Forces were stationed in Europe to provide credibility to the 
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national security policies and treaty obligations to defend member nations of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
353
  In case of hostilities, time available 
to raise and train an army would be dramatically less than was available at the onset 
of WWII.  This policy created basing requirements for a large standing force in 
Europe.  The military was required to build an expeditionary force structure to 
support these bases and permit defense of vital national interests in Europe and 
outside of the United States.  The United States has a history of expeditionary forces 
that precedes WWII; In World War I (WWI) the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF) deployed to Europe in support of the French. However, the force structure and 
bases were not maintained in Europe after the WWI.   After WWII the strategic 
situation developing with the start of the Cold War required a larger standing force 
structure to maintain a credible presence in Europe.  More recently, basing 
requirements on the Korean peninsula have contributed to the force structure 
requirements.
354
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Basing 
Basing requirements and rotation policies are intertwined considerations 
influencing force structure requirements.  The time required to accomplish the 
national military objectives often necessitates the establishment of permanent bases 
and force rotation policies.  During WWII, conscriptions were for the duration of the 
conflict.  However, maintaining a presence overseas for an indefinite period required 
consideration of a different policy.  Costs, as well as many cultural factors, prohibited 
maintaining the large active forces raised for World War II, or Korea, for the duration 
of the Cold War.  Further, the shift from a conscripted Army to an all volunteer force 
in the 1970s warranted reconsideration of the existing force rotation policies.  
Rotations to Korea were generally established for one year and three years for 
Germany.
355
  Planning models suggest that three soldiers are required in the active 
force structure for every one soldier required in Korea or Germany: one is currently 
serving overseas, one has just returned, and one is getting ready to deploy.  Returning 
to the current discussion of stress on the force, the force structure during the Cold 
War provided a rotation base far greater than three times the number of troops 
assigned in Korea and Germany.  If a one year rotation policy had been utilized in 
World War II or the Korean War, force structure requirements - specifically the 
number of troops required - clearly would have increased dramatically.   
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Debate continues around the rotation policies for each of the nation's conflicts. 
In addition to tour length considerations, the manner of replacements is also 
considered.  On one end of the spectrum, World War II conscripts and mobilized 
guard and reserve units generally trained together as a unit before being deployed in 
combat.  Units were formed and largely remained together for the duration of the war, 
although some units were disbanded early in their training to serve as replacements 
for war casualties in existing divisions.
356
  At the other end of the spectrum, Vietnam 
War units lacked of unit cohesion because of an individual replacement policy.  In 
1965, during the Vietnam War, "The Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor, asked the 
Chief of Staff to consider extending the average soldier's tour length in Vietnam to 15 
months. That adjustment would reduce replacements needed by 20 percent for 
Vietnam and 12 percent for Korea, while increasing unit effectiveness,"
357
  This 
proposal was rejected by President Johnson in October 1966 because he believed that 
an extension of tour lengths would spark  an unwanted congressional debate over the 
conduct of the war that would threaten his domestic agenda.
358
  General 
Westmoreland, the Commander in Vietnam also argued, "The harsh conditions 
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provided one of the strongest arguments for a one-year tour of duty."
359
  Soldiers 
rotated into units for twelve months rather than collectively training as a unit 
replacement.  Combat command tours were also limited to six months in Vietnam.
360
  
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich in his book, The Army and Vietnam, argued, "General 
Westmoreland did not believe that it (the Vietnam War) was going to be a long war.  
If he had he there would have been no reason to rotate command so frequently."
361
  
Hence, force structure requirements are tied to the deployment policies, based on the 
projected conflict duration and time available prior to war.  Premonition is not 
required of national leaders before they can respond to a conflict.   However, the 
military and security strategies must inform subsequent force structure deliberations. 
Dr. Tim Kane has consolidated U.S. troop deployment statistics into a single 
data base which demonstrates the force structure basing and rotation considerations.  
His study identified fifty-four nations that have had over one thousand U.S. troops 
deployed.  On average, he demonstrated, between 1950 and 2003 nearly forty-five 
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thousand soldiers have remained stationed in Korea on active duty at any one time.
362
  
However, the largest numbers of U.S. troops deployed overseas, nearly two hundred-
fifty thousand during this period, were stationed in Germany.  He concluded that 
during this period, the total number of U.S. troops deployed on foreign soil averaged 
over twenty-two percent of the total force.
363
  This demonstrated that Cold War force 
structure requirements were resourced sufficiently to support the rotation policies 
without significant stress on the force.  In reality, during the Cold War, most active 
duty soldiers expected only one assignment to Korea or Germany during an average 
twenty year career.  In contrast, with no end in sight to the "overseas contingency 
operations" or combat operations in the Middle East, many soldiers today have served 
in an Army at war for over ten years of their projected twenty year career.
364
 
Recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq have brought more attention to 
the percentage of the total force deployed overseas.   Reductions in force structure in 
Germany and Korea are being considered in order to meet the growing troop demands 
in the Middle East.   Similar to the Korea and Germany rotation examples, for every 
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soldier required in the force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan, one soldier has just left 
the theater and another is getting ready to deploy.  Dissimilarly however, different 
Army rotation policies limit deployment frequency to 1:2 for the active force, and 1:4 
for the reserve force.   This implies that for every one year ―boots on the ground‖ time 
(BOG) - time that a soldier spends deployed overseas to the Middle East- he will 
maintain two years out of theater (dwell time between deployments) - or four years 
out of theater for a reserve component soldier.  This policy is a goal and not a law, so 
it does not prohibit earlier reassignment of forces back to the theater.  However, the 
Army tracks each individual soldiers dwell time in an effort to achieve this goal.  In 
order to achieve this policy goal with the current operational demand, a much larger 
force structure is required than the current active duty force.  In practice, soldiers are 
typically spending one year in theatre and are returning within a year for another 
combat assignment in Afghanistan or Iraq.  Secretary Gates recently expressed his 
concern for dwell times,  
My hope is that we will begin to see a lengthening of the dwell times to 
beyond a year, perhaps before the later part of this year (2009), and I think it 
will incrementally lengthen over time.  We won‘t go from one year deployed 
to two years at home.  We will more likely go from one year deployed to 
fifteen months, to eighteen months and so on.
365
   
As the operational demands are increased in Afghanistan, increases in the force levels 
are needed to account for normal attrition, injuries, and schooling requirements in 
order to effectively lengthen dwell times.  
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  Dwell time is important because it allows soldiers time to recover from the 
stress of deployment.   During dwell time soldiers have the opportunity to reunite 
with families, physically recuperate, train on required specialty skills, and complete 
professional development courses or schools.  Many of these tasks are essential to the 
long term resiliency and readiness of an all volunteer Army.  Failure to provide 
adequate dwell time threatens the long term health of the military.   Obviously, the 
military has the ability to surge to meet the national requirements and has 
demonstrated extraordinary resiliency already throughout the last nine years.   Failure 
to consider the long term effects of these operational commitments is the 
metaphorical equivalent of eating the seed corn.   The immediate dilemma requires 
attention, yet the long term impacts - although uncertain - are significant.  Eating the 
seed corn may satisfy an immediate need for nourishment, which must be met in 
order to survive, yet it limits the ability to plant a new crop in the coming year.  
Similarly, the Army must address current combat requirements, yet future readiness 
cannot be ignored.  Force management provides a lens to quantify these requirements 
and their costs.   Consequently, the force structure should be increased in the absence 
of policy guidance in order to meet the military requirements of the nation.  Failure to 
increase the force structure increases the strategic risk to respond to existential 
threats.  The debate between military effectiveness and national objectives lies at the 
heart of civil-military relations.  Military leaders must clearly articulate their best 
military advice to civilian policy makers to ensure that the likely consequences of 
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current operations are understood.   Strategic flexibility further considers the policy 
implications arising from current operations. 
Strategic Flexibility 
 In December 2009, President Obama announced plans to increase the 
operational force structure requirements - the troop levels - in Afghanistan by thirty 
thousand soldiers.
366
  This increased the troop requirements - and hence the stress on 
the force - for many elements of the Army that are already pressured.  This does not 
increase the overall force structure, or size of the Army to meet this increase in 
operational demand.  The specialties required in Afghanistan are similar to those 
required in Iraq.  The total number of troops available to meet the surge requirement 
is much smaller than the total number of U.S. troops serving in all the Services within 
DoD.  The pool of troops available to deploy to Afghanistan is the same pool of 
troops that have already deployed on recent tours to Iraq or Afghanistan.  The earlier 
discussion of rotation policies argued that increasing the demand for one soldier 
overseas creates a force structure requirement for three soldiers.  Logically, the force 
structure requirements generated from this thirty thousand soldier increase would 
therefore impact approximately ninety thousand soldiers.   
Too, a multiple of combat enablers, or support personnel, is required to 
facilitate an increase in combat strength.  Much has been written debating the 
                                                 
366
Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html; 
(accessed 4 December 2009). 
171 
appropriate ―tooth to tail‖ ratio of combat troops to combat enablers.367  For example, 
World War I marked a high point in percentage of combat forces to support forces in 
1918 at nearly fifty percent and a low of nearly twenty-percent in World War II.  
"The Korean War approached thirty-three percent combat forces, Vietnam thirty-five 
percent, and twenty-seven percent in Cold War Germany.  Congress intervened to 
enforce economy and mandate a minimum level of combat elements of twenty-nine to 
thirty-four percent."
368
  Regardless of what one considers the appropriate ratio, the 
fact remains that the Army requires a significant number of combat support enablers 
for each combat brigade deployed.  Ironically, efforts to reduce the tooth to tail ratio 
have reduced the number of enablers in the force structure.  This has resulted in many 
capability gaps within the Services.  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
identified many of these gaps and directed the restructuring of many specialties 
within the force structure to address some of these gaps.
369
  Congress limits the size 
of the force structure, largely through budget appropriations, so recruiting sufficient 
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personnel to fill these gaps is not possible.
370
  Consequently, many civilian 
contractors have been hired to meet these capability gaps and provide essential 
support to combat operations.  Hiring civilian contractors has created additional 
security and support concerns that must be addressed for their welfare.   Additionally, 
the nature of counterinsurgency, stability support, and security operations places a 
greater emphasis upon non kinetic means, which are increasingly dependent upon 
combat enablers such as intelligence analysts.  These specialties have been considered 
high demand, low density specialties or HD/LD.   These HD/LD specialties are not 
limited to combat enablers.   Demand for military police, infantry, military 
intelligence, linguists, veterinarians, as well as other specialties, exceeds the supply 
available.  Personnel within these specialties cannot expect to meet the rotation policy 
goals of 1:2 or 1:4 until the operational demand is decreased - mission requirements 
are reduced.
371
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The size of the military is determined through a detailed Joint Strategic Planning System 
that was explicated in Chapter Two.  Each of the Services further have their own method of 
determining their force structure recommendation to the Secretary of Defense which is then modified 
and submitted to the President as part of his budget which is sent to Congress.  The Congress then 
deliberates and modifies the President's Budget based on their varied considerations.  The President 
ultimately receives the budget and has the ability to approve or veto the budget similar to other 
legislative proposals.  Ultimately, however, the authorizations and appropriations in the budget 
determine the size of the force structure.  
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While it may appear obvious that more personnel should be converted to specialties that are 
in high demand from those that are in lesser demand, the solution is more complex than simply 
retraining existing personnel.  Veterinarians, Linguists, Special Forces troops, and many other 
specialties require capabilities and aptitudes that may not exist in the available personnel in low 
demand specialties available for retraining.  Some of these specialties must be recruited from the 
population outside the military and undergo training that takes years before they are ready for 
assignment in the operational Army.   
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 Rotation policies have broader security implications beyond the 
determination of force structure requirements.  Much has been written in the media 
about a concern that the military has become overcommitted and lost the ability to 
respond to additional security challenges.
372
   As early as August 2004, Dr. Andrew 
Krepinevich, and many military officials, openly questioned how long the Army 
could conduct sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Krepinevich coined the 
phrase ―the thin green line‖ to represent how the Army was overstretched by 
operational requirements.
373
  In January 2006, he conducted a Pentagon sponsored 
study to determine how well the Army was doing in Iraq.  He further reported that the 
―Army is dangerously overtaxed in Iraq‖ and the strategy should change ―before the 
Army is broken.‖374  More recently in 2009, U.S. News and World Report published 
an article that is representative of many similar arguments.  It stated: 
With progress in Iraq still precarious and the war in Afghanistan growing ever 
more violent, the American military remains overburdened and, U.S. officials 
repeatedly point out, dangerously overstretched. Troops are also exhausted, 
                                                 
372
The loss of strategic flexibility is mentioned as a concern in the 2009 DoD budget.  Having 
a large pool of trained and ready forces available provides military options that can be tailored to 
mission requirements.  As the pool of available forces is reduced by military commitments and reduced 
equipment readiness, the options available to respond to a crisis become limited and strategic 
flexibility is reduced.  Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget /fy2009 
defense.html; (accessed 13 December 2009). 
373
Andrew Krepinevich, The Thin Green Line: Backgrounder. Available from http://www.c 
sbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20040814.GrnLne/B.20040814.GrnLne.php; (accessed 4 
November 2009). 
374Associated Press, ―Study: Army Stretched to Breaking Point.‖ USA Today, 24 January 
2006. Available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-24-army-study_x.htm 
(accessed 4 November 2009). 
174 
after back-to-back tours that are leaving a growing number of military 
families in shambles.
375
    
America's adversaries can read these reports and may infer that the degraded military 
capacity provides them with a strategic opportunity.  They may believe the United 
States has lost the capacity or willingness to engage in any additional military 
operations.  Further, they may conclude that they can pursue their own national 
interests - which may challenge U.S. security interests - without fear of a 
conventional military response.
376
  
This belief is founded on the rationale that major or peripheral U.S. national 
interests are less likely to be defended with military force when higher priority 
interests are consuming a large share of the national elements of power: (political, 
informational, military, and economic power).   Survival and vital interests are 
unlikely to be directly challenged by state actors because the risk to the United States 
would still require a military response to ensure national existence.  The threat and 
the risk associated with major or peripheral interests are subject to much greater 
interpretation because they do not directly threaten the existence of the nation and 
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offer a greater range of appropriate responses.   What is considered appropriate is 
itself a topic for extended debate.  
 Resources for defense compete with other domestic budgetary items.  The 
President‘s budget submission includes both defense and domestic spending 
programs.  Increased concern over deficit spending and the loss of U.S. economic 
power in the global economy has reduced popular support for the current operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  As domestic economic concerns increase, risk tolerance 
increases for major and peripheral interests.  Congress, as an expression of popular 
support, is unlikely to support military involvement in peripheral or major U.S. 
interests until economic recovery occurs.  Congress reflects the societal isolationist 
tendencies that favor addressing concrete domestic economic threats over less visible, 
indirect threats overseas.  The complex nature of the overseas security threats often 
makes it difficult for defense advocates to demonstrate the direct threat to rural 
neighborhoods in the continental United States.   The impacts of economic recession 
are much more visible to the American population than these complex foreign threats.  
Without a clear depiction of the threat to security, domestic concerns often take 
priority over major or peripheral national interests. 
Krepinevich‘s theory of ‗a thin green line‘ can be applied to Iranian efforts to 
develop nuclear weapons.  The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is at least a major 
U.S. security concern.
377
  However, current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
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imply that they would use military means to prevent Iran.  Israeli military action could lead to a larger 
Middle-Eastern conflict that could involve the United States if it were to commit forces in defense of 
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limited the United State‘s ability to respond militarily with conventional ground 
forces.  Ironically, U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have strengthened 
Iran‘s relative military power in the region.  Iran now has the largest military force in 
the region.
378
   Iran may believe that they have a strategic opportunity to develop 
nuclear weapons without fear of foreign intervention as long as the U.S. military is 
engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.  On 25 April 2008, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Mullen stated, ―A war against Iran would extremely stress forces 
already stretched thin by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan… However, I have 
reserve capability in particularly our Navy and our Air Force…available 
globally…but it would be a mistake to think that we are out of combat capability.‖379  
His statement reflected concern for the ability of the ground forces to respond to 
another conflict.  It also provided warning that other military capabilities may still be 
employed if U.S. vital interests are sufficiently threatened. 
                                                                                                                                           
Israel. Iran‘s declaration that it‖ would eliminate Israel‖ is cited by those who believe that Iran should 
not be a nuclear power. Concern also exists that a nuclear capable Iran might share technology or 
capabilities with non state actors or other states that would threaten the United States and hence makes 
it a U.S. vital interest to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.  Further, if Iran maintained 
nuclear weapons would the balance of power in the region be threatened to the point that other Middle-
Eastern states would feel compelled to also develop a nuclear capability?  The comparable wealth 
within the region makes it likely that resources exist for states to acquire nuclear weapons if their 
leaders are determined to do so. 
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President Carter declared in his State of the Union Address 23 November 
1980: ―Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 
of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force.‖380   This statement became known as the Carter 
Doctrine and was a direct response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Iranian Revolution.  United States economic dependence on Middle East oil has led to 
continuous naval operations in the Persian Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation 
through the Strait of Hormuz.  
  Public approval for military action against Iran in response to their nuclear 
program may be difficult to achieve.  Americans understand that their dependence on 
foreign oil validates the vital interest in securing the Strait of Hormuz.  It is less clear, 
however, that a nuclear capable Iran directly threatens the flow of oil through the 
region.  Articulation of this threat is further confused by the lack of information about 
Iran‘s nuclear capabilities or intentions.  The indirect and uncertain future Iranian 
threat of proliferation of technology or weapons to other actors and nations is a 
serious concern, but future intentions are difficult to prove without corresponding 
actions.  Without a clear understanding or articulation of the facts, it is difficult to 
determine exactly which military option would be the most appropriate - or effective - 
response to this Iranian threat.  Additionally, public skepticism following the failure 
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to locate nuclear weapons in Iraq is high.  The standards of proof required to gain 
popular support for military action should be expected to be high.  Hence, the 
combination of these factors makes popular support for U.S. military action in Iran 
logically unlikely.  However, the President as the Commander in Chief has the ability 
to direct military action against Iran without the prior approval of Congress or the 
American people.  Returning to the discussion of stress on the force, conventional 
military operations against Iran would increase the stress on the force considerably. 
The defense of Taiwan is another declared U.S. national interest that may lack 
popular support for direct U.S. military intervention.
381
   Similarly, it is difficult to 
articulate how China‘s actions in Taiwan directly threaten the security of rural 
America.   Conceivably, China could gradually escalate pressure against Taiwan, 
short of military action, with a variety of peaceful actions within their border meant to 
pressure Taiwan to closer unification.   From this perspective, U.S. military 
operations against China are not likely to gain U.S. popular support.  The special 
relation with Taiwan may be difficult to define for the Chinese as well as the 
American public.  Similarly, Russian operations within their borders in Chechnya did 
not receive U.S. popular support for U.S. military intervention despite concern over 
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the rights of the Chechens to declare themselves an independent republic.
382
 
Operations against Iran, Russia, or China while we are still deployed in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, would challenge national economic and military resources.  In the same 
way, one could argue that operations against China would be even more challenging 
than the other two nations due to China‘s relative enormity and large population.  
China may perceive that they have an opportunity to pursue their interests without 
fear of a U.S. military response. 
Analysts have explored some of the possible scenarios for military actions 
between Taiwan and China.  Chinese intentions for offensive military operations 
against Taiwan remain unclear.
383
  China‘s stated policy was reaffirmed in 2005.  The 
Chinese parliament passed a resolution that threatened to use force if Taiwan 
attempted to secede from China.  Specifically, party members reaffirmed, ―(to take) 
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China‘s sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity.‖384  There is much room for debate over the likely consequences 
and outcomes of future military actions however; the arguments can be simplified 
into two scenarios: China wins in one, and Taiwan wins in the other.   In the first, 
China has a significant numerical military advantage over Taiwan and would prevail 
in a conflict.  In the second, others believe that Taiwan has a qualitative military 
advantage because their western military equipment is considered more advanced 
than most of the Chinese equipment.
385
    
These scenarios include a varying role for the U.S. military in the defense of 
Taiwan.   If the U. S. military were asked to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack, 
conceivably, they would utilize the most advanced weapons systems available to 
compensate for a smaller military force.   David Lague reported that China has taken 
significant steps to counter U.S. military advantages in advanced weapon systems that 
rely on satellites, computers, and radio transmissions.   He described their actions in 
2007, ―analysts say, measures like these combined with jamming of radars and 
communications along with attacks on computer networks could force the U.S. 
military to fight an old-fashioned war‖386  The military options available to consider 
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for a defense of Taiwan are further reduced by the lack of available conventional 
troops due to operational commitments in the Middle East.  If the only options 
available involve ―advanced weapon systems‖, mentioned by Lague, than the 
possibility of escalation to a total war with China must be considered before military 
actions are initiated.   Equally, one must consider what level of national commitment 
is necessary to achieve the political and military objectives?  What vital interests are 
at stake that threatens the existence of the United States and should they be defended 
at all costs?  If these questions cannot be answered precisely before the engagement 
of forces, then military failure is likely against a powerful nation like China.  One 
should anticipate that national leaders would not initiate military action in such a case 
without careful consideration of the long term costs and benefits of such actions.  
Notional scenarios are often examined to build a knowledge base to ponder these 
difficult questions before a crisis emerges.  Such complex analysis and subsequent 
understanding cannot be achieved rapidly during a crisis without prior awareness.  
There are clear linkages between the aforementioned three components of 
stress on the force and rotation policies.  Rotation policies are commonly associated 
with the Army; but the Air Force, Navy, and Marines also faced challenges associated 
with rotations.  Specialties exist in each of the services that are taxed by the continued 
operational requirements in the Middle East.  Some shortages within the Army have 
been filled by over fourteen thousand sailors serving on the ground with the Army.
387
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The Department of the Navy is also concerned that many marines have never served 
on an amphibious rotation due to the force structure requirements for ground 
operations in Iraq over the last seven years.  Andrew Tilghman recently reported, 
―Years ago, half the marines in a marine expeditionary unit (MEU) had amphibious 
experience. Now roughly three quarters of them are going to sea for the first time.‖388  
Concern exists that the Marines are losing their amphibious experience as well as 
sailors losing their experience working with marines afloat.  Both experiences are 
associated with the corps competencies of each of these services to conduct 
amphibious operations.  Stress is also affecting the Air Force.  Combat related stress 
has been attributed to roughly four percent of the deaths in theater over the last six 
years.  ―Over one hundred seventy- two airmen have committed suicide since the start 
of the war…That‘s roughly eighteen percent of all non-hostile related deaths.‖389   
Complex challenges confront the leaders responsible for restoring a sense of balance 
between operational demand and resources available in all services.  Stress on the 
force will likely remain an issue for many years to come.  
Equipment 
Returning to the third component of stress on the force identified by Secretary 
Gates, the military equipment required to meet the national policy objectives also 
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requires actions to reduce stress on the force.
390
  While many troops have been 
removed from Iraq, much of the equipment remains in Iraq to equip the Iraqi Army.  
This equipment must be replaced in order to maintain military capabilities and 
strategic flexibility.   Michelle Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 
addressed this policy goal, ―Iraqi forces must be able to provide security for Iraq‘s 
population and to conduct internal defense and basic external defenses to maintain 
stability there;‖ she explained, ―Congress recently granted the Defense Department 
authority to provide ―excess material‖ and some ―non-excess material‖ to help the 
Iraqis meet that goal.‖391   Although the reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq continues 
there is a large amount of equipment that must be transported to the United States for 
reconditioning or reset.  Much of this equipment has been utilized at a rate much 
higher than it was initially designed.  Many of these systems are the same ones that 
were developed in the 1980s and require ‗deep maintenance‘.  This deep maintenance 
is referred to as part of the process to reset the force in preparation for future 
operations and effects Bradley fighting vehicles, M-1 Abrams tanks, High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HUMWV's), and the fleet of helicopters.
392
  ―The 
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reset process takes used vehicles apart, inspects the parts, then replaces any defective 
parts and refurbishes the equipment to like-new condition, often installing available 
upgrades.‖393  The scope of the problem was expressed to Congress by Michelle 
Flournoy.  ―About 3.3 million pieces of U.S. equipment are in Iraq now, and although 
some will transfer to Iraq and eventually to Afghanistan, the majority will stay with 
U.S. forces.‖ 394  Other policy initiatives propose transferring equipment to Pakistan 
to increase Pakistani capacity to fight the Taliban in Pakistan.
395
  Alan Estavez, acting 
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness added, 
―Military logisticians are also determining what to do with 49,000 sea-land 
containers, 34,000 tons of ammunition, and 21,000 tons of supplies.‖396  
Supplemental funding has financed the operating costs in Iraq; however, most 
personnel are scheduled to be withdrawn from Iraq by 2011.  It remains uncertain 
how much budget support will exist for refitting and reconditioning military 
equipment after the operational demand has been reduced in the Middle East.   
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Much has been written over the past nine years on the lack of capacity within 
the industrial base to provide the materials needed to support military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Small arms ammunition is one of the basic requirements for an 
Army at war and also serves to demonstrate the lack of production capacity in the 
industrial base.  
A weapon without ammunition is useless, which is why ammunition is almost 
always a strategic national capability whose production must remain in-
country. On the other hand, government demand has a tendency to swing up 
and down within narrow limits, and the demands of efficiency usually lead to 
a single supplier situation – often using equipment that dates back to World 
War II.
397
 
Since 2004, ammunition shortages have existed for a variety of small arms calibers 
including precision guided missiles.  The military has steadily expended ammunition 
beyond the production capacity to replace it.
398
  War time stocks were reduced below 
acceptable levels and strategic flexibility again was reduced.   
Great Britain and Australia also depleted their reserves and were forced to 
reexamine their ammunition acquisition and stockpiling policies.
399
  In an effort to 
maximize efficiency and minimize costs these nations had relied upon single source 
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providers, rather than maintaining numerous providers that could supply a greater 
surge capacity as wartime needs increased.
400
  Great Britain in 2008 addressed the 
problem, of having a single supplier whose production could not meet the operational 
demands, by contracting with a German company to produce conventional munitions.   
Similarly, the U.S. Army Sustainment Command in Rock Island, Illinois has 
sought to expand from its single production facility, Lake City Army Ammunition 
Plant (LCAAP) in Independence, Missouri.  The United States also preferred to 
outsource ammunition development rather than build a government owned and 
managed production facility.  General Dynamics was named the secondary supplier 
of small arms ammunition.  Additionally, ten other manufacturers across the United 
States were also awarded contracts to alleviate the shortage of small arms 
ammunition.
401
   
The shortage of war stocks is not a new phenomenon springing from recent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Stuart Brandes in his book, WarHogs: a History 
of War Profits in America, argued that American production capacity has never been 
prepared for the start of a war.  His analysis examined U. S. materiel production from 
Colonial times to World War II.  He stated, ―When World War II opened, the United 
States leadership was shocked to find that the American capacity to produce war 
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materiel was woefully inadequate.  In 1940, the entire stockpile of gunpowder was 
too small to meet the needs of a single day of battle at 1943 levels.‖402  The United 
States historically has increased civilian production facilities to meet operational 
requirements.  During World War II a centralized government approach resulted in 
the government owning nearly sixteen percent of the nation‘s industrial capacity.   
However, after World War II, much of the defense production facilities were quickly 
sold off at a fraction of their cost to the government in an attempt to quickly return to 
private enterprise.
403
   
The previous analysis implies that recent operational demand must inform 
policy formulation.  As foretold by the ancient rhyme ―…for want of a nail…the 
kingdom was lost‖, emphasized the point that policy decisions have weighty 
consequences related to war preparations.
404
   When ammunition utilization rates 
decrease with the anticipated troop withdrawals from the Middle East, policies must 
remain in place to ensure sufficient war reserves and production capacity to maintain 
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strategic flexibility.
405
  War stockpiles and production capacity should be 
reconsidered.  Analysis must expand beyond ammunition shortages to other wartime 
consumable goods and major end items.  Just as ship building traditionally has 
required forethought to ensure the Navy is able to defend the sea lines of 
communications, the armed forces of today must be adequately resourced to execute 
the national strategy.  Tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, and planes have suffered 
from shortages of spare parts from years of operational demand and maintenance 
requirements exceeding the production capacity.
406
  Budget competition between 
defense programs to ‗reset‘ the force and domestic programs will likely increase from 
an implied ‗peace dividend‘ as troops are withdrawn from overseas areas.  The policy 
challenge remains to provide for the national defense at an acceptable level of risk.  
The current indicators of stress on the force may demonstrate that the level of risk 
assumed in the past is not appropriate for the emerging security environment.  
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Conclusion 
 Secretary Gates identified three components of stress on the force - repeated 
and prolonged absences from home, exposure to combat operations, and equipment 
fatigue.  They all reveal visible consequences of executing the national security 
strategy with limited resources.
407
   The goal of force development is to create combat 
capable forces within constrained resources.  All DoD efforts associated with 
acquisition, training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and 
separation are impacted by resources, command, leadership, and management.  The 
functional life cycle model of the Army addressed these interrelationships within the 
Army.  General Trefry commented on the importance of being able to understand and 
apply these relationships to the challenges facing the Army for the future:  
Well I think the Army faces some severe problems.  There are so very few 
people who know all this stuff.  The experts are in force management...until 
we can get some people who can articulate Army positions it is going to be 
tough as hell.  The Army is not going to get what the hell its wants. …To be 
able to do that, I don't see how you can do it any other way than force 
management.
408
   
The fundamental strategic questions raised in this chapter remain; 1) can all the 
national security objectives be achieved with limited resources? And, 2) what is the 
proper prioritization of objectives and resources to maintain combat capable forces? 
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 President Obama‘s speech at West Point 1 December 2009 reflected many of 
the concerns surrounding these questions related to operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  He announced his decision to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan by 
thirty thousand and established a timeline to begin the withdrawal of these troops by 
July 2011.
409
  Much of the public debate has polarized around the issue of how many 
troops should be deployed to Afghanistan and for how long.  However, very little 
public debate surrounded his declared objectives: 
We will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny 
al-Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it 
the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity 
of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead 
responsibility for Afghanistan's future.
410
  
The Washington Post headline 2 December 2009 reflected this polarization; it 
read: ―Obama: U.S. security is still at stake AFGHAN WAR TO ESCALATE, 30,000 
more troops; pullout begins mid-2011.‖411  Obama also recognized that defense 
requirements must be balanced against domestic economic concerns in his statement, 
―…having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the 
American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting 
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people to work here at home.‖412  Further, he acknowledged a conflict between 
potential mission accomplishment and cost by limiting the scope of our commitment.  
He declared ―it is in our vital national interest‖ to send more troops and it is ―not 
simply a test of NATO‘s credibility,‖ indicating his viewed importance of success in 
Afghanistan.
 413
  But he also rejected an absolute commitment of U.S. resources to the 
mission. ―Some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, 
one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade.  I reject this 
course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost 
and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.‖414  Challenges must be 
reassessed regularly in order to ensure that the appropriate amounts of resources are 
dedicated to achieve our national objectives.  The underlying national objectives must 
also be reassessed to ensure that they still warrant prioritization of scarce resources 
with the government and the DoD.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
 
The idea for this research began in 2007 at a celebration in honor of George 
Washington‘s 275th birthday at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.   General Richard 
Trefry proposed the idea of celebrating this occasion with the military community at 
the U.S. Army War College.  Organizers displayed several three by six foot charts on 
easels in a large ballroom in the Letort Creek Community Club.  These charts were 
known as the Mother of all Charts.   They attracted much attention from many of the 
attending War College faculty and students, who were fascinated with this diverse 
collection of detailed information associated with Army force management.  As they 
gazed at this display, they discussed the various events and issues portrayed ranging 
from the Army‘s policy development, doctrine development, organizational structure, 
civilian leadership, military equipment, and the associated periods of declared 
conflicts.  Many of the older participants reminisced about their personal experiences 
during their active military service.   
These charts were not new, but the reaction that they received inspired new 
questions: What was the story behind their creation?  For what purpose was this 
information recorded and archived?  Who decided to present this information visually 
as a series of charts?  Why had the Army‘s organization and equipment changed so 
much over the past seventy years?  How was a complex organization able to manage 
such dramatic changes?  From a historical perspective alone, the information on these 
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charts provided a rich database documenting over twenty-seven themes of change in 
the Department of Defense (DoD).  Collectively, they told the story of how the Army 
has been organized, trained, and equipped since 1940.  These changes were driven by 
changes in policies and missions determined by the civilian leadership.  However, 
analyzing this data required an understanding of the processes used to determine 
defense policy.   
Defense policy formulation has evolved significantly since 1940, yet these 
processes are securely grounded on a constitutional foundation.   The constitutional 
separation of powers is represented on the charts under the headings of ―President‘s, 
key advisors, key Congressional leaders, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.‖415   The 
interactions among these groups are depicted in the military budget and policy 
decisions portrayed on the charts.  Civil-military relations lie at the heart of these 
interactions.  This study has examined some of the many of these leader‘s 
management techniques and styles.  These styles can be reduced to two groups: those 
favoring either objective or subjective control of the military.  Historical examples 
support both the supporters of objective and subjective control of management of the 
military to ensure national security.  
This study provided new analysis of management of complex DoD systems.  
The inherent challenge of managing a complex organization like the DoD invites 
comparisons between military and corporate management techniques.  Accordingly, 
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this study examined the dominant civilian management theories of the 1980s.   
Corporate America and the military can learn from each other about the management 
of large organizations.   Best practices have migrated in both directions between 
them.  Both military and civilian organizations rely on systems that are vertically 
separated and exist within their own management communities, such as acquisition or 
training systems.  Force management provides a holistic approach that crosses 
vertical barriers to improve effectiveness, efficiency, and management of change.  
Many of these principles of management are common within large organizations, 
both corporate and military.   
This research revealed the evolution of the process of force management in 
the 1980s - from policy formulation to combat ready organizations in a resource- 
constrained environment.  In other words, force management led change in the 
Army.
416
  Lieutenant General (retired) Richard G. Trefry has remained at the center 
of Army force management.  The Secretary of the Army awarded Trefry the first 
―LTG Richard G. Trefry Lifetime Service Award‖ for over sixty-five years of service 
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to the Army on 20 March 2009.
417
  The life and times of LTG Trefry warrant separate 
treatment.   His experiences over his years of service chronicle many noteworthy 
accomplishments.  They also offer many valuable insights to the challenges that faced 
the nation.   He was instrumental in the advancement of a systematic approach to 
managing change across the Army, which involved many independent projects.  
Chief among these was the development of the Army Force Management System 
(AFMS), the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS), the Mother of All 
Charts (MOAC), as well as the role of the Inspector General of the Army.  This study 
offers historical background on Trefry‘s labors to improve Army force management. 
This study has described the process that the U.S. government has used to 
meet its security challenges since the 1980s.  The Joint Strategic Planning System 
(JSPS) codified national priorities and enabled the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
translate them into military requirements.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) utilizes the JSPS to meet his statutory requirements for defense planning.
418
   
This study examined the interdependent relationships between the JSPS and the Army 
Force Management System (AFMS); it analyzed the Army process to determine the 
forces and equipment needed to meet the civilian leadership‘s guidance for national 
security. 
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Chapter Three traced the history of the Army Force Management System 
(AFMS) during the 1970s and 1980s.  It explained how in the 1970s and 1980s Trefry 
developed a system to manage change in the Army.  This analysis included the 
development of the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM), or Functional 
Life Cycle Model of the Army (FLCM).  This model was designed to manage change 
in the Army during the 1980s.  This chapter illustrated how the contemporary 
management philosophies of Peter Drucker, Henry Mintzberg and others, influenced 
organizational behavior in force management and defense strategic planning.  This 
chapter then provided a basis for further analysis of national security objectives, 
policies, and issues.  It stressed the need for a holistic approach to manage the 
complex systems that direct change across the DoD.  Understanding these systems 
and their interrelationships is essential for ensuring combat-ready units have the 
requisite structure, equipment, and training to accomplish national security objectives.  
As the Inspector General of the Army, Trefry understood and articulated these 
systems. 
Continuing the analysis of the AFMS, Chapter Four examined the history of 
the U.S. Army Force Management School (USAFMS) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  It 
explains how the Army incorporated Trefry‘s holistic vision of management.  Despite 
early efforts in the 1980s to establish force management training in the Army, by 
1993 most force management training initiatives had been eliminated.  In 1993, 
Trefry led the Army investigation that detailed the state of Army force management 
training since 1980s.   This chapter described the events that led to the creation of the 
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USAFMS as the Army‘s central educational institution for preparing senior analysts 
and leaders for assignment in the global force management community.  USAFMS 
has produced many DoD primers and reference books.  One of the most 
comprehensive is How the Army Runs: a Senior Leader Reference Book, written by 
the USAFMS.
419
   In 1994, Trefry became the Program Manager of the school; he 
still serves in 2010.  Sadly, few senior military officers have the background or have 
expressed the inclination to succeed Trefry in this position.  
Chapter Four also chronicled the history of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).  
In 1996, Trefry developed these charts as a training aid to visually depict the 
interrelationships among the AFMS‘s many domains.  These charts are managed by 
Scott Wilson at the USAFMS and detail several themes affecting the Army since 
1940.  Collectively, these charts display trends and portray some of the unintended 
consequences of defense policy changes over time.  The MOAC currently exhibits 
twenty-seven themes in over 100 separate charts.  This study provided the first 
documentation of the development of these charts and the electronic database that 
supports them.  The archives at the USAFMS have yet to be fully cataloged or 
analyzed.  The U.S. Military Academy at West Point has expressed interest in 
acquiring and cataloging many of these records, however, the Army Heritage and 
Education Center has also expressed an interest.  These archives deserve additional 
examination as they mature.     
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Chapter Five explored civil-military relations.  These relations, or interactions, 
develop the objectives that drive change in the DoD.   This chapter elaborated on the 
role of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) described in Chapter Two.  
Analysts must be familiar with the JSPS and AFMS before they consider the impacts 
of current military operations on equipment, personnel, organizations, and strategy.  
Civilian policy decisions, and the resources allocated to implement them, have 
serious implications for future U.S. national security.  The interrelationships among 
force management and the JSPS provide a new heuristic for examining the 
implications of current military operations upon national security policy.  Few 
analysts seem to be aware of the implications of policy decisions on Army force 
management.  Senior military leaders have a professional responsibility to inform 
their civilian leaders of the likely implications of defense related policy decisions.  
 The attacks of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States 
homeland is vulnerable to attacks from violent extremists.  This spectacular attack 
changed many Americans‘ view of our national security within the new global 
security environment.  The coordinated efforts of a few extremists irrevocably 
changed Americans‘ view of national security requirements.  This vulnerability 
created a sense of urgency, which prompted examination of U.S. defense measures on 
a global scale.  Within the United States, homeland defense was elevated to a cabinet-
level position as public and private organizations increased security awareness and 
defense measures.  This dissertation provided a history of the management systems 
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critical to ensuring the Army and the nation are capable of developing a viable 
national security strategy. 
Chapter Six presented some policy considerations that affect interactions 
among policy, the JSPS, and force management.   Journalists, politicians, scholars, 
and various defense analysts have added to this emerging body of literature 
concerning future threats and likely U.S. national security challenges.  This 
dissertation showed how the JSPS system produces divergent views of the security 
environment, leading to divergent DoD policy recommendations.  Civilian leaders 
also have access to a wealth of knowledge that can inform their policy 
recommendations.  The military must remain actively involved in deliberations of 
policy to ensure that informed decisions are reached.  However, the civilian 
leadership is ultimately responsible for determining national security objectives and 
the organization of the military.  
Recent operations in the Middle East have stressed the force to the point that it 
will take many years to replace equipment and train personnel to conduct operations 
on a scale equivalent to what is required for major combat operations.  Many believe 
that the probability of fighting a near-peer competitor is too low to justify the expense 
of refitting the Army.  Some place their confidence in the nuclear arsenal to mitigate 
or deter any future near peer military threat.  Others believe the future Army should 
be organized to conduct counterinsurgency operations similar to the ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Proposals for future military structures are based 
on differing views of the global security environment.  Yet all future threat 
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assessments are fraught with ambiguity.  Warfare is inherently asymmetric; there 
would be no armed conflict if all adversaries were transparently symmetrical.  
Adversaries always adapt to new technology, tactics, and procedures; they find ways 
to compensate for their comparative weaknesses.  However, time is not always 
available to mitigate vulnerabilities and thus to prevent devastating consequences.  
Risk must be assumed as current needs are balanced against future requirements.  
Competition for scarce resources makes prioritization of resources even more 
difficult.   
In a democracy, defense spending will continue to compete with other 
domestic programs for limited resources.  Right minded leaders will continue to 
disagree over the composition of the military needed to accomplish the national 
security objectives.  This debate must include an open discussion of all parties‘ 
assumptions and expectations.  Allocation of resources may be based on deep-seated 
values and beliefs that may never be altered by reason.   Risk will be assumed across 
all elements of national power.  The military provides just one of the means that can 
be used to achieve national security objectives.   Policy makers must determine and 
prioritize national objectives as they allocate resources.  Failure to do so jeopardizes 
accomplishment of domestic agendas as well as national security objectives. 
Public opinion also plays a large role in determining how much national 
treasure will be expended for defense.  Many Americans believe the most immediate 
threat to the nation is economic.  Most also acknowledge that terrorist extremist 
groups threaten global security.  Incessant news broadcasts reinforce the impression – 
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even the fear- that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are actively working to attack 
the United States.   However, the role of the military in addressing this threat is less 
clear.  The Federal Aviation Administration has played a significant role in 
establishing practices to combat terrorism on flights.   Increased security procedures 
at airports are the most visible evidence of these changes.  Similarly, piracy threatens 
free commerce on a global scale, yet the role of the military to combat piracy is also 
limited.  The business community has independently adopted several security 
measures to protect themselves in overseas operations.  Improved security procedures 
have also reduced pirates‘ abilities to seize merchant ships.  All elements of power 
must be coordinated to effectively deal with these varied threats.  National security 
can be improved in many ways without increasing the defense budget.   
This dissertation focused on the military‘s national security processes to 
explicate the role of force management in coordinating resources to field combat 
ready units.  However, it does not advocate that the DoD is the only element of power 
that should be considered in developing the national security strategy.  A 
comprehensive, or whole-of-government, approach should be developed to mitigate 
risks to vital national security interests.  Other elements of national power can 
effectively achieve national objectives.  But just like the military, they have their own 
limitations.  Effective force management satisfies realistic expectations when the 
military is called to respond to respond to a crisis.  The Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, 
and Airmen of the nation have always acted valorously in response to our national 
emergencies.  Our national policy makers do not need 20/20 future vision to assure 
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the nation‘s security.  Plans for the future force structure must be realistically based 
on the intended military mission.  As these requirements change, so must the force 
structure to accomplish these missions.  Strategy development requires national 
leaders to make hard decisions and set priorities to guide the development of a force 
structure.  Changes in force structure take years to implement; they must be 
anticipated in order to succeed.  Understanding force management provides insight 
into a process that analyzes the threat and produces trained and ready combat 
organizations to maintain national defense.   Defense professionals and scholars of 
national security should understand the history of this system in order to inform their 
decisions as they lead change to provide for our nation‘s security.  
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Appendix 1  
The Mother of All Charts 
 
 
Figure 6. The Mother of All Charts Threat “Theme” Chart (Left).420 
                                                 
420
U.S. Army Force Management School, Mother of All Charts. Available from: 
http://160.147.135.6/afms/charts; (accessed 21 January 2010).  Picture of charts converted by U.S. 
Army War College Photo Lab, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 23 January 2010. 
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Figure 7. The Mother of All Charts “Threat” Theme Chart (Right).421 
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Figure 8. The Mother of All Charts “Army Secretariat” Theme Chart 
(Left).
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Figure 9. The Mother of All Charts “Army Secretariat” Theme Chart 
(Right).
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Figure 10. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits Outside of U.S.” 
Theme Chart (Left).
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Figure 11. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits Outside of U.S.” 
Theme Chart (Right).
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Figure 12. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits to U.S. 1940-
1975” Theme Chart (Left).426 
  
                                                 
426
Ibid. 
222 
 
Figure 13. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits to U.S. 1940 - 
1975” Theme Chart (Right).427  
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Figure 14. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits to U. S. 1975 -
1990” Theme Chart (Left).428 
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Figure 15. The Mother of All Charts “Heads of State Visits to U. S. 1975 -
1990” Theme Chart (Right).429 
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Figure 16. The Mother of All Charts “Key Leadership” Theme Chart 
(Left).
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Figure 17. The Mother of All Charts “Key Leadership” Theme Chart 
(Right).
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Figure 18. The Mother of All Charts “Organizations” Theme Chart (Left).432 
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Figure 19. The Mother of All Charts “Organizations” Theme Chart 
(Right).
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Appendix 2 
Interview Questions for Lieutenant General Richard Trefry 
(Interviewed by Colonel Gregory L. Cantwell 18, 19, 20 December 2007 
at the U.S. Army Force Management School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia) 
1. History of the US Army Force Management School? (What is the story behind 
establishing the Force Management School (AFMS)?) 
a. Why did the Army establish the Army Force Management School? 
b. When did The Army establish the Army Force Management School?  
c. How long did it take from conceptualization to activation? 
i. Who were the key players involved: supporters and opponents? 
1. In Congress?  
2. In DA?  
3. In MPRI?  
d. How did the curriculum evolve? 
i. What were the first courses offered?  Why? 
ii. What courses don‘t you offer that you believe should be 
offered? Why? 
e. What is the funding source for the AFMS?  
i. Is it subject to change annually? 
ii. I understand that many of the officers newly assigned to the 
pentagon attend your orientation courses.   
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1. What are the selection criteria for attendance?  Is it 
required? Is there a goal? Are records kept to show the 
percentage of personnel that have attended the staff 
orientation courses?   
2. Who funds their attendance? 
3. What courses do they attend?  Staff Officers? General 
Officers? 
4. What are the objectives of these courses? 
5. Who develops the curriculum and courseware?  What is 
the approval process for the courseware? 
 
f. Based on the importance of the school- I understand that the school is 
a US Army field agency in support of the army G-3.  
i.  Is this a permanent association?  Can the G-3 alter this 
relationship?  Is it codified? 
ii. Are the instructors DOD civilians? 
iii. Can the AFMS be closed? If so, what authority could do so?  
iv. What do you see as the future for the school? 
v. What challenges do you see to this future for the school? 
g. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the Force 
Management School or its founding?  Is there anyone else that you 
recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?  
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2. History of Mother of all Charts (MOAC) (What is the Story behind the 
Mother of All Charts?) 
a. What is the purpose of the MOAC? 
b. Why did you establish the Mother of All Charts (MOAC)? 
c. What did the first chart cover? 
d. How did you determine what information should be captured?  What 
were the criteria? 
e. Management of Charts: 
i. Who manages the charts? Scott Wilson? What is his 
background?  How did you select him for the job?  
ii. How are the charts managed? 
f. What are the charts used for?  Who uses them?  Where are they 
displayed permanently, and temporarily? 
g. How does information get added to the chart?  
h. I understand that you currently have 27 different themes.  How many 
charts cover are there in total?  
i. Are there additional charts you would like to see? 
j. What do you see as the future of the MOAC? 
k. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the Mother of 
All Charts?  Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak with or 
questions that I should ask?  
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3. I understand that you have an extensive archive collection.  Can you tell me 
more about what kind of information is contained in these archives? 
a. Where are they located?  
b. Is there a custodian?  How can they be accessed? 
c. How does the information get into the archives? 
d. Where does it come from? Are parts of it classified? 
e. Has it been digitally preserved? 
f. I understand that you have arranged for West Point to accept the 
archives.  Can you tell me more about this? (degree of scope, quantity, 
timetable for transfer) 
i. How are they organized? 
ii. Are these personal archives or government property? 
iii. Who is the point of contact at West Point? 
iv. What do you believe is the greatest value of the archive? 
v. What do you believe is the most valuable information 
contained in them? 
vi. What is the most interesting information? 
g. Is there anything else that you would like to add about the archives or 
their establishment?  Is there anyone else that you recommend I speak 
with or questions that I should ask?  
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4. History of ―How the Army Runs‖ (HTAR).  I understand that this is a War 
College Textbook that was written by the AFMS at one time.  What is the 
History of the development of HTAR? 
a. Who were the key players involved:  
i. In Congress? 
ii. In DA?  
iii. At Carlisle?  
iv. In MPRI?  
b. When was it created? 
c. Why is it now managed at the War College? 
d. Who is the primary audience? 
e. What changes would you suggest to it?  
f. The book ―How the Army Runs‖ covers many of the systems that you 
mention in your presentation.  Some of this is by necessity.  What is 
the relationship between the presentation and the Book? Is there a 
chicken and an egg? 
g. What components do you believe needs modification in the force 
management process? Why?  
h. Is there anything else that you would like to add about ―How the Army 
Runs‖ or its establishment?  Is there anyone else that you recommend I 
speak with or questions that I should ask?  
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5. I have been one of your trained force management instructors at the Command 
and General Staff College (2000-2003) and have great appreciation for what 
you do personally and with the Army Force Management School.  I have 
observed your ‗Preamble to the Foxhole‘ presentation given to the Majors at 
the resident course several times. I have received many emails and phone calls 
from students thanking me for the instruction and assistance in understanding 
the Army Bureaucracy.  Others have told me they wished they had paid more 
attention in class, but still appreciated the instruction.  In all cases they had an 
increased appreciation for the importance of the subject matter a very short 
time after their new assignment in the Pentagon or a staff position.  
 
a. What led you to develop that presentation? 
b. What is the objective of the presentation? What is its importance to 
you? 
c. Where has it been given? Where do you still present this briefing? 
d. Is there anything else that you would like to add about ―Preamble to 
the Foxhole‖ or its establishment?  Is there anyone else that you 
recommend I speak with or questions that I should ask?  
6. General questions: 
a. What is your top concern in the Army right now? 
b. What other areas do you want to see better addressed by the Army 
leadership? 
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c. What other areas do you think that ―somebody‖ needs to take a closer 
look at in the Army? 
d. What would you change today if you had the resources and ability? 
Process? Structure?  
e. H.R. Mc Master‘s ―Dereliction of duty‖ made a lot of accusations 
about senior military leaders‘ lack of fortitude to resist civilian 
authority in the employment of troops in the Vietnam War.  More 
recently, many journalists are criticizing the role of the senior military 
leaders in Iraq.  
i. What do you believe is the appropriate approach for a senior 
military leader to express disagreement with national policies 
and military employment?   
ii. How do you effect change when the underlying principle is 
civilian control of the military? 
iii. How should the military interact with Congress in this regard?   
iv. What do you believe is the proper role for a retired general 
officer in the press, media, and politics? 
7. There has been a debate for decades over the size of the military.  The short 
and long of it is that the missions and resources, ((DOTMLPF) people, 
organizations, equipment, training, funding) must balance or national security 
risk is assumed.  Many claim that there is a current imbalance between the 
two and that the force structure should be increased to enable the Army to 
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better meet its obligations.  This assumes that the current operational 
requirements are representative of future requirements.  No one has a crystal 
ball, but what trends do you see that support an increase or decrease in force 
structure? 
8. Many Reservists are now serving in the Middle East or are scheduled for 
service in the Middle-East.  This has many journalists calling for a 
reevaluation of the role of the reserves.  A reevaluation on this scale has many 
force Management implications. You have seen many changes in the role of 
the reserve since WWII.   
a. What do you believe should happen?   
b. What will happen?   
c. Andrew Bacevich in his book ‗The New American Militarism‘ claims 
that the military has become too separated from society, and in effect, 
the all volunteer force has become a elite mercenary force.  Society no 
longer embraces citizenship with a sense of obligation for military 
service.  Currently, less than 1% of the population serves in the 
military. 
i.  What are the implications or historical trends you anticipate by 
maintaining the all volunteer force.   
ii. Do you believe that a change is needed? 
iii. Do you believe that the United States could go back to a draft? 
Under what circumstances? 
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Appendix 3 
Selected Annotated Bibliography 
 The research identified in this review was the first step on the journey towards 
completing this dissertation.  Each of these references led to additional sources and 
raised new questions that warranted deeper investigation.  The following documents 
highlight the existing literature applicable to this study.  This brief synopsis is 
separated into two categories: primary and secondary sources.  Some sources could 
be considered in either categories depending upon the context in which they are 
viewed.  Each section is arranged alphabetically by title.  
 The secondary sources contain a brief summary of the author‘s thesis or main 
points- often in their own words- and their respective value to this study.  Several 
books provide an analysis of the emerging international security environment.  Many 
others present alternate models for restructuring the DoD or deal with the broader 
topic of managing organizational change.  These fields were explored in greater depth 
in the course of my research and are rich with published and unpublished works and 
studies.  The United States Army War College librarians compiled a thirty one page 
bibliography focused on doctrine and organizational change that provided valuable 
starting points for this research.  Additionally, they have compilations on a variety of 
related topics: transformation, leadership, and management, which are recommended 
for additional research.  The Combined Arms Research Library Research Librarians 
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at Fort Leavenworth also compiled larger bibliographies on force management and 
related defense issues.  Similarly, the Force Management School archive at Fort 
Belvoir contains a wealth of information on force management and the Army 
inspector general inspections.   The following summary does not address the entirety 
of the research effort or attempt to evaluate all of these sources, yet it is provided to 
assist in additional research.   
The richest primary source should come as no surprise, the Oral History 
Interviews with LTG Richard Trefry.  The first 1276 pages of the transcript provided 
information documenting other portions of his military career.  These documents 
could serve as a starting point for a separate work on the life and times of Trefry.  The 
interviews conducted 18 -20 December 2007 focused specifically on the force 
management research questions in this dissertation.  Neither of these sources have 
been released or reviewed prior to this research effort.  The manuscripts of these 
interviews will be maintained at the Army War College library archives.  
 The information synthesized in How the Army Runs outlines the Joint 
Strategic Planning System and the Army Force Management System. Outlining these 
bureaucratic systems is not new ground.  However, the new regulation CJCSI 
3100.01B changed the system dramatically.  The new version of How the Army Runs 
was not available in time to inform this dissertation.  Force Management instruction 
however, has been part of the institutional training school houses for many years.  
Unfortunately, interest in the subject is nominal in all but the practitioners of the 
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system.  Many developing leaders do not understand that they have a need to 
understand the system until they are placed in a leadership position within the system.  
Their wakeup call comes in the form of assignment orders to a position on a 
Divisions, Corps, or Army Staff.  One goal of this research was to develop a narrative 
description that explains the interrelationships between these systems that can be 
easily understood.  
 LTG Trefry established the Force Management School and is still the director.  
He is also the creator of the ‗Mother of All Charts‘ and oversees revisions to How the 
Army Runs.   This study of the force management systems and products all relate back 
to Fort Belvoir, MPRI, and its founder, LTG Trefry.  
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Primary Sources 
1. Chairman Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A Joint 
Strategic Planning System: (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
Dated 1 September 1999, current as of 12 September 2003) 25 pages. 
Summary:  This instruction provides joint policy and guidance on, and describes 
the responsibilities and functions of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). 
Contents: A) Introduction. B) Strategic direction.  Purpose, Scope, Components. 
C) Strategic Plans.  Purpose, Scope, Components and Guidance.  D) 
Programming Advice.  Purpose, Scope, Linking Programs and Strategy, Sources 
and Programmatic Advice, Synchronization, Planning and Programming.  E) 
Strategic Assessments, Purpose, Scope.  F) References. 
Value:  This document outlines the strategic documents that provide the strategic 
direction of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This includes the 
National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the 
Chairman's Guidance, Joint Vision (JV), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
(JSCP), Operation Plans (OPLAN), Contingency Plans (CONPLAN), Functional 
Plans (FUNCPLAN), Theater Engagement Plans (TEP), Joint Planning Document 
(JPD), Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), Chairman‘s Program 
Assessment (CPA), and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). 
2. Chairman’s Program Assessment 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS. 
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Summary:  The Chairman‘s Program Assessment (CPA) provides the Chairman's 
personal assessment of the conformance of Service and Agencies Program 
Objective Memorandums (POMs) to the priorities established in the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), strategic plans, and Combatant Commander‘s 
requirements. Main Points: 1) The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff‘s personal 
advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman‘s Program Assessment are 
submitted to impact the Program Decision Memorandums (PDM) in the budget 
review.  2) The Chairman‘s Program Assessment (CPA) is prepared in accordance 
with Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3137.01A Series, and developed 
through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) -- the Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, now called the Functional 
Capabilities Board Process (FCB).
434
   Using a process similar to the production of 
the draft Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), most Chairman‘s Program 
Assessment (CPA) issues are derived from the Joint Warfighting Capabilities 
Assessment (JWCA) findings and recommendations that have been vetted 
through the Joint Requirements Board (JRB) and approved by the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).   3) The JROC approved draft 
Chairman‘s Program Assessment is vetted: through each Combatant Commander, 
Service Chief, and Joint Staff Director.  The Chairman considers the comments 
                                                 
434
 CJCSI 31 37.01C Functional Capabilities Board Process (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, dated 12 November 2004), ―CJCSI 3137.01B, 15 April 2002, ―The Joint Warfighting 
Capabilities Assessment Process (JWCA)‖ is canceled.1. 
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from these senior leaders as he personally finalizes this memorandum. (From 
CJCSI 3100.01A). 
Value:  This document is one of the many documents that the Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff uses to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide his best 
military advice to the President.  This document demonstrates how the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides his assessment, within the Joint Strategic 
Planning System, of how well the Services are prepared to accomplish their 
mission requirements. 
3. Chairman's Program Recommendation 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS. 
Summary:  The Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) is developed in 
accordance with the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01A 
Series, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Process.  The 
Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) provides the Chairman's personal 
programmatic advice to the Secretary of Defense.  This memorandum is provided 
prior to the publication of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (This has since 
been replaced (as of 2006) by the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the 
Joint Planning Guidance (JPG) that are produced separately.  However, the CJCSI 
(regulation) changed in December 2008).  The Chairman's Program 
Recommendation (CPR) emphasizes specific recommendations, within 
Department of Defense resource constraints and within an acceptable risk level, 
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that will - enhance joint readiness; promote joint doctrine and training; and, better 
satisfy joint warfighting requirements.  The Chairman's Program 
Recommendation (CPR) is developed through the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process.  
Most Chairman‘s Program Recommendation (CPR) issues are derived from the 
Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) findings and 
recommendations that have been vetted through the Joint Requirements Board 
(JRB) and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).  The 
JROC approved Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) draft is sent 
personally through each Combatant Commander, Service Chief, and Joint Staff J-
Director.  The Chairman considers the comments from the senior leader as he 
personally finalizes his memorandum. (From CJCSI 3100.01A) 
Value:  This document is one of the many documents that the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff uses to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide 
planning and programmatic guidance to the Services.  It provided the statutory 
basis for the CJCS requirements as component of the Joint Strategic Planning 
System analyzed in my research.  (Document superseded in Dec 2008 by CJCSI 
3100.01B) 
4. Interview from LTG (RET) Richard Trefry with Gregory L. Cantwell 
Summary: Interviews conducted by author with Lieutenant General Trefry at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 18-20 December 2007.  Trefry was born 6 August 1924. 
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His career of service spans from WWII to the present at time of this writing.  He 
is currently the Program Manager at the U.S. Army Force Management School at 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  He was commissioned in 1950 from West Point and 
retired from active duty in 1983.  The interview questions are included in 
Appendix 2.  Discussions cover: 1) The founding of the Army Force Management 
School; 2) The development of the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army; 3) 
The history of the ―Mother of All Charts‖; 4) The history of ―How the Army 
Runs‖; and, 5) The history of ―Preamble to the Foxhole‖.  Additional discussion 
addressed the implications of current operations on national security from a force 
management perspective.  Topics deal with civil-military relations, the challenges 
of an all volunteer Army, and the role of the National Guard and Reserve in 
defense planning.  
Value:  These interviews provided detailed personal accounts of events spanning 
throughout General Trefry‘s career. His ability to recall names, places and dates is 
noteworthy.  His personal insights have provided opportunities for further study.  
Without exception, his accounts of events have been substantiated by additional 
research.  His experience as the Army Inspector General provided him with 
invaluable insights to the changes which occurred in the Army in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.   This information provided many avenues for further exploration 
and research beyond the scope of this study. 
5. Joint Planning Document 
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(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) CJCS. 
Summary:  The Joint Planning Document (JPD) consists, as a minimum, of a 
cover letter and several chapters with specific planning and broad programming 
recommendations for topics approved by the CJCS.  Program recommendations 
address capabilities warranting further programmatic assessments or emphasis.  
The Joint Staff J- 5 Director, in consultation with the Joint Staff J-8 Director, 
prepares cover letters to: direct the planning, provide programmatic advice, and 
set priorities for the development of the DPG.  The JPD is forwarded to the CJCS 
for approval.  Upon approval, the JPD is forwarded to the SecDef under the 
CJCS‘s signature.  The JPD provides the initial, timely, authoritative CJCS 
planning and programming advice to the SecDef for initial preparations of the 
draft DPG.  It contains the CJCS‘s planning and programming priorities.  
Specifically, the JPD 1) Reflects the Chairman's planning guidance based on the 
National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Strategy Review (JSR), Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and Joint Vision (JV).  2) Strives to identify critical 
capabilities and shortfalls in meeting the National Military Strategy (NMS).  
These capability shortfall findings provide clear and concise terms to focus the 
efforts of the Defense Planning Guidance writers.  3) Emphasizes the Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff‘s priorities.  The JPD is prepared and submitted 
approximately six months before the scheduled publication of the DPG.  The 
format for the JPD chapters is developed annually by the Joint Staff J-5 Director, 
each chapter addresses the following areas: 1) Planning Guidance; 2) Challenges; 
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3) Required Capabilities; 4) Priorities; and, 5) Commander in Chief and Service 
Programming Initiatives.  (From CJCSI 3100.01A). 
Value:  This document is one of the many documents that the CJCS uses to meet 
his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and programmatic guidance to 
the Services.  It examines a component of the Joint Strategic Planning System 
covered in this dissertation. 
6. The Joint Strategy Review 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Chairman Joint Chief of Staff 
(CJCS). 
Summary:  The Joint Strategy Review (JSR) is a continuous process used to 
develop strategic military planning advice and assessments.  The Joint Strategy 
Review Working Groups (JSRWG), composed of representatives from the Joint 
Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and supported by the defense agencies, 
study the strategic environment to develop a common planning horizon for 
specific areas of concern identified by the Chairman.  This analysis provides a 
basis for changes to the Joint Vision (JV) and the National Military Strategy 
(NMS).  The JSR provides a strategic framework for Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff advice to the National Command Authority (NCA) on critical defense 
issues.  The Joint Strategy Review validates a common set of planning 
assumptions and provides a common reference point to be used by the other joint 
staff processes; Such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) and 
Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB).  The assumptions developed in the JSR 
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provide a common thread for the development of future plans and programs.  The 
JSR scrutinizes current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives to assess - 
near, - mid, and - long, term United States requirements and objectives.  The JSR 
provides the primary means for the Chairman, in consultation with the Combatant 
Commanders, Services, and defense agencies, to analyze strategic concepts and 
issues relevant to strategy formulation.  The JSR process continuously gathers 
information through an examination of the current, emerging, and future issues: 
related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, 
organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions.  
Although it is not the subject of a JSR, the current strategic picture may serve as a 
useful reference point for other analysis.  The Joint Strategy Review process 
produces the: Joint Strategy Review Annual Report, and Joint Strategy Review 
Issue Papers. 
7. Joint Strategy Review Annual Report 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Chairman Joint Chief of Staff 
(CJCS). 
Summary:  A key annual report that provides a framework for the CJCS‘s 
strategic military advice.  It includes an assessment of the strategic environment, 
national security objectives, and strategic priorities covering a designated - 
midterm or long term - timeframe.  It reports anticipated changes in the strategic 
environment, significant enough to warrant senior leader attention.  The report 
highlights the threat assessment and issues contained in the JSR.  It contains issue 
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papers on topics that affect the NMS.  These papers provide the Chairman with 
findings, options, and recommendations.  The CJCS‘s endorsement of a specific 
issue constitutes guidance to update, rewrite, or retain the current NMS.  
Alternately, this report may focus on a strategic topic of separate importance to 
the Chairman. (From CJCSI 3100.01A). 
8. Joint Strategy Review Issue Papers. 
Summary:  When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment 
occur or apply, papers may be presented to the Chairman, Service Chiefs, and 
Combatant Commanders.  These papers address changes to the Joint Vision, 
NMS, JPD, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  Each paper provides 
the CJCS and Combatant Commanders with an issue summary, significant change 
in the strategic environment, and the impact on the NMS.  Issues selected for 
review will be based on a continuous analysis and assessment of National 
Command Authority policy guidance, NMS, DPG, Chairman‘s Program 
Assessment (CPA), strategic environment, and other sources. (from CJCSI 
3100.01A) 
Value:  This document is one of the main documents produced by the Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and 
programmatic guidance to the Services.  It serves as a component of the Joint 
Strategic Planning System analyzed in this study. 
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9. National Military Strategy of the United States 1992 -- 1997. 
Summary:  The versions from 1992 to 1997 are available digitally.  The current 
(2004) version is summarized below.  This document has been under revision for 
the last year and a new version is overdue.  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) has changed the strategic guidance and established a new force 
sizing construct that supersedes the guidance in the 2004 National Military 
Strategy (NMS).  The Classified appendices to the NMS are not included in the 
reviewed version of the NMS.   
The NMS conveys the CJCS message to the joint force of the strategic 
direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the NSS 
and NDS in this time of war.  This document describes the ways and means to 
protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attack and prevail against 
adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, allies and friends.  
Success rests on three priorities: first, while protecting the United States we must 
win the war on terrorism.  Second, we will enhance our ability to fight as a joint 
force.  Third, we will transform the Armed Forces in stride - fielding new 
capabilities and adopting new operational concepts while actively taking the fight 
to the terrorists.  The NMS serves to focus the Armed Forces on maintaining 
United States leadership in a global community that is challenged on many fronts.  
In this environment, United States presence and commitment to partners are 
essential.  Our dedication to security and stability ensures that the United States is 
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viewed as an indispensable partner, encouraging other nations to join us in 
helping make the world not just safer, but better.  (Richard B. Myers, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
Content: I. Introduction, Strategic Guidance, the Role of the National Military 
Strategy, Key Aspects of the Security Environment, Strategic Principles.  II. 
National Military Objectives.  III. Joint Force Mission Success, Desired Attributes 
Functions and Capabilities. IV. Force Design and Size.  V.  Joint Vision for 
Future Warfighting.   
Value:  This document is one of the main documents produced by the Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet his Title 10 responsibilities and provide planning and 
programmatic guidance to the Services.  It will serve as a component of the Joint 
Strategic Planning System Analyzed in this study. 
10. National Security Strategy of the United States 1987 -- 2002. 
Summary: The versions from 1987 to 2002 are available digitally.  The current 
version (March 2006) is summarized below. The 2002 version may be more 
noteworthy because it established the declared policy of preventative war.  This 
policy differs from the policy of preemptive strike, which remains an 
internationally justifiable cause for war.  This document is produced by the 
President and establishes the NSS.  The NSS is founded upon two pillars: the first 
pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity -- working to end tyranny, 
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to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair 
trade and the wise development policies.  The second pillar of the strategy is 
confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of 
democracies.  Achieving the goals of this strategy is acknowledged as a work of 
generations.  The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to 
what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War.  A new totalitarian 
ideology now threatens us, and ideology grounded not in secular philosophy, but 
in perversion of a proud religion.  The content may be different from the 
ideologies of last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, 
enslavement, and repression.  The United States must: - champion aspirations for 
human dignity; - strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to 
prevent attacks against us and our friends; - work with others to defuse regional 
conflicts; - prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends 
with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); - ignite a new era of global 
economic growth through free markets and free trade; - expand the circle of 
development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; - 
develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; - 
transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and 
opportunities of the 21st century; and - engage the opportunities and confront the 
challenges of globalization. 
Content: I. Overview of America's National Security Strategy.  II. Champion 
Aspirations for Human Dignity.  III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global 
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Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against us and our Friends.  IV. Work 
with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts.  V.  Prevent our Enemies from 
Threatening Us, our Allies, and our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD).  VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free 
Markets and Free Trade.  VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening 
Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.  VIII. Develop Agendas 
for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.  IX. 
Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and 
Opportunities of the 21st Century.  X.  Engage the Opportunities and Confront the 
Challenges of Globalization.  XI. Conclusion. 
Value:  This document provides a broad overarching guidance that establishes 
priorities for the DoD and other agencies to meet our national security objectives.  
This is the top document in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) hierarchy 
analyzed in this study.  All of our military objectives should support the 
objectives of the NSS.   
11. Oral History Interview from LTG (RET) Trefry: Whitehorne 
United States Army War College / United States Army Military History Institute 
(USAWC/USAMHI) Senior Officer Oral History Program, Project: 85-6, 
Interviewers:  Colonel William A. Hall, III, Colonel Robert J. Michela; 
Interviewee: Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA Retired; Interview 
Number 1:  25 January 1985.  Session number five with Lieutenant General 
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Trefry, USA Retired, 19 April 1985 (page 557). Interviewer Number 3:  Joseph 
Whitehorne, Session Five, Clifton, Virginia, 27 November 1987 (Page 1168).  
Tapes reviewed 69-97, 113, 118-120, 124-134 (30 tapes, 1 hour each).   
Summary:  1276 pages.  Many interview sessions of spread out from 1985 - 
1987.  They have been consolidated into a single transcript.  The first three 
hundred pages (double spaced) of this interview, deal with the personal history of 
Richard G. Trefry.  He was born and raised in Massachusetts.  He remembers his 
elementary school teachers, all by name, and describes his upbringing, times at 
Dartmouth and West Point, and traces his early Army career from graduation 
forward.  There are a series of fascinating monograph length discussions on some 
of the significant projects Trefry worked on, similar to those contained in Edward 
M. Coffman, the Old Army.  For example, He was the LTC in charge of morale 
welfare and services at Fort De Russey, Hawaii (1965) (pages 400-550); Hamsters 
at West Point (as a Cadet), West Point and the honor code (with the Bormann 
Commission); Saving Fort De Russey from the General Accounting Office; 
Mortar employment and reorganization in the Artillery in Vietnam, 180 MPH 
winds on Mount McKinley (as a meteorologist); Establishing skiing in the New 
Hampshire (working at Mt. McKinley)….These tapes have not be previously 
released or analyzed.  I found breaks in the discussion (after page 800).  Several 
pieces may have been omitted due to their sensitive nature.  Specifically, names in 
the Inspector General portion are removed from much of the discussion.  
However, their absence is more noticeable because of his tremendous recall of all 
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acquaintances in the rest of the discussions.  It appears that over thirty tapes were 
used on this project. 
Value: There is much rich discussion in these interviews that provide endless 
vignettes and insights into the life of Richard Trefry and the Army of from 1948 
forward.    There is a wealth of opportunities here.  Dr. Jacob Kipp suggested that 
the story of Richard Trefry may be worthy of a separate effort altogether.  The 
narratives contained in these interviews are fascinating.  However, to tell the 
larger narrative for all the events that he describes would be a monumental task.  
Research may be able to substantiate his narrative, but the scope of information 
required would be daunting.  This transcript can be reviewed in greater detail for 
many tangential efforts.  Several chapters could be written on the life and times of 
Richard Trefry alone.  Some of the topics contained are: His childhood and 
college days / WWII / West Point days / Germany / Korea / Hawaii / Armed 
Forces Staff College / Vietnam / West Point Cheating Scandal Investigation / 
Department of the Army Chief of Staff Personnel /and,  Department of the Army 
Inspector General.  Trefry also provided the author an interview, addressed 
separately, 18-20 December 2007 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  Appendix two of this 
dissertation contains the questions discussed with Trefry.  These questions 
directly relate to this dissertation.  Trefry‘s responses have provided many 
avenues for additional research. 
12. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress. 
255 
Summary:  1990 through 1999. Call number 353.60973 U565 RS for hard copy 
at Combined Arms Research Library. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 – annual).  Past editions (1995-2005) 
available at (http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html.  Current edition 
available online at http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2005.pdf.  The Annual Report 
to the President and the Congress commonly referred to as the Annual Defense 
Report, details how the DoD built its capabilities and is working to maintain them 
for the future.  In addition to fulfilling a statutory requirement, specifically, Title 
10 of U.S. Code, the SecDef‘s Annual Defense Report is widely distributed and 
serves as a basic reference document for those interested in national defense 
issues and programs. This report is unclassified so that it may be presented in an 
open forum. 
Content: I. Summary of the National Defense Strategy.  II. Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress.  III. Force Management Challenges.  IV. Operational 
Challenges.  V.  Institutional Challenges.  VI. Future Challenges.  VII. Reports 
from the Secretaries of the Military Departments. VIII. Report of the Secretary of 
the Army.  IX. Report of the Secretary of the Navy.   X.  Report of the Secretary 
of the Air Force. XI. Appendices, A: Budget Tables; B: Personnel Tempo; C: 
Resources Allocated to Mission and Support Activities; D: Goldwater-Nichols 
Act Implementation Report. 
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Value:  This report provides a formal record of the status of the armed forces as 
viewed by the SecDef.   Although it is not formally part of the JSPS, this report 
addresses many of the same central defense issues. 
13. Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 3062, 3032, 3013; Title 32 Section 102 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) 
Summary:  U.S. Code provides the legal basis for the establishment of the Army, 
and the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).  Further, it establishes 
the responsibilities of the senior leadership within the Army. The following 
excerpts reflect these relationships.   Section 3062.  (a) It is the intent of Congress 
to provide an Army that is capable…; Section 3032. The Army Staff: general 
duties: (a) The Army Staff shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, 
the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and to the Chief of 
Staff of the Army.  Section 3013. Secretary of the Army (a) (1) there is a 
Secretary of the Army, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department 
of the Army. (2) A person may not be appointed as Secretary of the Army within 
five years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular 
component of an armed force. (b) Subject to the authority, direction, and control 
of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, 
the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to 
conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following 
functions: (1) Recruiting. (2) Organizing. (3) Supplying. (4) Equipping (including 
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research and development). (5) Training. (6) Servicing. (7) Mobilizing. (8) 
Demobilizing. (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel). 
(10) Maintaining. (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military 
equipment. (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, 
structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real 
property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.  
United States Code, Title 32, National Guard, Chapter 1, Organization, Section 
102. General policy: In accordance with the traditional military policy of the 
United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the Army 
National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line 
defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.  
Value:  These codes provide the legal basis for the responsibilities of the 
leadership of the Army.  They serve to demonstrate the origin and source of 
responsibilities and authority.  The entire code is available in a PDF file and 
further delineates responsibilities within the Department of Defense.  
Understanding the legal basis is essential to the analysis contained in this 
dissertation. 
14. Quadrennial Defense Review Report by Donald Rumsfeld (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 92 pages.   
Summary: The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is required by Congress 
every four years.  The Department of Defense provides a review of its forces, 
resources, and programs and presents the findings in a report to the President and 
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Congress. The report provides a basic strategy for addressing critical defense 
issues concerning acquisition priorities, emerging threats, and defense capabilities 
for the next 20 years.    
Contents: The report is organized into eight sections.  I. Introduction.  II. 
Fighting the Long War.  III. Operationalizing the Strategy.  IV. Reorienting 
Capabilities and Forces.  V.  Reshaping the Defense Enterprise.  VI. Developing a 
21st-Century Total Force.  VII. Achieving Unity of Effort.  VIII. Chairman's 
Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. 
Value: This report provides the SecDef‘s analysis of the current capabilities of 
the DoD, and the future capabilities required for the next 20 years.  It further 
provides guidance and establishes priorities for the development of future forces.  
Many of the issues contained within the report have force management 
implications.  This is one of the primary documents provided by the SecDef in the 
JSPS.  It establishes the force sizing construct which guides the development of 
organizations and prioritization of resources within the DoD. 
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Secondary Sources 
Books 
1. American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process by Charles W. Kegley and 
Eugene Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1996), 658 pages. 
Summary: This book is organized with an analytical framework that maintains: 
five sources of power -- international, societal, governmental, role, and individual 
-- collectively influence decisions about foreign policy goals and the means 
chosen to realize them.  Kegley examined the questions: 1) Does the Cold War 
legacy continue to inform the making of American policymakers?  2) What 
challenges and opportunities to changes in the post-Cold War political and 
economic system structures pose for the United States?  3) Have the American 
people tired of the burdens of leadership and prefer to return to a pattern of 
isolation from world affairs?  4) Will the President remain a preeminent player in 
the foreign policy development in defining the nation's role in war and peace in 
setting priorities that other nation should follow?  5) Will Congress now asserts its 
prerogatives constraining the president for policy flexibility shifting resources 
away from long-standing policy instruments?  6) What impact will the 
downsizing of the defense establishment exert on the Pentagon's ability to project 
power and protect the nation's interests and those of its allies?  7) Will the 
generation of policymakers on the horizon who are unschooled in the thinking of 
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the 1930s and 1940s, opt for a radically new approach to the challenge the nation 
will face in the new millennium? 
Value:  This book is a valuable reference for understanding the organizations and 
processes that are involved in defense policy formulation.  The multilayered 
approach provides a framework for analysis of the Mother of All Charts (MOAC).  
Analysis of the data points on the MOAC is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
but this study could provide valuable context about policy formulation outside of 
the Department of Defense.  Understanding the policy formulation system outside 
the department of defense is at least as daunting a task as understanding the 
military components of the system.  This book also explores how civilian control 
of the military is exercised in foreign policy formulation. 
2. Attitudes and Latitudes: Exploring the World after September 11 by Thomas L. 
Friedman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 383 pages. 
Summary: This book has two parts.  The first part contains the newspaper 
columns Thomas Friedman published in the New York Times about September 
11.  The second part contains a diary of his private experiences and reflections 
reporting on the post-September 11 world.  It covers his travels to Afghanistan, 
Israel, Europe, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.  Friedman had two driving 
motivations for this book.  The first: to understand who the hijackers were.  The 
second: to better understand and express who Americans are.  Collectively, this 
book constitutes a word album for the September 11 experience.  His columns 
attempt to capture and preserve in words, rather than pictures, some of the 
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emotions to remind ourselves and our grandchildren what it was like to 
experience 9/11.  Each of his columns is limited to 740 words and presents a 
concise argument. 
Value:  Thomas Friedman is a Pulitzer Prize-winning - New York Times 
journalist.  This book is not a historical analysis.  However, he does provide 
valuable insight into the contemporary understanding of the events of 9/11.  Many 
current analysts use 20/20 hindsight to criticize the current military policy or 
strategy.  This book serves to capture the perceptions and understandings that 
existed in September 2001.  This book may become a valuable reference for 
placing other strategic documents in the context of the times.  Specifically, the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 and the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) of 2001 were released a few months after September 2001.  
3. Breaking the Phalanx: a New Design for Landpower in 21st Century by 
Douglas A. Macgregor (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 283 
pages.  Index and bibliography. 
Summary:  Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor‘s study economically and 
convincingly makes a case for the importance of land forces in wars of the future 
and, no less important, deterrence of war.  He uses the victory of the Roman 
legion over less flexible Greek hoplite phalanx as an illuminating analogy to his 
own proposal for a new military.  His study shows a deep knowledge and 
appreciation of the value of the other Services, and fairly evaluates their strengths 
and weaknesses.  He is focused on ground forces.  Having demonstrated the 
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continual essential role of ground forces, he recommends a new organization for 
ground combat power, more flexible, mobile and self-sufficient, versatile and 
powerful, structured to operate as part of a Joint Task Force.  Its purpose is not 
only to make best use of the new technology, but also to unleash the potentialities 
of human beings to use them.  McGregor argues that there is no going back to the 
assumption on which the traditional American nation-state was founded: that a 
small Army, augmented by large numbers of reservists, is all that is needed to 
hold the enemy at bay while civilian economy is converted to wartime production.  
In practical terms, this involves replacing old military structures and concepts - 
the contemporary equivalent of the phalanx - with new structures: a modern army 
military equivalent of the Roman legion.  This book seeks to answer the questions 
which confront the United States Army today: 1) is land power essential to 
American strategic dominance?  2) Can the Army‘s elected and appointed leaders 
shape warfighting organizations so that they are skilled enough, smart enough, 
and enduring enough to maneuver within a joint framework through the 
treacherous environments of contemporary and future conflict?  3) How do 
political and military leaders ensure execution of complex operations in winning 
performance in battle without restricting human potential and suffocating the 
American soldiers‘ individual brains and initiative?  Answers to these questions 
must be found before key choices are made by defense planners.  Macgregor 
contended Landpower will be an essential feature of statecraft and deterrence in 
the future.  What is needed today is a vision for the role the Army will play in the 
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NMS, and a description of how the Army will achieve that role.  This works 
suggests reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups positioned on the 
frontiers of American security, ready to act quickly and decisively, primed to 
move with a minimum of preparation.  However, what is certain is that 
organizational change in armies can produce revolutionary changes in warfare.  
Contents:  This book is organized into eight chapters. I.  Introduction.  II. 
Landpower and Strategic Dominance.  III. Meeting the Demands of 
Revolutionary Change in Warfare.  IV. Organizing within the RMA Trend Line.  
V.  Fighting with the Information-Age Army in the year 2003.  VI. Shaping 
Landpower for Strategic Dominance.  VII. Streamlining Defense to Pay for 
Strategic Dominance.  VIII. Final Thoughts and Future Prospects. 
Value:  This book suggests an alternative organizational design and basing 
structure to meet the United States future defense requirements.  Conceptually, 
this model Army should be organized to operate as part of a Joint Task Force.  
This analysis takes a broad look at organizational change but gets detailed about 
the specifics of each organization.  There is little mention of the mechanics or 
processes that are needed to execute this change.  This book is relevant because 
the arguments for change are central to policy determination and this dissertation. 
4. Bureaucratic Power in National Politics by Francis E. Rourke (Boston, MA: 
Little Brown and Company, 1978, 3
rd
 edition), 478 pages. 
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Summary:   This book contains a collection of 29 essays from notable authors in 
the field of political science and policy formulation, to include: James Q. Wilson, 
Max Weber, Morton Halperin, Graham Allison, Arthur's Schlesinger Jr., and Carl 
Friedrich, et al.  The author argues that the American executive has increased in 
power and with it the bureaucracy has grown dramatically. The foreign policy and 
national defense policy organizations specifically demonstrate this trend.  Both 
organizations are more bureaucratic in nature than electoral.  This book 
illuminates how bureaucratic organizations influence public policy.  These 
readings show the leading role that the executive organizations play as 
instruments of government.  In the policy arena, power is not just located in the 
executive agency.  Governmental and nongovernmental pressure groups, 
legislative committees, and other executive institutions all influence policy 
development.  Much of the discussion centers on reforming executive agencies to 
make them more effective in achieving the goals for which they were created and 
more serviceable for the people who depend on them.   
Contents:  Chapters: 1) Administrative Agencies and their Constituencies; 2) The 
Power of Bureaucratic Expertise; 3) Bureaucratic Politics: the Struggle for Power; 
4) Bureaucratic and other Elites; 5) Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative 
Reform; 6) Public Control over Bureaucratic Power. 
Value:  The military is clearly a bureaucratic organization.  Examining the 
principles of bureaucratic organizations is central to understanding how and why 
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policy decisions are reached.  Although this source predates Goldwater-Nichols 
1986, it serves as a valuable reference to bureaucratic theory and terminology.  
Many of the issues of bureaucratic reform and control reappear over time.  Many 
of the essays argue that bureaucracies continually grow as they strive for greater 
control or power. 
5. Cases in Joint Force Development   by Wade Hinkle; Edward Smith; Joel 
Christiansen; Lawrence Morton.  (Institute for Defense Analysis: Alexandria, 
Virginia.)  Report date October 2001.  73 pages. 
Summary:  This report contains the teaching syllabus and lesson plans for the 
joint force development course developed by the Institute for Defense Analysis 
(IDA) at the request of the Dean of the Air War College.  This elective course 
increased curriculum emphasis on joint matters.  It was designed to give students 
both an overview of service force development processes, and the opportunity to 
discuss trends that may portend changes to these processes in the future.  This 
course consists of three parts, presented in 15 instructional periods (IPS). Part one 
defines and delineates force development.  Part two contains a series of case 
studies (Army Force XXI; Marine Corps Urban Warfare; Naval Mine Warfare; 
Air Force Composite Wing; TRANSCOM Strategic Airlift).  Each case study is 
followed by a lesson dedicated to the official policies and regulations that guide 
each of the player‘s actions and decisions in the force development process.  In 
part three the students take an in-depth look at a number of current and 
prospective issues that may impact the manner in which the Department of 
Defense develops forces in the future.  (Accession number: ADA 397010). 
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Value:  This course provides the Air War College students an opportunity to 
develop a common level of understanding and exposure to force management.  It 
was designed as a senior leader overview and the Air College equivalent to what 
is taught by the Department of Leadership at the Army War College.  This course 
material provides an alternative model for the study of How the Army Runs at the 
Army War College.  Both present the details of Joint Force development which is 
central to this dissertation. 
6. Classical Readings of International Relations by Phil Williams, Donald M. 
Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1994), 498 pages.   
Summary: This book provides an appreciation of the diversity of approaches 
involved in the study of international relations and an understanding of the key 
concepts and frameworks.  This volume identifies the themes and issues of 
enduring importance in international relations. Williams argues, there are several 
reasons for this current relevance.  First, this book identifies some of the ways in 
which analysts and scholars have understood and explained relations among 
states.  Second, considerations of actors in international relations has never been 
more pertinent than today.  When the states of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have reasserted their sovereignty and independence and are 
attempting to make a transition to democracies and market economies; and, when 
the states of the Third World are seeking a greater sense of identity and a more 
equitable distribution of global resources.  Third, the end of the Cold War has had 
little impact on the issues of Third World development.  The problems of 
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economic inequality remain acute.  Fourth, the book contains several selections 
which focus on the distribution of power in the international system.  The 
proponents of interdependence and integration are represented here, but so too are 
those who believe that interdependence does not guarantee harmony.  The 
selections in this book provide a classical analysis, basic themes, and enduring 
problems of international relations.  The concepts and ideas and analysis can be 
used as a model to provide meaning, order, and interpretation to current events 
facing the DoD. 
 Contents: The book is organized into seven sections: I. Theories and Traditions; 
II. The Structure of the International System; III. The Actors in International 
Politics; IV. Anarchy and Society in the International System; V. Deterrence, 
Crisis, and War; VI. The Cold War International System; and, VII. International 
Relations after the Cold War.  Noted authors are: Hugo Grotius, Woodrow 
Wilson, Hedley Bull, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau, 
Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Thucydides, Bernard Brodie, 
Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling, John Mearsheimer, George Kennan, et 
al…  
Value:  This book is a valuable reference for understanding the divergent 
approaches and schools of thought with which inform the discussion of defense 
policy formulation.  This book specifically relates to this dissertation concerning 
diplomatic relations and foreign policy.  It is important to understand the theories 
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of international relations prior to analyzing strategy or policy. Understanding and 
applying these theories adds scholarly depth to this study.  
7. Department of the Army Historical Summaries (DAHSUMs) 1969-1990 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Government Printing Office). 
Summary:  Since 1969 the U.S. Army Center of Military History has produced 
the Department of the Army Historical Summary (DAHSUM) as an annual 
publication.  It provides an overview of the successes and problems of major 
Army programs during the given fiscal year.  The DAHSUMs seek to provide a 
record similar to, but more concise then, that published in the Annual Reports of 
the Secretary of War from 1822 to World War II, and in the Army's portion of the 
Semiannual Report of the SecDef from 1949 through 1968. 
Value:  This report provides a formal record of the status of the Armed forces as 
viewed by the SecDef at any period of time.  These reports may inform further 
research of the specific programs or events represented on the MOAC discussed 
in this study.   
8. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3-50 – Force Development  
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 August 1987) 
Summary:  By definition, the force development functional area includes staff 
positions from the Department of the Army to division level.  Force development 
officers focus on the management of resources for changing the Army's 
organizational structure, to provide for the associated manpower and equipment 
needs of active and reserve component forces.  This staff work determines force 
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levels capable of implementing the Army's role in national security within 
established resource levels.  Force management involves the integration of force 
structuring, resourcing, documentation, manning, and equipping to reach these 
goals. 
Contents:  1) Force Development Functional Area.  2) Role of the Force 
Development Officer.  3) Education.  4) Duties and Positions.  5) Selection and 
Professional Development. 
Value: This pamphlet is a valuable reference for reviewing the roles of force 
development officer.  This Department of the Army Pamphlet describes the role 
of a force development officer and the training required for him to meet his duties 
and responsibilities throughout his career.  These officers are the specialists in the 
Army that work within the bureaucracy to manages the endless changes that occur 
with modernization and reorganization. 
9. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century 
by Henry Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 318 pages. 
Summary: Kissinger argued, at the apex of its power, the United States finds 
itself in an ironic position.  In the face of perhaps the most profound and 
widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, it is failed to develop concepts 
relevant to the emerging realities.  Victory in the Cold War temps smugness; 
satisfaction with the status quo causes policy to be viewed as a projection of the 
familiar into the future; astonishing economic performance forces policymakers to 
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confuse strategy with economics and makes them less sensitive to the political, 
cultural, and spiritual impact of the vast transformation brought about by an 
American technology.  The debate focuses on an abstract issue: whether values or 
interest, idealism or realism, should guide American foreign policy.  The real 
challenge is to merge the two; the serious American maker of foreign policy 
cannot be oblivious to the traditions of exceptionalism by which American 
democracy has defined itself. Contents: 1) America at the apex: Empire Earth 
leader?  2) America and Europe: the World of Democracies I.  3) The Western 
Hemisphere: the World of Democracies II.  4) Asia: World of Equilibrium.  5) 
The Middle East and Africa: Worlds in Transition.  6) The Politics of 
Globalization.  7) Peace and Justice. 
Value: This book is a valuable reference for understanding many of the 
challenges facing the United States.  Although Kissinger‘s use of notes and 
references is sparse, his arguments are clearly presented in an unclassified forum.  
Dr. Kissinger is now head of the Kissinger consulting group.  This book addresses 
some of the same issues outlined in the National Security Strategy and provides 
needed context for the events portrayed on the MOAC.  Although this book is six 
years old, it is still relevant to this study because policy formulation issues still 
exist today.  
10. F100: Changing the Army, Selected Readings and References (AY06-07) (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 
2006) 350 pages. 
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Summary:   This is the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 
course materials for presenting ―Force Management‖ as part of the ―Changing the 
Army Course‖.  The book contains the advance sheets, selected readings, 
references, and extracts required for the course.  This is the broad overview 
course that is provided to all the students attending the resident Command and 
General Staff College.  An elective is offered, A499, Force Management that 
provides greater detail into the processes of force management.  Traditionally, this 
elective-A499- is only selected by 6-9 students a year, who are already force 
development specialists.  
Contents: Strategic Change; Army Campaign Plan and Modularity; Combat and 
Force Development; ARFORGEN; Material Development and Rapid Fielding; 
Organization and FMS Web; Force Management Practical Exercise. 
Value:  This course is taught to all the majors attending CGSC.  For many this is 
the only exposure to force management or force development that they will ever 
receive. (Because many of them will never attend the Army War College; only 
two to four percent of each year group of officers attends the Army War College 
in residence.  The nonresident course is voluntary.)  The low number of CGSC 
students that take the elective course is representative of the other indicators that 
force management is not studied or understood by the majority of the army. This 
is one of the central points that reinforce the importance of this dissertation.  
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These course materials provide another perspective of how to communicate an 
understanding of the force development process.  
11. F100: Changing the Army, Selected Readings and References (AY07-08) (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 
2006) 350 pages. 
Summary:   Like the F100 entry above, this is the CGSC course materials for 
presenting ―Force Management‖ as part of the ―Changing the Army Course‖ for 
AY 2007-2008.  Changes reflected in this version are:  Army Campaign Plan and 
Modularity have been dropped from last year‘s course and Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), Total Army Analysis (TAA), 
and Ethics and Military Contracting have been added.  
Contents: Strategic Change; Combat and Force Development; Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and Total Army Analysis 
(TAA); Material Development and FCS Case Study; Organization and FMS Web; 
Ethics and Military Contracting; ARFORGEN; Rapid Fielding and Equipping. 
Value:  Same value as F100 above.  The course no longer teaches the Joint 
Strategic Planning System.  The course has been reduced from forty contact hours 
to twelve.  This reflects a diminished emphasis on understanding force 
management and development in the Army school system. 
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12. Games Nations Play:  The Three Levels of Analysis: A Framework for the 
Study of International Politics by John Spanier and  Robert Wendzel (CQ Press, 
1996) reproduced in Theory of War and Strategy, AY 2007 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Department of National Security and Strategy, 2007). 204 pages. 
Summary:   This work provides three models used to study international 
relations.  They are: the international system level, the actor level, and the 
decision making level.  
Value:   These models could be applied to the historical events depicted on the 
MOAC.  Much of the history depicted on the MOAC originated with an 
international dispute.  Application of the concepts from this book informs analysis 
of the key events that have occurred since 1940.  The original book should also be 
considered for additional background on international relations theory. 
13. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2005 – 2006 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Army War College, 2005), 553 pages. 
Summary:  This book is a synthesis and interpretation of existing and developing 
Army and Joint systems, processes and procedures as currently practiced.  
Content: The book is organized into 23 chapters. Chapter 1) Introduction.  
Chapter 2) The Army Organizational Life Cycle.  Chapter 3) The Army 
Organizational Structure.  Chapter 4) The Relationship of Joint and Army Force 
Planning.  Chapter 5) Army Force Development.  Chapter 6) Planning for 
Mobilization and Deployment.  Chapter 7) Reserve Components.  Chapter 8) 
Force Readiness.  Chapter 9) Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution Process.  Chapter 10) Resource Management.  Chapter 11) Material 
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System Research, and Development, and Acquisition Management.  Chapter 12) 
Logistics.  Chapter 13) Military Human Resource Management.  Chapter 14) 
Civilian Personnel Management.  Chapter 15) Army Training.  Chapter 16) Army 
Knowledge Management.  Chapter 17) Installation Command and Management.  
Chapter 18) Intelligence.  Chapter 19) The Army Health Services Support 
System.  Chapter 20) Management of Legal Affairs.  Chapter 21) Civil Functions 
of the Department of the Army.  Chapter 22) Public Affairs.  Chapter 23) Defense 
Support of Civilian Authorities. 
Value:  This book is a senior leader reference book that describes two of the 
systems researched in detail in this dissertation: The Joint Strategic Planning 
System (JSPS), and the Army Force Management System (AFMS).  It is produced 
by the Army Force Management School but has ‗chapter authors‘, Army War 
College Professors, which serve as points of contact for updating each volume.  
This book is a ‗one source reference‘ for information concerning how the Army 
bureaucracy functions.  One of the findings of the dissertation details the origins 
of this document. 
14. International Law Cases and Materials: Third Edition by Louis Hankin, 
Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and, Hans Smit (St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co., 1993), 1596 pages.   
Summary:  This book is a casebook of international law.  It is a reference book 
with an encyclopedic index.  It has many cases that present the history and 
justification for the corresponding international laws.  It also contains a 
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historiography of the evolution of international law.  The book is organized into 
nineteen chapters and covers most aspects of international law. 
Value:  Understanding international law has become increasingly important with 
the changes in the international community brought about by the fall of the Soviet 
Union, emerging democracies, non-state actors, and increased globalization.  The 
Bush Doctrine of preventative employment of combat forces, and the prolonged 
custody of detainees, raises legal questions that are important for policy makers to 
understand.  This book provides a reference for understanding the international 
legal implications and historical precedence of established international norms.   
This book provides a valuable reference for considering the products of the JSPS 
and the emerging issues in international law. 
15. Modern Strategy by Colin Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 412 
pages. 
Summary: This book is Gray‘s effort to share an understanding of his chosen 
field of scholarly interest at the 30 year point in his career.  The master theme of 
the book - the claim that there is unity of all strategic experiences: nothing 
essentially changes in the nature and functions (or purpose) -- in sharp contrast to 
the character -- of strategy and war (In other words, strategy eternal).  ―There is 
an essential unity to all strategic experiences in all periods of history because 
nothing vital to the nature and functions of war and strategy changes.‖  In support 
of this master theme, six major questions shaped the design of the book.  1) How 
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does the theory and practice of strategy interact?  2) What has the growing 
complexity of defense preparation and war meant for strategy?  3) Why is strategy 
so difficult?  4) Since strategy and war have many dimensions, is it probable that 
superiority in only one or even several such dimensions can deliver victory? 5) 
What has changed for strategy in the 20th century and what has not?  6) What 
does the strategic experience of the 20th century tell us about what is probably to 
come in the 21st century?  This book is about modern strategy: the use or threat of 
military power for political purposes. 
Value: Colin Gray has been a leading defense strategist and strategic thinker for 
the last 30 years.  His mission here is to help improve understanding of modern 
strategy.  He does not see important differences among ancient, medieval and 
modern strategy.  This book is a valuable reference for considering the strategic 
challenges of modern warfare.  The extensive list of references is also useful for 
further research on many of the themes on the MOAC.  This book provides 
background for consideration of many of other books written about modern or 
future warfare. 
16. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. 
Huntington (New York, New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997), 
367 pages.  
Summary:  This book is based on a concept proposed in the 1993 Foreign Affairs 
article entitled the Clash of Civilizations? Huntington explores the concept of 
civilizations; the question of the universal civilization; the relation between power 
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and culture; the shifting balance of power among civilizations; cultural 
indigenization in non-Western societies; the political structure of civilizations; 
conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy, and Chinese 
assertion; balancing and bandwagoning responses to the rise of Chinese power; 
the causes and dynamics of fault line wars; and the futures of the West and of a 
world of civilizations.  Additionally, he proposes: 1) Clashes of civilizations are 
the greatest threat to world peace, and, 2) An international order based on 
civilizations is the surest safeguard against a world war. 
Contents:  This book is organized into five sections.  I.  A World of Civilizations.  
II. The Shifting Balance of Civilizations.  III. The Emerging Order of 
Civilizations.  IV. Clashes of Civilizations.  V.  The Future of Civilizations. 
Value:  This book presents a paradigm for viewing global politics that will be 
meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers.  He presents a useful lens to 
view international developments of the early 21st century.  Samuel Huntington 
stated that Foreign Affairs editors received more discussion on this article in 1993 
than they had on any article published since 1940.  As such, it is worth 
considering the themes, and understanding the arguments, presented as threats to 
the future of world peace.  If one accepts Huntington‘s arguments, then there are 
direct implications that should be addressed in the JSPS documents and 
considered in force development.  Both the JSPS and force development are 
central to this dissertation.  
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17. The Downsized Warrior: America's Army in Transition by David McCormick 
(New York, New York: New York University Press, 1998), 266 pages. Notes and 
bibliography. 
Summary: This book examines: between 1989 and 1996, the active-duty Army 
was cut back by more than a third, from 770,000 soldiers to fewer than half a 
million.  How has the Army implemented this mandate to downsize?  What 
common threads exist between past postwar cutbacks and today's redistribution of 
the peace dividend?  How has downsizing affected morale, devotion, and 
disposition of the Army's officers, whose commitment to the institution 
profoundly determines its effectiveness?  Crucially, is it truly possible to institute 
the radical transformation that downsizing requires without affecting the Army's 
ability to fight and win the future wars?  The Army's downsizing is the story of 
both failure and success.  Unable to make a persuasive case for larger force, the 
Army's leaders energetically implemented dramatic reductions, particularly 
among the officer corps.  Downsizing of the Army is unique in that it was 
externally mandated.  Its experiences are enormously instructive for all 
organizations -- government, corporate, and nonprofit alike -- faced with the need 
to streamline their operations.  McCormick proposes a reform agenda for 
addressing the effects of downsizing and preparing the Army for the 21st century.  
His work is based on hundreds of in-depth interviews with officers across all 
ranks, senior civilians and military leaders.  He provides a definitive portrait of 
today's U.S. Army in transition, one that will transform our thinking about both 
downsizing and the military. 
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Contents:  This book has five chapters. 1) Introduction: The Legacy of 
Downsizing.  2) The Politics of Downsizing: the Dark Side of Defense Policy 
Making.  3) Reducing the Ranks: Anatomy of the Decision-Making Process.  4) 
Lean and Mean: Changing Attitudes and Behaviors in the Muddy Boots Army.  5) 
An Agenda for Reform: An Officer Corps for the 21st Century.  Epilogue: the 
Army's Future Course.   
Value:  This book has a 20 page bibliography with many relevant sources. This is 
the first book by David McCormick based on his studies at Princeton.  His 
dissertation advisor was Aaron Friedberg, who wrote In the Shadow of the 
Garrison State, which is a study of the interior dimension of American grand 
strategy during the Cold War.  McCormick‘s focus on downsizing and the active 
Army between 1989 and 1996 is clearly related to force management. His thesis 
supports many of the themes in this dissertation:―that the dramatic downsizing has 
compromised the Army's institutional health in ways not studied or completely 
understood.  Qualitative reform measures are needed to restore the Army's 
vitality.‖   Or that few understand or want to comprehend the complexity involved 
in force management.   This book illustrates the complexity and the consequences 
of force management policy decisions.  It is particularly relevant because it looks 
at dramatic cuts in an all volunteer force, as compared to dramatic cuts after 
periods of conscription. This makes his analysis more current and a source for 
greater analysis to determine applicability to current challenges.   He further 
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supports the emphasis in this dissertation that the civilian leadership of the 
military is at the center of policy decisions. 
18. The Future of the Army Profession by Don M. Snider (Boston, MA: McGraw-
Hill Custom Publishing, 2002 and 2005), 762 pages. 
Summary:  This book is a collection of 33 essays based on the research of each 
of the authors within their fields.  The essays address the majority of the 
contemporary issues that challenge the nation's military. This book was developed 
by the faculty at West Point.  It contends:  Professor Andrew Abbott in his prize-
winning book, The System of Professions, established the methodological 
framework for both the first and second research projects with his descriptive and 
analytical schema on how all professions, and would be professions - including 
the Army and other military professions, struggle within an ecology of competitor 
professions for legitimacy in doing the expert work associated with their chosen 
jurisdiction.  This framework has become the only functional and realistic means 
for the next generation of Army officers to understand the dynamics of their 
professional evolution within a larger context of all professional work and 
aspiration. This new edition amplifies the major findings of the first edition of 
2002.    
Contents:  This book is organized into seven parts.  Part One) the Study of 
Military Professions.  Part Two) Officership in the Army Profession.  Part Three) 
the Expert Knowledge of the Army Profession.  Part Four) the Army's Military 
Technical Expertise.  Part Five) the Army Profession and the Army Ethos.  Part 
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Six) the Premier Expertise – Human / Leader Development.  Part Seven) the 
Army Profession and its Political - Culture Expertise. 
Value:  This book has renewed the formal study of the Army as a vocational 
profession rather than simply as a uniformed bureaucracy after a thirty year 
hiatus.  It is a valuable reference for understanding the current challenges to the 
military profession.  It also provides a basis for understanding many of the issues 
involving policy analysis and civil-military relations covered in this dissertation. 
19. The Lexus and the Olive Tree by Thomas Friedman (New York, New York: 
Anchor Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 2000), 490 pages. 
Summary: Thomas Friedman examined the international system that is 
transforming world affairs.  He argued: globalization has replaced the Cold War 
system with integration of capital, technology, and information across national 
borders - a single global village.  Friedman explained the new electronic global 
economy and what it takes to live within it.  The Lexus and the olive tree 
symbolize the tension between globalization and the ancient forces of culture, 
geography, tradition, and community.  He also detailed the animosity that 
globalization produces among those who feel brutalized by it, and proposes what 
should be done to maintain a peaceful world balance.  Friedman stated that 
globalization is not simply a trend or a fad but is, rather an international system.  
It is the system that has now replaced the old Cold War system and has its own 
rules and logic that directly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and 
economics of virtually every country in the world.  
282 
Contents:  This book is organized into four parts.  Part One: Seeing the System.  
Part Two: Plugging into the System.  Part Three: The Backlash against the 
System.  Part Four: America and the System.   
Value:   This book provides an alternate model for analyzing international 
relations and politics.  Friedman provides much quantitative data that identified 
global trends in 2000.  As such, it is a valuable reference book for the period and 
provides valuable context for discussion of other policy issues. His thesis 
proposed that increased interdependence provides stability in the international 
state system.  This concept has national security and policy development 
implications that are central themes of this dissertation.   
20. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes, USMC (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 321 pages. 
Summary:  Hammes stated: David‘s sling and stone fight against Goliath isn't 
that far from Iraqi insurgents fighting against coalition forces.  While the DoD 
continues to build a high-tech American military to win wars against others, albeit 
second-tier, Goliaths, insurgents have adopted and are practicing sling and stone, 
low-tech, fourth generation warfare.  These fourth generation warfare warriors 
rely on networks of people versus Americas networks of state-of-the-art high-tech 
weapons.  Just as the world has evolved from an industrial society to an 
information-based society, so has warfare.  Information collection against today's 
threats requires a greater investment in human skills.  Technology by itself is not 
the answer.  The United States defense establishment‘s failure to address the 
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importance of human knowledge over that of technology leaves us as unprepared 
to deal with the kinds of wars we are fighting today and those we are most likely 
to face in the future -- fourth-generation wars.  Fourth generation war is the only 
kind of war America has ever lost, we've done so three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, 
and Somalia.  It has also defeated the Soviet Union, in Chechnya, and the French, 
in Indochina and Algeria.  Arguably fourth-generation war has been the most 
successful form of war, for our adversaries, for last 50 years. 
Value:  This book provides a plausible model for future warfare that has 
historical precedent.  Additionally, as fourth-generation warfare, as it is described, 
exploits the superpowers‘ military vulnerabilities.   Understanding this model is 
essential to determining future force capability requirements.  This book provides 
an unclassified model of potential future threats that the Department of Defense 
may have to face.  There are obvious force structure implications if one accepts 
his arguments.  Further, the model for fourth-generation warfare has been 
accepted by many senior leaders within the DoD  
21. United States Diplomatic History: the Age of Ascendancy Volume 2, Since 1900 
by Gerard Clarfield (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), 772 
pages. 
Summary: This book is a synthesis based on extensive readings. This book has 
20 chapters that cover the period 1899 to 1992.  It provides a chronological 
assessment of 20th century U.S. diplomatic history.    
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Value:  This book is a valuable reference for understanding the broad historical 
trends that made up the 20th century.  The supplementary readings provide a 
broad historiography of diplomatic history writings for each 20
th
 century 
chronological theme.    The Themes identified are: The Age of Empire, 1899 -- 
1917; World War I and its Aftermath; Between the Wars 1921 to 1939; World 
War II; the Cold War 1945 -- 1961; to the Present: Carter and Reagan.  
22. The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business by Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977).   
Summary:  Chandler states: the purpose of this book is to examine the changing 
processes of production and distribution in the United States and the ways in 
which they have been managed.   The large enterprises administered by salaried 
managers replaced the small traditional family firm as the primary instrument for 
management, production, and distribution. This book concentrates specifically on 
the rise of the modern business enterprise and its managers.  It is a history of 
business institutions and a business class. (1)  In many sectors of the economy the 
‗visible hand of management‘ replaced what Adam Smith referred to as the 
‗invisible hand of market forces‘.  The market remained a generator of demand 
for goods and services, but modern business enterprise took over the functions of 
coordinating flows of goods through existing processes of production and 
distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and 
distribution.  As a result, modern business enterprise became the most powerful 
institution in the American economy and its manager‘s the most influential group 
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of economic decision-makers.  The rise of modern business enterprise in the 
United States brought with it ―managerial capitalism‖.   This study is an attempt 
to fill a void by concentrating on a specific time and a specific set of concerns.  It 
centers on the years 1840 to 1920s -- when the agrarian, rural economy of the 
United States became industrial and urban.  These decades witnessed 
revolutionary changes in the processes and production and distribution in the 
United States.  It also examines the ways in which the unit carrying out these 
changing processes of production and distribution -- including transportation, 
communication, and finance -- were administered and coordinated.     
Value: This book is considered the seminal work on the emergence of the 
professional managerial class in American business.  This book provides valuable 
historical information about American business.   The professionalization of 
management, the development of hierarchical organizations, and the influence of 
government in regulating modern business, as described in this book, are all 
associated with the early 1950s.  However, understanding the origins of these 
broad trends in business development adds depth to my analysis of business in the 
1970s and 1980s. Specific management techniques or philosophies are not 
covered in this work.  This work is a synthesis of the economic impacts of private 
business in the period between the Civil War and the Korean War.  It Most 
closely informs Chapter Three of this dissertation. 
23. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946 – 1976 by Robert A. 
Doughty.  (Washington, D. C.: Combat Studies Institute, United States Army 
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Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and The Center 
of Military History, 1979 and 2001.  
Summary: United States Army's tactical doctrine in the generation following the 
Second World War owed its character to the influence of a number of factors.  
Doughty proposed: among these factors, national security policy, new technology, 
service branch parochialism, and actual battlefield experience, became the 
arbitrators of what Army doctrine would be.  As the Army attempted to respond 
to the shift in mission required by policy, Army doctrine writers capitalized upon 
the technological advances that spurred new potentials for firepower and mobility.  
Europe remained the focus of national defense policy concerns.  Virtual 
revolutions in tactical doctrine occurred in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and early 
1970s, as the Army shifted the focus of its doctrine from conventional to nuclear, 
to counterinsurgency, to conventional operations.  The combination of these 
changes has contributed to the modern Army tactical doctrine, now more complex 
than at any other time in American history.  The purpose of this study is to 
describe and analyze major trends in Army doctrine since World War II.  ―In 
short, intellectual changes can sometimes be more difficult to achieve than 
material changes.  One of the purposes of doctrine is to ensure common thinking, 
but when changes are necessary, that common thinking can become an obstacle to 
needed modification or improvements." (page 47). 
Value:  This book provides a detailed analysis of the actual changes in major 
policy trends from World War II to the present.  It details the considerations that 
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led to organizational and weaponry changes during the same period.  His 
investigation provides a vertical analysis of change within the Army specifically 
focused upon doctrine.  It supports the dissertation‘s claim that a horizontal (or 
holistic) approach to managing change in the Army was lacking prior to 1983 
Inspector General Report.  This book specifically informs the development of 
Chapter Three. 
24.  The Essential Drucker by Peter Drucker (New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2001). 
Summary:  Drucker states: this book contains twenty six selections on 
management in organizations, management and the individual, and management 
and society.  It is a collection from sixty years of his writings on management.  
(page VIII).  
Value:  Drucker‘s articles on management that deal with organizational design 
are especially relevant to the dissertation focus on the study of large organizations 
in the 1980s.  His numerous articles on senior executive leadership provide 
credible examples for comparison with the Army leadership of the 1980s.  He has 
several articles that deal with the structure of an organization and the importance 
of information flow - form follows function - that express the concept of 
horizontal integration and the need for a holistic approach to managing change.  
Further, his article on social transformation and changes in society provide 
valuable context on the challenges to business in the 1970s and 1980s addressed 
in the dissertation. 
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25. Peter Drucker on the Profession of Management by Peter Drucker (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Books, 1998). 
Summary:  Drucker claimed: management has become a well-established 
discipline; and the book that helped launch this discipline was The Concept of the 
Corporation, published from Drucker's study of General Motors.  Drucker 
concluded that large business enterprise had become the most important 
institution in an industrialized society, and he wanted to understand how it 
worked.  The 13 chapters of his book are divided into two distinct sections.  The 
first, called the managers responsibilities, devotes itself to the fundamental work 
of management.  Other recurring topics in this section involve effective decision-
making, the systematic practice of innovation, and the responsible management of 
people.  The second section, the executive's world, addresses the particular 
challenges of management in a knowledge economy.  Peter Drucker was among 
the first to observe the transformation of industrial economies into knowledge 
economies and to explore the implications of this change for the world of 
management.    The chapters in this book were originally published separately in 
the Harvard Business Review.  (page xiv).  
Value:  Peter Drucker is one of the most respected professors and consultants on 
business management.  His writing spans from the 1950s to present day.  This 
book provides a good basis of understanding the dominant management theories 
associated with the manager‘s responsibilities in the business world.  Numerous 
theories of management are explained in these chapters.  References are made to 
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case studies and consulting work that Drucker has accomplished over the last 45 
years.  These concrete examples provide useful illustrations for comparison 
between the military and the corporate world.  His discussion of vertical and 
horizontal organizations and the management of knowledge based organizations 
was particularly useful for analysis of the Army organizations of the 1980s in this 
dissertation. 
26. Army Inspector General Inspection Methodology by David M. Foye (Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania: United States Army War College, 1984).  
Summary: This essay analyzes the Army Inspector General Inspection 
Methodology.  It highlights three major events leading to adoption of a new 
methodology - the Inspector General Act of 1978, the finding from a Force 
Modernization Special Inspection conducted by the Department of the Army 
Inspector General Office in 1983, and a need for Inspector General follow-up to 
ensure proper resolution of inspection findings.  These events led the Army's 
leadership to adopt its current Inspector General Inspection Methodology.  This 
methodology is formally known as: the compliance/systemically inspection 
approach using the functional life cycle model of the Army.  Lastly, the study 
outlines the major steps of the newly adopted Inspector General Inspection 
Methodology and compares these steps to the previous inspection methodology 
used by Army Inspectors General. (Abstract)  
Value:  This monograph provides a detailed narrative account of the Inspector 
General Inspection Methodology before 1978; and, after 1983 when General 
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Trefry initiated the functional life cycle model training program for the Inspectors 
General of the Army.  This model provided a horizontal integration system and 
emphasized a greater awareness of the systemic interrelationships between 
various functions of the Army.  This methodology served to examine the broader 
root causes, or systemic causes, of problems.  Previous inspections documented 
noncompliance with standards and ignored the reasons for non-compliance.  This 
monograph also credits General Trefry with developing the functional life cycle 
model and points to another article in the Army Green Book written by General 
Trefry.  This horizontal integration of an organization is compared -between 
business and the Army -in the 1980s in Chapter Three of this dissertation.  
Detailed descriptions of the Inspector General Inspection Methodology also aided 
comparison of how to manage change in an organization discussed in the other 
works by Drucker, Gilmore, and others. 
27. Making a Leadership Change: How Organizations and Leaders Can Handle 
Leadership Transition Successfully by Thomas North Gilmore, (San Francisco, 
California: Jossey - Bass Publishers, 1989). 
Summary:  This book offers advice for executives and managers assuming new 
positions, and for organizations undergoing changes in leadership.  Drawing on 
his experience as consultant to top corporations and political leaders, Thomas 
North Gilmore gives practical tips on how executives in new positions can 
quickly take charge and set the stage for long-term success.   Thomas North 
Gilmore is Vice President of the Wharton Center for Applied Research, a private 
consulting firm that operates with the Wharton School of the University of 
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Pennsylvania.  He has worked with many large industrial enterprises and small 
nonprofit organizations.  He has also worked extensively in government on the 
transitions of Governors and other senior executives. 
Value:  This is a ‗how to‘ book of management.  As such, the book provides 
practical information and advice about determining the strategic objectives of a 
corporation, and developing the means to reorganize and modify an existing 
organization.  The focus of the book is on new leadership and management of an 
organization.  Within this discussion many techniques for managing change are 
proposed.  Gilmore addressed some of the challenges to organizational change as 
well as proposed some solutions.  Again, this book provides a foundation for 
discussion of comparison between management of change in large organizations, 
corporate or military.  Specifically, Chapter 12 ‗handling the inevitable 
reorganization effectively‘ explores the reasons for reorganization and proposes a 
theoretical three phase plan for designing organizations.  Many of the reasons for 
reorganization correspond to the series addressed by Peter Drucker and others in 
their books.  These models could also be applied to analyze the causes for Army 
reorganization in the 1980s. 
28. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning 
System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders by  Richard M. 
Meinhart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2003), 54 pages. 
Summary:  The JSPS is considered the primary formal means by which the CJCS 
executes his statutory responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10, U.S. 
292 
Code.  Yet, little has been written about the strategic planning system itself.  
Some of its products: such as the NMS, and Joint Visions (JV) have been 
thoroughly reviewed. Meinhart contends: one can gain great insight into the 
Chairman's formal leadership since the 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act by 
understanding how the JSPS evolved, reviewing its process, and examining all of 
its products.  Meinhart examines how three Chairmen - Generals Powell, 
Shalikashvili, and Shelton - adapted and used strategic planning to provide 
direction and shape the military in the strategic environment of the 1990s.   
The author examined four major revisions in this strategic planning system, as it 
changes from being rigid and focused on the Cold War to be more flexible, vision 
oriented, and resource focused by the decade‘s end.  The major strategic planning 
products are analyzed from both the content and process perspective to identify 
the formal role of the Chairman's leadership in developing them.  Meinhart 
proposed five broad recommendations for future senior leaders to enable them to 
better use the strategic planning system and transform their organizations.  They 
are: (1) use of the strategic planning system for revolutionary change; (2) use of 
strategic planning system for evolutionary change; (3) need for senior leaders 
vision to lead organizations; (4) need for flexibility and bureaucracy balance for 
success in strategic planning; and, (5) need for senior leaders energy and moral 
courage to execute fundamental change. 
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Value:  This monograph has useful background information about the origins of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  The endnotes provided useful references to 
primary documents that were examined to better understand the discussion 
surrounding the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.   This 
work also referenced several books that dealt with: 1) Congress and the politics of 
defense reform, and, 2) Strategic defense planning.  The author conducted 
interviews with the three former Chairmen while researching this effort.  This 
study provided valuable research material and insight about the JSPS system that 
emerged in the 1980s that is central to my research. 
29. Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 to 2005 by 
Richard M. Meinhart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 
2006), 35 pages. 
Summary:  This is an update of the previous published monograph, Chairman 
Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 
1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders, By Dr. Meinhart.  This 
monograph includes information about Gen Shelton and the changes to the Joint 
Strategic Planning System (JSPS) since 2000.  It does not cover the recent 
changes of CJCSI 3100.01B to the JSPS. 
Value:  This monograph has useful background information about the origins of 
the JSPS System and the changes that have occurred since 2000.  Again, the fifty 
seven endnotes provided useful references to primary documents that were 
examined to better appreciate the JSPS. 
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30. Inspector General Inspection Report dated 1 March 1983 - Functional Life 
Cycle Model of the Army: Introduction. (Washington, D.C.: Inspector General of 
the Army, 1983).  
Summary:  This book explains the Functional Life Cycle Model of the Army that 
was developed by the Inspector General Agency in March of 1983.  It is the result 
of: an Army Inspector General Modernization Inspection; and, the new inspector 
general inspection methodology.  It presents a model to determine the systemic 
causes of noncompliance with Army standards and regulations. It is arranged as 
an instructor guide for a program of instruction consisting of twelve major 
sections of the functional life cycle model of the Army.  As stated: ―the purpose 
of this book is to provide the required foundation of knowledge of the functions 
and operations of the Army in order to ensure a more cohesive and disciplined 
approach to the assessment of organizational needs.‖  (page 27). 
Value:  The development of the functional Life Cycle model of the Army tells the 
story of how the Army in the 1980s designed a systemic means to manage 
modernization.  The Army Inspector General Agency was at the center of this 
initiative.  This report provided a detailed explanation of this model and how to 
apply it within the Army to identify systemic problems or opportunities for 
greater efficiencies.  Understanding this model is a prerequisite for further 
comparison to the dominant corporate management theories of the 1980s. Central 
to this model is an understanding of the interrelationships between actions and 
processes within the Army.  These concepts are similar to a holistic view required 
of senior organizational executives.  This model is similar to the business concept 
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of horizontal integration.  This model was adopted by the senior leadership of the 
Army to manage modernization in the 1980s and is still in use today.  LTG 
Trefry‘s involvement in the development of this model is a major finding of this 
dissertation.  
31. US Army Material Command: Project Management in the Army Material 
Command, 1962 – 1987 by Herbert A.  Leventhal (Virginia: United States Army 
Material Command, 1992). 
Summary:  This book provides a history of the Army Material Command (AMC) 
and the evolution of Project Managers in the Army.  In short Leventhal stated:  
AMC had been the primary user of project managers within the Army from early 
1960s to the late 1980s.  Prior to the 1962 establishment of AMC, project 
management had been used by industry, by the Navy to develop the Polaris 
missile, by the Air Force to manage a variety of systems, and, by the Army to 
construct the Jupiter missile.  It was introduced to AMC by its first commander 
General Frank Besson who drew especially on the example of the Air Force 
Special Projects Office in which individuals were given substantial amount of 
authority over specific items of equipment. Subsequent commanders were 
concerned about the need to limit the use of project manager programs and 
integrated them into normal command channels.  In addition to efforts to reduce 
the number of programs, there were also strong efforts to reduce their autonomy. 
(page X)   This trend was abruptly reversed by the implementation of the Packard 
Commission Report of 1986.  Most project management programs moved 
completely out of AMC and into the Army Secretariat for management.  Another 
296 
major trend throughout the history of the project manager program was the effort 
to normalize the selection of the project managers. 
Value:  The history of project management and the Army Material Command 
provides valuable background information about the vertical orientation of project 
management within the Army between 1962 and 1987.  Their examples of project 
management are valuable illustrations that this dissertation compared and 
contrasted with the corporate management techniques contained in the other 
readings.  In 1987 the Packard Commission results were implemented.  They 
established an under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Program Executive 
Offices within each of the Service and DOD Secretariats.  This simplified the 
chain of command for all project managers.  Although the structure was 
simplified, it nevertheless was still a vertical organization. This study adds to the 
knowledge of military material management and supports this dissertation finding 
that management of change within the Army occurred along vertical lines.  
32. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series - The Army of Excellence: the 
Development of the 1980s Army by John L. Romjue (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 
Historical Office United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982). 
 
Summary:   The Office of the Command Historian prepared the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Historical Monograph to provide planners, action 
officers, and researchers in the Army with a critical, documented evaluation of the 
design and development of the 1980s Army.  Romjue Summarized: this volume 
addressed the completed Army 86 design work and examined the origins and the 
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development of the Army of Excellence during 1983, including the conceptual 
formulation of the Infantry division.  The originator and dominating influence 
upon the Army of Excellence was General John A. Wickham Jr., Chief of Staff of 
the Army from 1983 to 1987, whose difficult decisions affecting the light and 
heavy divisions - while controversial at different levels - met the Army's twin 
strategic challenges of the early 1980s: the defense of NATO Europe, and the 
provision of rapidly deployable light infantry force package to defend United 
States interests worldwide.  It was the achievement of the Army of Excellence 
that provided a balanced force at an acceptable level of risk within limited 
resource constraints.  This study attempts to present for future Army planners a 
record of the significant contribution to the security of the nation and to the 
ending of the Cold War. (Foreword). 
Value:  This study contains detailed information about the changes in doctrine, 
organizations, and material developed between the 1970s and 1980s.  Detailed 
studies are referenced that document the history of these three themes.  This study 
provides valuable background information and supports this dissertation assertion 
that no consolidated "macro" level study has been conducted that includes the 
Army Functional Life Cycle Model.  This historical monograph portrays the 
needs for the Army to modernize prior to 1980 and documents the doctrinal 
development of the organizations required to support the Army of Excellence.  
There is no mention in Romjue‘s study about the Inspector General's Report or its 
potential impacts.  this study contains substantial background information on the 
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fielding of the big five and potential influence the fielding had on the Chief of 
Staff‘s of the Army. (Chief of Staff of the Army General Edward C. Meyer (1979 
-- 1983); General John A. Wickham Jr.  (1983 -- 1987); and, General Carl E. 
Vouno 1989). 
33. Readings in Strategic Management by Thompson, Arthur A. Jr., A.J. Strickland 
III, and Tracy Robertson Kramer (Boston, Massachusetts: McGraw Hill, 1998). 
 
Summary:  The whole strategic management cycle - from defining the business, 
to crafting a strategy, to implementation and execution, to evaluation of results, to 
reformulation and fine-tuning the game plan - is being intensively scrutinized by 
practitioners, consultants, and business school academics.  Readings in Strategic 
Management provides a blend of contemporary and landmark oracles of the 
theory and practice of strategic management.  This edition contains forty three 
articles.  The readings are of two types.  One type consists of a standard length 
article from first-tier journals, and provides in-depth treatment of important topics 
covered in most business policy strategy text.  The second type includes shorter 
goals drawn from practitioners that emphasize how strategic management 
concepts and tools were applied to actual practice.  Together the two types of 
readings provide an effective and efficient vehicle for reinforcing and expanding 
case study treatments to include a flavor of both current literature and 
management applications.  The forty three readings are grouped into five sections 
-- each of which represents one of the major building blocks of strategic 
management.  At the beginning of these grouping is a brief overview of the topics 
covered and how each article fits into the scheme and structure of strategy 
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management.  The topic areas covered include: creating and sustaining corporate 
vision; mission strategic content; and, business definitions and strategic planning.  
The second group of eleven articles deals with analyzing and crafting business 
strategy.  The third section is concerned with strategic analysis and diversified 
companies in the formation and management of strategic alliances.  The fourth 
group of articles surveys the ins and outs of effective strategy implementation and 
execution.  The final section concerns business ethics and social responsibility. 
(iv). 
Value:  Each of the five sections of the book contains valuable information about 
corporate strategy development.  Specifically, the articles on strategy formulation 
and the difficulties in managing change are applicable to this dissertation‘s 
comparison of how change is conducted within the military and the corporate 
world.  Although many of these articles were written in the 1990s, they deal with 
the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s and provide background and context about 
the dominant changes in management theory during this period.    Chapter four on 
managing strategy and implementation is the most applicable to this dissertation.  
34. Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political, and Cultural Dynamics by 
Knoll M. Tichy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983). (The senior editors are 
Edward Lawler and Stanley Seashore.)   
 
Summary:  This series on organizational assessment and change is concerned 
with all aspects of the debate on how an organization should be managed, 
changed, and controlled.  This volume addresses issues of organizational 
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assessment and change at a very broad level.  It focuses upon organizational 
response to change in the environment or in managerial priorities that require 
changes of the organizational design - changes that are substantial and the affects 
are often irreversible.  The author proposed a model of organizational functioning 
that incorporates factors commonly overlooked, or undervalued by managers 
under the stress of approaching critical organizational designs.  This analysis 
includes case studies.  It is a ‗how-to book‘ as well as one that offers a broad 
theoretical framework and orientation.  It is an invitation to scholars to rethink 
their ways of studying the processes of organizational transformation.  (Preface)  
Three major foci with regard to change management: (1) technical aspects of 
work, (2) power, and (3) values.  These correspond to the three strands -- 
technical, political, and cultural -- of the strategic model presented in Chapter 1. 
(X). Tichy further argued: contemporary change management practice is limited 
because managers and consultants tend to focus attention on a restricted set of 
organizational change levers.  Some always restructure the organization.  Others 
always try to improve communication.  Others always replace people.  Others 
always alter production and control systems.  Some see change solely as a 
technical problem, others see it as a political problem, and still others see it as a 
cultural problem.  By limiting their viewpoint, they limit their use of different 
change levers.  All three sets of problems require management.  In order to 
strategically manage change, dependence upon nine change levers must be 
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equally available for use. Very few managers and consultants are trained to work 
with all levers.  This book attempts to help managers acquire that training.  (7). 
Value:  This book provides a holistic approach to managing strategic change.  It 
provides an alternative model to compare and contrast with the Army Functional 
Life Cycle Model.  Noel Tichy worked on this book for ten years.  He stressed the 
importance of horizontal integration to affecting change within an organization.  
He modified his approach dramatically after hands-on experience working with 
hospital organizations in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  He 
stressed the importance of including all aspects of technical, political, and cultural 
dynamics in developing strategic level change.  He asserted, change consultants 
previously focused on the technical, the political, or the cultural dynamics of an 
organization, but none focused on incorporating all three aspects.  Further, he 
claimed, few consultants or scholars understand the comprehensive nature of all 
three of these elements.  He argued, technical management expertise is needed for 
specific change to be effective.  This expertise is only gained by attending 
specialized training.  Similarly, the Army developed a Force Management School 
and the Force Management specialty branch.  This book was published in 1983.  
This book came from the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Training 
Center.  Further research of this center has not revealed any other sources 
pertinent to this study.  However, future research in management may find this 
resource valuable.  This book is part of a series on organizational assessment and 
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change.  It is a valuable intellectual history of the management of organizational 
change in the 1970s and 1980s. 
303 
Articles 
“The Army Force Management Update,” Quarterly Newsletter of the 
Army Force Management School, July 2007.  Fort Belvoir, VA. 
Summary:  This newsletter provides an update of the current changes in the field 
of force management.  Project officers provide summaries of new developments 
within their fields. For example, Mr. John Walsh described the changes to repeal 
the requirement for a two-year budget cycle for the Department of Defense from 
the National Defense Authorization Act FY 1986.
 435
 
Value: This newsletter tracks current developments that affect the field of force 
management.  Specifically, the referenced change to the repeal of a biennial 
budget submission should have lasting impacts on the current force development 
process.  In 2007, Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Schoomaker for the first time 
did not submit a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) ‗Army budget 
proposal‘ because he believed he could not comply with the resource constraints 
imposed by the Department of Defense.  He demonstrated that the Army needed 
much more money in the base budget, rather than supplemental budgets, for the 
war.  He presented the Army requirements to the President and the Congress 
without a POM submission.  This was an unprecedented act and provides valuable 
insight to the force management process addressed in this dissertation. 
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 See the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate Report 110-77, National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, ―Repeal of requirement for two-year budget cycle for 
the Department of Defense‖, p. 388, June 5, 2007. 
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“The Defense Readiness Reporting System: a New Tool for Force 
Management” by Laura Junor.  Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44, first quarter 
2007.  Page 30-33. 
 
Summary:  How does DoD measure the ability of the Armed Forces to execute a 
broad range of missions?  The sustained demand for forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan make it challenging to find units that are both suitable and available 
for deployment.  It also underscores the importance of understanding residual 
force capability should another crisis occur.  In the spring of 2000 to the Office of 
Secretary of Defense formally announced plans to create the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) to promote real change in how the Department of 
Defense thinks about, plans for, and assesses, the ability of the Armed Forces to 
conduct operations.  When complete, the Defense Readiness Reporting System 
(DRRS) will be a network of applications that provides force managers at all 
levels the tools and information to respond to emerging crisis, and the ability to 
assess the risks of conducting such operations.
436
  The Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) is a major transformation, moving the focus of force 
managers from reporting unit readiness to managing force capabilities.  
Specifically, it represents a shift from resources to capabilities, deficiencies to 
their implications, units to combined forces, and front-line units to all units 
contributing to combat operations.  Force managers must be able to define 
capabilities and understand implications.  Defense Readiness Reporting System 
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 The Defense Readiness Reporting System: a New Tool for Force Management‖ by Laura 
Junor.  Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44, first quarter 2007.  31. 
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(DRRS) using ESORTS (secure electronic reporting of unit capabilities and 
status) will provide much needed visibility to enable deployment management and 
force management.  Bottom line:  this system will provide readiness visibility at 
all levels to inform planners at all levels of the availability of forces for 
operations. 
Value: This article highlights the challenges facing force providers to understand 
unit capabilities and readiness.  This system (DEERS) is an attempt to improve 
visibility of readiness through all components to enable efficient employment of 
resources to meet mission requirements.  Improved visibility and reporting 
efficiency effects force management by enabling consideration of smaller or 
fewer organizations to accomplish defense missions.  Rather than tasking a larger 
unit, specific elements can be mobilized for a mission.   A point still remains 
where mission requirements can exceed capabilities but, increased efficiency is 
desirable.   Visibility to enable smaller unit tasking however, may create new 
leadership or support challenges.  Increased visibility may lead to changes in the 
force sizing construct or assignment policies that should be a topic of future 
research. 
“The Successes of Global Force Management in Joint Force Providing”, by 
Michael Ferriter and Jay Burdon, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 44, first quarter 
2007.  Page 44-46. 
Summary:  Implementation of the Global Force Management (GFM) construct 
and associated joint force provider (JFP) has changed the assignment, allocation, 
and apportionment of forces into a predictive, streamlined, and integrated process.  
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United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Service components, Service 
headquarters, and Combatant Commands, now can bring the Secretary of Defense 
sourcing recommendations from the global pool of available resources and 
augment those recommendations with assessments of current and future readiness.  
This enables the Secretary to make proactive, risk informed force management 
decisions - by integrating the three processes to facilitate alignment of operational 
forces against known allocation and apportionment requirements - in advance of 
planning and deployment timelines. 
Value: This article explains the joint force provider process and the problems that 
it was established to resolve.  This is the evolving system that the Joint force has 
used to provide the SecDef risk informed sourcing solutions to meet our near-term 
military requirements. 
“What the Past Teaches about the Future” by Max Boot, Joint Forces 
Quarterly, Issue 44, First Quarter 2007.  Page 109 - 116. 
Summary:  While the United States has been dominant so far in the information 
age, there is no guarantee that this streak will continue.  A challenger, whether 
rival states such as China or even Nonstate groups such as Al Qaeda, could use 
new ways of war to alter the balance of power.  Cheap to produce and easy to 
disseminate - germs, chemicals, cyber viruses - are particularly well-suited for the 
weak to use against the strong.  History is full of super powers failing to take 
advantage of important revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).  Max Boot warned 
against complacency because historically, dominant powers are eventually 
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toppled.  He further warned that too much change creates a similar phenomenon 
that can lead to a great power's downfall.  He claimed that the possibility of 
conventional interstate war is lower today than at any other time in the past 500 
years, but it has not disappeared altogether.  The boundaries are blurring between 
conventional and unconventional war, regular and irregular war.  Nonstate groups 
are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the 
exclusive preserve of states.  He argued that future wars may resemble a series of 
terrorist attacks or hit-and-run raids rather than, traditional force on force 
armored, aerial, or naval engagements.  
Value: This article gets to the root of question related to the force management 
issues in this dissertation; what are the military capabilities required for future 
war?  Many other works provide conflicting concepts of how nations will fight 
wars in the future.  Correspondingly, there are conflicting visions of future 
military capabilities required.  The Sling and the Stone (T.X. Hammes) is 
mentioned as a similar book to examine.   Future warfare is a broad field that has 
force management and policy implications.  Assumptions about the nature of 
warfare, the threats, and the employment of forces should drive the future military 
capabilities required.  
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Monographs 
An Analysis of the Department of Defense Strategic Management Process by 
Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Graves, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania 17013. 7 June 1976.  115 pages.  
Abstract: This study examined the factors which impact the top-level 
management processes within the DoD.  It is based on readings, studies, 
interviews, questionnaires, and lectures.  The body of this paper contains a review 
of the relevant management theory, an outline of the formal defense management 
process, and an analysis of data collected.  Due to the broad scope of the subject, 
the conclusions take the form of a working hypothesis; the study then 
recommends specific areas for further study.  Among the primary hypothesis are a 
lack of effective long range and contingency planning, and absence of an 
articulated and perceived code of values, and an adversarial relationship between 
key participants in the Department of Defense short-circuits rational decision 
making.  Recommendations for further study include: creating a specific 
functional area for planning; eliminating the Service Secretaries; revising the Joint 
Strategic Planning System (JSPS); an immediate goal to streamline and sanitize 
the organization; and, the establishment of a firm set of values.   
Content: Chapter 1) Introduction; Chapter 2) Theoretical Considerations; Chapter 
3) The Department of Defense Management Design; Chapter 4) Interpretation, 
Analysis and Presentation of Data; Chapter 5) Hypothesis and Recommendations; 
Footnotes.  Bibliography.  
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Value:  This paper predates the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986.  Joint processes 
have evolved significantly since 1976.  Graves examined managerial theory 
(management by objectives, Mintzberg‘s theories, Maslow‘s theory, Galbrieths‘s 
complex organizations, and Rosenzweig‘s systems approach).  This discussion 
and related bibliography depicts the literature available in the seventies.  Some 
significant timeless concepts appear in this study: 1) a steep learning curve is 
required for action officer‘s to learn about the PPBES (page 47); 2) There is an 
inherent friction noted between Service budgets and Combatant Command 
requirements; 3) The time compressed budget process hampers optimal decision 
making.  This study includes an obvious pessimistic bias about budget specialists 
and the budget process.  The target group of 19 officers included then COL Peter 
Dawkins.  The survey used to gather the group responses is included in the 
monograph, but the responses are not. 
JCS Planning: Assessment and Recommendations by Lieutenant Commander 
Rocky D. Kropp., September 1989.  Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, the Co-advisors Nancy C. Roberts and James J. Tritten. (Master‘s 
thesis.)  
Abstract:  Strategic planning by the JCS has been a source of criticism about the 
lack of quality and timely military advice provided to the National Command 
Authorities (NCA).  The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act made organizational 
changes to help solve joint planning problems, but failed to address other 
functional problems such as: 1) the lack of Presidential participation in planning; 
2) the lack of recognition of strategic role of today's information technology in 
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joint strategic planning; and, 3) the lack of training and experienced planning 
officers.  This thesis provides a high-level overview of both the JSPS, currently 
being revised, and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
designed to improve deliberate planning for unified and specified commanders.  
Conclusions and recommendations are given to address the DoD‘s decentralized 
and incompatible planning systems currently in use, and to improve the flow of 
information from the CJCS to the President. 
Content:  1) Introduction.  Research questions, problems, changes, analysis.  
Structure of thesis, methodology.  2) Description of JCS planning process.  A) 
DOD planning officials.  B) JCS planning process. C) Deliberate planning.  3) 
Problems with JCS planning process.  A) Structural and procedural causes.  B) 
Information technology causes.  4) Planning process changes.  A) DOD planning 
officials.  B) Midrange planning.  C) Deliberate planning.  5) Analysis and 
discussion of military planning.  A) Anticipated improvements.  B) Remaining 
problem.  6) Conclusions and Recommendations.  A) Research questions.  B) 
Thesis findings.  C) Recommendations. 
Value: This report provides the background behind the Goldwater Nichols 1986 
Defense Reorganization Act.  It also referenced the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) report that stressed the necessity for change in 
defense reorganization.  Much of the information gathered for this report came 
from a JOPES conference held at the Armed Forces Staff College 15 through 19 
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July 1989.  In constructing this report, only one participant from the Joint Staff 
was able to communicate via the defense data net (DDN) which was the 
forerunner of the Internet.  (Page 9).  The Joint Staff Officers Guide is referenced 
for background information and definitions.  Structural and procedural causes of 
problems identified are: 1) lack of policy direction from the president; 2) 
overemphasis on budgeting; 3) decentralized structure; 4) functional 
organizational structure; 5) lack of integration; 6) bypassing formal process; (Page 
39 contains a summary of the changes proposed by Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986).  This report focuses on the information technology solutions that can help 
improve joint cooperation in planning for the DoD.  Each of the Goldwater - 
Nichols proposals is evaluated to demonstrate how to correct a deficiency 
identified in this report.  Note: References to review for further study: Joint 
Planning (National Defense University in the Armed Forces Staff College); the 
Joint Staff Officers Guide 1988 (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 
1988); Report to the Committee of Armed Services, United States Senate; 
Defense Organization: the Need for Change Gardner, J.R., Rachlin, R., Sweeney, 
H.WA. (Editors) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 October 
1985); Handbook of Strategic Planning (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1986). 
 
 
